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Abstract 
Value Chain (VC) approach has been widely applied in developing countries to promote eco-
nomic growth particularly of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and rural pro-
ducers. Many cases have shown that VC upgrading is strongly determined by the prevailing 
governance structure. However, hitherto the discussion on VC governance has been limited 
mainly on coordination, regulation, technology, and power; whereas socio-cultural aspects, 
albeit influential in determining individual behaviour, are mentioned en passant or totally ne-
glected. Thus, this study calls for the extension of governance concept by introducing a wider 
institutional perspective incorporating regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements 
to portray a more realistic picture of the interaction between VC operators. Then, it applies the 
extended concept in case studies of dairy VCs in Indonesia, comparing the governance of suc-
cessful and unsuccessful upgrading cases. Using an exploratory procedure, data were col-
lected from observations, interviews, and author’s own experiences involved in a practical VC 
promotion project. The causalities between VC governance and upgrading are explained using 
the qualitative approach of Macro-Micro Model to accentuate the role of VC operators, their 
perception, and selected action in the upgrading processes. The results show that regulations 
and their effective enforcement are necessary; but also social relations, values, and norms, as 
well as orientation, common practices, and habit exert strong influences on determining the 
behaviour of and thus the interdependency between VC operators. Hence, further VC re-
searches in similar context, i.e. rural areas where socio-cultural aspects are more influential, 
are to systematically integrate the extended concept of governance into the analysis in order to 
generate explanation, prediction, and technical recommendation on the facilitation of upgrad-
ing processes. 
Keywords: value chain, governance, upgrading, development cooperation, institution, 
methodological individualism, socio-cultural factors, subsistence. 
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Abstrakt 
In vielen Entwicklungsländern findet Wertschöpfungskettenansatz (WSK-Ansatz) verbreitete 
Anwendung zur Wirtschaftsförderung von Kleinst-, Klein-, und Mittelunternehmen sowie 
ländlichen Produzenten. Viele Studien belegten, dass WSK-Upgrading von der vorherrschen-
den WSK-Governance stark abhängt. Jedoch beschränkten sich Diskussionen über WSK-
Governance bisher auf Themen wie Koordinierung, Regulierung, Technologie, und Macht. 
Soziokulturelle Aspekte, die auf das individuelles Verhalten starke Einflüsse ausüben, wurde 
en passant erwähnt bzw. vollständig ignoriert. Aus diesem Grunde erweitert diese Studie das 
Governancekonzept durch die Einbeziehung institutioneller Perspektive, die regulative, nor-
mative, und kulturell-kognitive Elemente beinhaltet. Diese Erweiterung wird in den Fallstu-
dien von Milch-WSK in Indonesien angewendet. Dabei wird die WSK mit erfolgreichen und 
erfolglosen Upgradingsresultaten verglichen. Mit einer explorativen Vorgehensweise werden 
Daten durch Beobachtungen, Interviews sowie den eigenen praktischen Erfahrungen in einem 
WSK-Förderungsprojekt gesammelt. Die Kausalität zwischen WSK-Governance und –
Upgrading wird anhand der qualitativen Herangehensweise des Makro-Mikro-Modells erklärt. 
Dabei werden die Role von WSK-Operatoren, ihre Wahrnemung, und ihr Entscheidungsver-
halten in dem Upgradingsprozess akzentuiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen dass Regulierung und 
ihre effektive Durchsetzung von entscheidender Bedeutung sind. Paralel dazu haben aber ge-
sellschaftliche Beziehungen, Werte, und Normen sowie Orientierung und Gewohnheit beson-
ders starke Einflussnahme auf das individuelle Verhalten und somit die Interdependenz zwi-
schen WSK-Operatoren. Deswegen sollen weitere Studien in ähnlichem Kontext, nämlich im 
ländlichen Raum wo soziokulturelle Aspekte von größerem Belang sind, das erweiterte Go-
vernancekonzept in die WSK-Analyse integrieren, um verbesserte Erklärung, Voraussage, 
und technische Empfehlung über die Förderung der Upgradingsprozesse zu generieren. 
Schlagworte: Wertschöpfungskette, Governance, Upgrading, Entwicklungszusam-
menarbeit, Institution, methodologischer Individualismus, soziokulturelle Faktoren, 
Subsistenz. 
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1 Introduction 
Value Chain Approach or Analysis (VCA) has been advancing since the end of the last mil-
lennium as one of the most-used methods in analysing economic development (Kaplinsky et 
al. 2001). The context where VCA has been widely applied was the rising influences of global 
economy unto, particularly, the economy of developing countries. Several trends character-
ised this context. First, globalisation does not only provide opportunity for sustainable eco-
nomic and income growth, but also pose risks and losses upon countries integrated into global 
economy. Hence, there is a need for an approach designated to analyse and manage the suc-
cessful insertion into global economy. Second, there is an emerging phenomenon of industrial 
patterns with intensive vertical coordination that are placed between vertical integration and 
spot-market relationship. Lead firms need to systematically coordinate their supply chains 
across borders, transmitting product and process information along the chain to ensure homo-
geneous product quality – often with increasing complexity – and reliable delivery. This re-
quires a certain degree of control over other firms in the supply chains, yet without aspiring to 
gain ownership control of them (Altenburg 2006a, p. 498; Altenburg 2006b, pp. 493–494). 
Third, various process and product standards / certification have been of particular importance 
in recent years. They even became basic prerequisites of market access in several countries. 
This condition challenges firms to more intensively manage, coordinate and control their 
value chains so as to meet the market requirements (Humphrey 2006, pp. 1–6). 
Apart from the use in academic researches, VCA has been widely employed in practical field 
of development cooperation. Development agencies1 apply VCA in various forms and in 
combination with other concepts as an instrument in planning / assessing, implementing, and 
conducting monitoring and evaluation of development projects. Its application primarily aims 
at the economic promotion of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in developing 
countries in adherence to MDG’s goal to eradicate poverty. A particular feature of VCA is the 
focus analysis on VC governance which is generally associated with the relationship between 
                                                 
1 For the list of donor agencies employing VCA see the website of Donor Committee for Enterprise Develop-
ment, Working Group on Linkages and Value Chains on http://www.value-
chains.org/dyn/bds/bdssearch.otherBDSsites?p_lang=en 
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firms along the value chain – the VC operators. Main issues in VC governance are, inter alia, 
coordination, communication or transmission of information, distribution of (market) power, 
and collaboration. But of particular importance is the influence of VC governance in deter-
mining VC upgrading, i.e. improvements toward stronger competitiveness and higher value-
added.  
1.1 Problem statement 
The discussion of VC governance and upgrading, however, has been focusing mainly on eco-
nomic aspects. In his previous research on the application of VCA in development coopera-
tion Nugraha (2007), the author concluded that whether a value chain upgrades itself or de-
velops through external facilitation is not solely a matter of identifying market opportunities 
and exploiting them through innovations or improved cooperation; but rather, there were par-
ticular socio-cultural factors exerting strong influences on the decision making and action of 
individuals. The ignorance of socio-cultural factors results from the fact that most researchers 
employing VCA rest upon ‘homo oeconomicus’ – neo-classical economics’ underlying as-
sumption about human behaviour. The generalisation of such pre-assumption, however, 
should be put into question. While it may be applicable to VC operators of highly commer-
cialised, globally operating value chains; economic decisions and actions of individuals in 
rural areas of developing countries – that mainly are predominated by economic activities in 
agricultural sector – are influentially shaped by the prevailing socio-cultural context. In this 
respect, socio-cultural factors may hinder or support the development of the value chains. 
Hence, this situation gives a strong impetus to the identification of socio-cultural elements 
influencing the behaviour of VC operators and to the explanation of how the behaviour of VC 
operators, in turn, affects VC upgrading measures. 
1.2 Objectives 
The main objectives of the research are, first, to extend the existing concept of VC govern-
ance by incorporating socio-cultural factors; and, second, to explain the phenomena of differ-
ent upgrading outcomes based on the extended concept of VC governance. For the first objec-
tive, a broader conception of institution is introduced to reveal important socio-cultural 
elements influencing the economic behaviour of VC operators. For the second objective, the 
explanation employs the approach of methodological individualism to stress the role of both 
social structure and individuals in sociological explanation. In order to achieve the objectives, 
the research particularly attempts to: 
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 analyse and discuss the general concept of governance and specifically the existing con-
cepts of VC governance advanced by different researchers, 
 identify institutional theory appropriate for the integration of socio-cultural factors into the 
concept of VC governance, 
 illuminate how the extended concept of VC governance shapes the perceptions of VC op-
erators as individuals who in turn select particular actions, 
 elucidate how the actions of VC operators influence each others in dynamic processes of 
interdependencies which leads to certain VC performance, 
 make recommendations on the extension of the conceptual framework of VCA based on 
the research results. 
1.3 Structure of the book 
The next chapter clarifies the definition of VC upgrading and governance. As the concept of 
governance plays a central role throughout the study, the basic notion and use of the term 
‘governance’ in general is first described. Then, the term ‘value chain governance’ is exam-
ined in more detail by identifying other terms associated with it and comparing the defini-
tions, emphases as well as typology of VC governance posited by researchers from different 
academic background. 
Chapter 3 presents the research framework. In the first part diverse concepts on institution 
proposed by scholars from economics, political science, and sociology are briefly reviewed to 
provide sound basis for the theoretical framework. These contributions are summarised in the 
omnibus definition of institution advanced by Scott (2008) encompassing the regulative, nor-
mative, and cultural-cognitive institutional pillars. The theoretical framework is then opera-
tionalised using the analytical framework of methodological individualism, particularly 
Macro-Micro Model as posited by Coleman (1990) and Esser (1999). 
Chapter 4 concerns the research process and design. First, the characteristics of the research 
are briefly described. The second sub-chapter delineates the model of research process and 
design applied in the study, justifying the scientific approach taken in the empirical study. The 
third sub-chapter informs the application of the model in the actual empirical study. 
Chapter 5 provides background information about Indonesia and characterises the overall 
situation of dairy sub-sector in South-East Asia, including the current situation and retrospec-
tive development of production, consumption, export and import in the region. A particular 
emphasis is given on the position of Indonesia on the regional level. 
  4 
Chapter 6 presents the first part of the value chain analysis, i.e. the analysis of end product 
and end market. Of particular importance are the segmentation of products and markets and 
their characteristics, the situation and trend of demand and price, and the influence of interna-
tional policy. 
Chapter 7 deals with the second part of the value chain analysis, namely the analysis of VC 
operators ranging from input suppliers, dairy farmers, cooperatives, to dairy processing indus-
tries (DPIs). The policy environment of Indonesian dairy VC also receives an attention here, 
since it has influential role in the development of dairy VC in Indonesia. 
Chapter 8 describes the dairy VCs to be compared. The three production centres to be exam-
ined are categorised into lesser and higher-performing interaction system. These are charac-
terised based on their contrasting end conditions. Considering the complexity of the upgrad-
ing issues of interaction system, the chapter closes with a modification of the visual 
presentation of Macro-Micro Model to enhance the legibility of the model. 
Chapters 9 and 10 explain the causal relations between the prevailing governance and eco-
nomic performance of the observed chain links, namely the interaction system DPIs – coop-
eratives and cooperatives – dairy farmers. The analysis starts with a brief overview of the his-
torical development of the VC operators. Then, the governance structure of the lesser and 
higher-performing interaction system is described based on the institutional pillars. The causal 
relationships between the governance and the performance of the chain link (the macro vari-
ables) are explicated based on the subjective perception and selected action of the different 
categories of VC operators (the micro variables). 
Chapter 11 closes the study with the reflection of the research results and the application of 
the research framework. The last sub-chapter provides a short discussion on the relevance of 
the study for development cooperation and the recommendation on the extension of the con-
ceptual framework of value chain analysis. 
  5
2 Value Chain Upgrading and Governance 
This chapter, first, clarifies the definition and typology of VC upgrading. The second sub-
chapter examines the term ‘governance’ used in general and the concept behind it. The subse-
quent sub-chapters specifically discuss the definitions of VC governance as proposed by dif-
ferent researchers. Here, a wide range of other terms associated with VC governance are de-
scribed. The last part concerns the typologies of VC governance. 
2.1 Value chain upgrading 
First of all, it is important to clarify the definition of ‘upgrading’. In general, literatures in 
value chain researches, e.g. Humphrey et al. (2004), Gibbon (2001), and Morris (2001), 
agreed on the typology of upgrading as defined in Kaplinsky et al. (2001, p. 38) (see Figure 
2-1 for illustration): 
 
Figure 2-1 Illustration of upgrading typology 
Source: own compilation 
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i. Process upgrading (U1): Enhancing the efficiency of processes and procedures – e.g. of 
value-adding activities, production organisation, cost efficiency, productivity, and infor-
mation flow – by, for example, introducing innovative production technology or improv-
ing coordination and communication. Process upgrading can take place both within an in-
dividual or between chain functions or links. 
ii. Product upgrading (U2): Transforming an old product into a new product with higher 
quality, value, and thus price. For example, vegetable farmers shift the production of con-
ventional vegetables designated for traditional markets unto organic vegetables designated 
for supermarkets. Product upgrading also includes the introduction of a completely new, 
more sophisticated product line. 
iii. Functional upgrading (U3): Assuming or acquiring value-adding activities from the sub-
sequent or previous chain function. For example, by forming association producers per-
forms a collective marketing, thereby taking over this value-adding activity from the trad-
ers.  The introduction of new value-adding activities is also regarded as functional 
upgrading, for example when apparel producers design their own product instead of imi-
tating other products. 
iv. Chain upgrading or inter-sectoral upgrading1 (U4): Moving into another new value 
chain or (sub-) sector by establishing business linkages with new suppliers and buyers. 
Kaplinsky et al. (2001) highlighted the necessity of seeing upgrading as a rent-creating activ-
ity and thus upgrading should always stand in comparison to what the competitors or rivals 
are doing or possessing. Moreover, he also called for a distinction between upgrading as on-
going practices (process oriented) – e.g. improved production design – in comparison to per-
formance output (result oriented) – e.g. lower product cost. Other authors like Humphrey 
(2006) accentuated the role of flow of information, knowledge transfer, and technical assis-
tance – which can be provided by actors within the chain or outside – as the determinant fac-
tor for upgrading; whereas Morris (2001) underlined the role of improved inter-firm relation-
                                                 
1 Instead of ‘chain upgrading’ Humphrey et al. (2004) uses the term ‘inter-sectoral upgrading’ for this specific 
type of upgrading to, perhaps, introduce a more precise term and avoid ambiguity with the generally used term 
‘chain upgrading’. 
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ship or cooperation among them. Despite these minor differences in emphases2, value chain 
upgrading can thus be summarised in a broader definition of: 
[...] what the actors in a value chain must do to become more competitive and to generate 
greater value added in the future. The joint improvement of the value chain by private enter-
prises and their associations is called “value chain upgrading”. (Springer-Heinze 2007d, p. 2) 
2.2 Governance: A widely-used term 
In English dictionaries (Walter 2008; Soanes et al. 2005) the word ‘governance’ means 
the act or manner of governing, (technical) the activity of governing a country or controlling 
a company or an organisation; the way in which a country is governed or a company or institu-
tion is controlled; 
while the word ‘govern’ means 
to legally control a country or its people and be responsible for introducing new laws, organiz-
ing public services, etc., [often passive] to control or influence somebody / something or how 
something happens, functions, etc. 
These meanings signify that governance does not only cover activities of ruling, coordinating, 
controlling, constituting rules, etc. but also the manner or the way these are done. 
As a scientific term ‘governance’ was not introduced initially in political science but in eco-
nomics. Coase (1937) suggested that firm organisation – besides market – contributes to the 
realisation of efficient economic transactions. Both should be further examined comparatively 
as coordination mechanism. This thought was the extended by Williamson (1985) into a re-
search programme. The institutional regulations of firms that are established to reduce trans-
action costs, namely the directing and administrative structures as well as the vertical and 
horizontal interaction patterns of the firm, were dubbed ‘governance’. The introduction of 
governance concept in economics proved that there is a shift of view on economic transac-
tions. Since markets are functioning when certain regulations are in place, the view on eco-
nomic transaction is shifted from merely exchange mechanism unto institutions, a system of 
rules. These rules must then be implemented and enforced by a powerful instance, e.g. the 
state. In sum, the existence of rules and the manner of their enforcement in economic proc-
esses is included in the term governance (Benz 2004a, pp. 15–16). 
                                                 
2 Cf. Gibbon (2004) 
  8 
According to Benz (2004b, p. 5) the term governance describes the reality of complex ruling / 
governing and of collective actions in societies. It should, however, be acknowledged from 
the outset that – similar to other core terms in social sciences like state, democracy, society – 
there is no unanimous definition of governance and that this term contains a wide variation of 
understandings. This term is connected with neither any theoretical concept nor specific re-
search approach, but rather a view on the complex reality. Indeed, governance contains vari-
able meanings, not because of the imprecision of the concept, but rather because of the vast 
research areas and diverse research objects dealt with (Benz 2004b, pp. 12–13). Various theo-
ries can also be applied to approach governance according to research questions to be an-
swered. He, then, concluded that there is no governance theory and no governance theory can 
exist3.  
Nevertheless, the widespread use of this term implies that either there are new aspects need 
more accentuation (new perception / interpretation of reality) or there are indeed new actual 
changes of reality that cannot be represented by other, older terms. These new aspects and 
changes are taking place in not only in society but also in economy, politics; not only in local 
but also in national and international level; etc. For example, in the field of economy it is ac-
knowledged that markets can fully function provided that they are supported by effective and 
efficient state regulations and institutionalised negotiation system. There is a growing ten-
dency that processes in different areas of societies and different institutions are interwoven, so 
that the interdependency between them is increasing (Benz 2004b, pp. 5–14). Against this 
background the term governance has been gaining popularity: a call for a better understanding 
in managing these interdependencies. 
Despite the varying meanings and understandings behind the term governance there are some 
constant core meanings that can be identified from different research fields (Benz 2004a, p. 
25): 
 Governance means to control, coordinate (or also rule) with the purpose to manage the 
interdependencies among collective actors. Control means the intentional intervention into 
                                                 
3 Benz (2004a) drew this conclusion based on the contributions from various authors compiled in his book re-
garding governance in diverse fields: local, regional, and global governance; multilevel governance; governance 
in political economy; etc. 
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fields of action or the steering of behaviour of actors by inducing changes towards collec-
tively agreed goals. Coordinate means the synchronisation of actions of various actors to 
reach collective goals. Both terms are in large congruent but emphasise different aspects: 
control emphasises the intervention of action and the interaction between controlling and 
controlled actors; whereas coordinate accentuate the interdependency und reciprocity of 
actions (Benz 2004a, p. 20). 
 Controlling and coordination are established on the base of diverse institutional rule sys-
tems, usually in combination forms. It should be noticed, however, that institutions can 
formal or informal, self-enforced or externally-enforced. Therefore, the observation of in-
stitutional rule system should also be directed toward abstract, inherent rules in societies 
that frequently do not receive much attention4. 
 Governance also covers the interaction pattern and modus of collective actions that result 
from institutions (network, coalitions, contract agreements, mutual adaptation in competi-
tion). The interaction also includes disputes or conflicts due to contradictory, competing 
interests and how this is settled (e.g. through hierarchy); as well as the mechanism how 
collective decisions are made. 
 Processes of controlling and coordination and interaction patterns cross the traditional 
organisational borders. Moreover, they exhibit a very dynamic characteristic, namely in 
constant change (abrupt or incremental) and adjustment process to the rule systems and 
vice versa. Hence, in theoretical perspective governance refers to the interplay between 
structures and processes, between institutions and actors, between rule setting and rule en-
forcement, and so on. 
2.3 Value chain governance: Definitions and associated terms 
Various authors used the term governance in their value chain researches and studies. Gereffi 
(1994) was the first to introduce this term and to develop the pioneering concept behind it. 
This term has been gaining significance ever since: 
Most analyses have focused on the dynamics underlying buyer- or producer-driven chains, from 
the vantage point of the location of the 'lead' firms ‘driving’ the process and ‘governing’ global 
chains usually located in the industrialised countries. (Gereffi 1994, p. 93) 
                                                 
4 Cf. Granovetter (2001); Leipold (2006) 
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Gereffi (1994) showed in his work that globally dispersed yet linked production systems are 
coordinated by a dominant party (or parties) that determine the overall character of the chain. 
He emphasised the prevalence of power relation embedded in the value chain.  Those firms 
possessing the power (‘lead firms’) are taking the role and function of coordinating produc-
tion system along the chain, determining the division of labour among firms along the chain, 
setting up or determining rules to be followed, and taking or driving upgrading measures in 
the value chain. The notion of governance described also implies that the interaction between 
firms in the value chain is somewhat in repetitive and organized way rather than simply acci-
dental and random5. 
Humphrey (2006) associated value chain with the existence of lead firms performing vertical 
chain coordination. These lead firms introduce “modern manufacturing including driving 
product differentiation and innovation [drive upgrading], a shift from quality control based on 
inspection and testing towards quality assurance based upon risk management and process 
controls (…) and just-in-time delivery” (Humphrey 2006, pp. 7–8). Literatures on vertical 
coordination recognised that the tacit coordination of markets is being replaced increasingly 
by ‘explicit coordination’, namely coordination through direct exchanges of information be-
tween firms (Altenburg 2006b, pp. 493–494). This coordination is usually referred to as 
‘value chain governance’. Humphrey (2006) then suggested limiting the term ‘value chain 
governance’ to inter-firm relationships, in a manner similar to the use of ‘economic govern-
ance’ by theorists of transaction costs economics; whereas the broader institutional context of 
the ‘rules of the game’ for economic transactions where the inter-firm relationships take place 
should be referred to as ‘institutional governance’. 
Regarding value chain governance Humphrey (2006) further described it as 
the definition and enforcement of instructions relating to what products are to be produced 
(product design), how they are to be produced (process controls) and when (timing). Setting and 
enforcement of these instructions need not be carried out by the same firm. (Humphrey 2006, 
pp. 10–11) 
The exertion of governance is possible when, first, the economies of scale in defining and 
communicating instructions are met and, second, when the instructions are enforced by both 
                                                 
5 Cf. Morris (2001, p. 134) 
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positive and negative sanctions and more importantly, third, when buyers have the capability 
to impose sanctions on suppliers.  
In his article about Agro-Commodity Chains, Gibbon (2001) viewed chain governance and its 
institutional structures as merely formal organisational framework. The institutional structures 
here are interpreted not as a broad, comprehensive institutional framework as it is in new in-
stitutional economics, but rather ‘rules of the game’ limited only in relation to governance 
exercised by lead firms (Gibbon 2001, pp. 60–61). 
According to Kaplinsky et al. (2001), value chains are governed when “parameters requiring 
product, process, and logistic qualification are set that have consequences up or down the 
value chain, encompassing bundles of activities, actors, roles, and functions” (Kaplinsky et al. 
2001, p. 134). To ensure these consequences along the chain a certain degree of power is re-
quired. Furthermore, Morris (2001) emphasised the contribution of value chain analysis as it  
returns us to issues of political economy, foregrounding the organisational and institutional 
linkages between firms whilst still maintaining the essential nature of competitive market rela-
tions. It allows an understanding how firms are locked into dependant relationships across terri-
tories through considering issues of cooperation, competition, power, management and control 
within and between value chains. All these have become subsumed within terms which seem to 
mean the same thing – governance, ‘lead firms’, ‘buyer-driven’, ‘producer-driven’ – to express 
what is essentially the governing role of non-market connectedness between firms. (Morris 
2001, p. 127) 
Similar notion of value chain governance was described by Altenburg (2006b, pp. 493–494) 
as “process control through non-market mechanisms”. This process control is needed to en-
sure homogeneous product quality and reliable delivery, which requires the transmission of 
product and process information and a certain degree of control of other firms in the supply 
chain. Other reasons are the increasing standard requirements, the increasing complexity of 
product which calls for simultaneous production planning and tight coordination of different 
complementary sub-products and services.  
2.4 Distinction between value chain governance and coordination 
Kaplinsky et al. (2001), however, criticised the mixing up and suggested a clearer differentia-
tion between governance and coordination. He associated governance more with the posses-
sion of power in establishing and enforcing rules determining the overall shape of a certain 
value chain; whereas coordination refers to the management of regular chain activities that 
can be exercised at several places in the value chain by different actors. Coordinative function 
is dynamic and changing over time as the division of labour among firms also shifts. This 
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means that those playing coordinative role are not necessarily governing the chain6. For ex-
ample, 
[t]he emergence of full package providers does not mean that this particular value chain is no 
longer ‘buyer driven’. It simply means that the coordination / management role has been con-
centrated elsewhere in the chain. If the full package provider can incorporate own-branding then 
this might well constitute a major shift in governance functions. Likewise, in the auto industry, 
the emergence of modular assembly under the control of multinational first tier suppliers within 
a ‘producer driven chain’ simply means that the coordination/management function has been 
driven down the chain. The governance function which defines the basic operations of the chain 
is still concentrated within the vehicle assemblers. (Kaplinsky et al. 2001, p. 30) 
In further detail Morris (2001, p. 134) described coordination as activities in “managing these 
parameters [...], monitoring the outcomes, linking the discrete activities between different 
actors, establishing and managing the relationships between the various actors comprising the 
links and organising the logistics to maintain networks of a national, regional or global na-
ture”.   
2.5 Governance approached from the concept of governance in civil society 
Kaplinsky et al. (2001, pp. 29–32) then suggested approaching the concept of governance in 
value chain by taking the perspective of governance in civil society that encompasses four 
elements: 
 The functions of governance are distinguished in three different powers, namely legisla-
tive (setting laws), executive (implementing laws), and judicial (monitoring conformance 
to laws)7, that can be exercised by various parties both internal and external to a particular 
value chain (see Table 2-1). In fact, it is seldom that these three functions are exercised by 
a single firm. 
 Sanctions both positive and negative (enforcement) are regarded as the key of functioning 
governance. Positive sanction or reward can be given as a result of compliance with cer-
tain requirements in the form of e.g. price incentive or less-demanding audit; whereas 
negative sanction or punishment in the form e.g. price penalty, exclusion from the value 
chain or final market. 
                                                 
6 Cf. the case study of Saligna furniture value chain in South Africa in Morris (2001, p. 133). 
7 The separation of powers, also called ‘trias politica’, was popularized by Montesquieu and is a basic model for 
the governance of democratic states these days. 
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 The legitimacy of enforcing reward and sanction over time reflects the popular support in 
democratic societies. In the case of value chain the trust among firms, particularly of the 
“governor”, corresponds to this popular support. In value chains characterised by low-
trust, the “governor” often changes suppliers to pursue short-term price advantages and 
immediately gives sanction by excluding those failing to conform to the wishes of the 
“governor” from the chain. In contrast, in value chains exhibiting high-trust, the “gover-
nor” pursues to establish long-term relationships with its suppliers and the failure to meet 
certain requirements is not immediately sanctioned, but instead the executive governance 
provides assistance to the non-conforming suppliers so that they can fulfil the require-
ments.  
 The remit of power is mirrored in the depth and pervasiveness of governance. Depth con-
cerns to what extent the rules influence the core activities of individual firms of the chain; 
whereas pervasiveness refers to how widely over the chain the power is exercised. 
Table 2-1 Functions of governance derived from the concept of civil government 
Functions of 
governance 
Description Exercised by parties within the 
chain 
Exercised by parties out-
side the chain 
Legislative Setting rules / standards / 
requirements of processes 
and products 
Lead firm (e.g. brand owner, 
assembly firm in auto industry) 
Bodies setting environ-
mental, labour standards, 
HACCP, etc. 
Executive Implementing rules,  en-
suring rules are met 
Firms managing their supply 
chain, technical assistance pro-
vided to farmers by processing 
industries or input suppliers 
Governmental development 
projects, technical assis-
tance by development coop-
eration agencies 
Judicial Monitoring the confor-
mance to the rules 
Monitoring by lead firms, export-
ers, importers, retailers, etc. 
Monitoring by NGOs, certi-
fication bodies 
Source: modified from Nugraha (2007, p. 15) 
2.6 Value chain governance: Perspective of industrial organisation theory 
Altenburg (2006a) extended the discussion on governance from the perspective of industrial 
organisation theory. He termed value chains governance as “patterns of industrial organisation 
which are increasingly placed between spot market exchanges and vertical integration”. Mar-
ket-intermediated organisations of production are established based on the traditional neo-
classic perspective that assumes market mechanisms with its competition to be more cost-
efficient than internal supply. With increasing firm size and internal organisational complex-
ity the cost of administrative coordination in a hierarchical organisation may increase substan-
tially. 
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By contrast, vertically integrated organisations of production are founded on the insight 
brought by new institutional economics, specifically transaction cost economics. This theory 
highlights the fact that transactions in competitive markets are not zero. Through market-
based transactions firms have less control over the supply chain in comparison to e.g. internal 
procurement. Hence, this can imperil cost efficient logistics, assurance of product quality and 
quantity, reliability in delivery, etc. The fact that market transactions contain contingencies 
which cannot be anticipated beforehand poses other risks, such as incomplete contracts and 
cost for monitoring and enforcing contracts, to the creation of efficient transaction between 
firms. 
Being in the intermediate position between market mechanism and vertical integration value 
chain governance seeks to make use of outsourcing in order to reduce cost yet without losing 
control over production processes. Value chain governance thus can be depicted as “produc-
tion by order of a lead firm that coordinates its value chain across borders and defines and 
enforces multiple product and process standards without aspiring to gain ownership control of 
its suppliers” (Altenburg 2006a, p. 498). Lead firms in the chain set and/or enforce the pa-
rameters under which others in the chain operates; influence the decisions of upstream and 
downstream enterprises; identify dynamic rent opportunities; rearrange the production system 
accordingly and assign different roles to other firms, ensure integration of the whole produc-
tion system (Altenburg 2006a, p. 499). 
Altenburg (2006a) concluded that all governance structures share the same feature, namely 
that they “imply the transmission of information on markets and standards and incentives 
along the value chain and some non-market mechanisms to coordinate production and assure 
certain parameters” (Altenburg 2006a, p. 502). Nevertheless, they also exhibit different fea-
tures in the “intensity of interference by lead firms, the degree of formalisation of contracts, 
the power relations, the distribution of gains and risks among cooperating firms and other 
characteristics”. Thus, the concrete form of value chain governance varies considerably, rang-
ing from basic agreements on terms of delivery to outright imposition of detailed procedures 
and cost-reduction strategies by powerful customers (Altenburg 2006b, pp. 493–494). 
2.7 Typology of value chain governance 
The typology of value chain governance is of particular importance because there is a funda-
mental necessity to predict under what circumstances certain type of governance would arise 
and what are the determining factors for the development / change of value chain governance. 
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Since value chain approach is also interesting for policy-makers, who seek to support eco-
nomic development in line with poverty alleviation, it is necessary to identify factors that in-
fluence and trigger the upgrading of a value chain, so that these factors can be precisely ad-
dressed through specific development interventions. 
Hitherto, there are three different, well-known typologies of value chain governance. These 
are concisely elaborated as follows. 
2.7.1 Buyer- and producer-driven chains 
The first typology was described in global commodity chains by Gereffi (1994, pp. 93–122) 
and later in Gereffi (1999) based on the “drivenness” of the chain, namely who assumes the 
role of governance or “drives” the whole value chain. Two types of value chain governance 
were described here: 
i. Buyer-driven chains occur in value chains where the critical governing role is played by 
a buyer at the apex of the chain such as retailers, marketers, and branded manufacturers 
that specify the product specifications. These are characteristic of labour intensive, con-
sumer goods industries (particularly contractors in developing countries), such as foot-
wear, garments, furniture, handicrafts, and toys.  
ii. Producer-driven chains occur in value chains where the key governing role is played by 
producers that generally command particular vital technologies and coordinate tightly 
their production networks. They also assume the responsibility to assist both their suppli-
ers and their customers. These are characteristic of capital- and technology-intensive in-
dustries – sometimes in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) – such as automobiles, 
aircraft, computers, semiconductors, and heavy machinery. 
Nonetheless, this distinction was not adequate to characterise the variety of network forms 
discovered in other empirical studies (Gereffi et al. 2005, pp. 83-83). Studies in horticulture 
industry by Dolan et al. (2000) and in footwear industry by Schmitz et al. (2000) underpinned 
the idea that thanks to their market power global buyers (retailers, marketers, and branded 
manufacturers) posses the capability to exercise intensive control over their value chains de-
spite the fact that they posses no production, transport or processing facilities. Other studies 
from Sturgeon (2002) and Sturgeon et al. (2005) on electronic industry and contract manufac-
turing discovered other forms of coordination based on the degree of standardisation of prod-
uct and process: 
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i. Commodity supplier that provides standard products through arm’s length market rela-
tionships 
ii. Captive supplier that makes non-standard products using machinery dedicated to the 
buyer’s needs 
iii. Turn-key supplier that produces customized products for buyers and uses flexible ma-
chinery to pool capacity for different customers. 
These studies underlined the complexity of information transferred along the chain and the 
degree of asset specificity in production equipment. Other studies by Humphrey et al. (2000) 
and Humphrey et al. (2002) highlighted the capability of supplier or supplier competence as a 
determinant factor in the degree of control / power of exerted by buyers upon their suppliers 
and thus shapes the governance pattern of the chain. 
2.7.2 Typology of governance according to Gereffi et al. (2005) 
Drawing on the aforementioned approaches that were applied in the industry case studies of 
bicycles, apparel, horticulture, and electronics, Gereffi et al. (2005) proposed the second ty-
pology of value chain governance. In this typology market governance and hierarchical gov-
ernance in vertically integrated firms are considered as the opposite ends of a spectrum of 
explicit coordination. Between these two ends the intermediate forms of explicit coordination, 
i.e. the network relationships, are further distinguished into 3 different categories: modular, 
relational, and captive. By acknowledging that in fact many factors (history, institutions, geo-
graphic and social contexts, evolving rules of the game, path dependencies) influence global 
chain governance, Gereffi et al. (2005) proposed a simple framework to build a theory of 
value chain governance based on following three key factors: 
i. The complexity of information and knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular 
transaction, particularly with respect to product and process specifications 
ii. The extent to which this information and knowledge can be codified and, therefore, 
transmitted efficiently and without transaction-specific investment between the parties to 
the transaction 
iii. The capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements of the 
transaction. 
Assuming that these three factors could only have two values – high or low – there are eight 
possible combinations of analytical, not empirical, governance types, of which 5 are actually 
reasonable (Gereffi et al. 2005, pp. 82–88). Table 2-2 summarised these governance types: 
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i. Markets. This type of governance can arise when: 
 complexity of information exchanged is relatively low. 
 transactions are easily codified, product specifications are relatively simple, and thus no 
asset specificity is needed. 
 suppliers have the capability to make the products in question with little input from buy-
ers. 
Hence, the transactions in this governance type require little explicit coordination; the power 
relation is relatively equal because in market exchange buyers respond to specifications and 
prices set by sellers; and the costs of switching to new partners are low for both parties. 
ii. Modular value chains. Typically, suppliers in modular value chains make products to a 
customer’s specifications, which may be more or less detailed. Modular governance can 
arise when: 
 transactions require complex information to be transmitted and information flow between 
firms are high regarding technical aspects. 
 specifications of complex products can be codified, simplified, and unified through tech-
nical standards reducing component, product, and process variations (in the case of modu-
lar product architecture). 
 suppliers have high competence to supply full packages and modules, which internalizes 
hard to codify (tacit) information. Usually suppliers use generic machinery that limits 
transaction-specific investments. They also provide ‘turn-key services’ covering compe-
tencies surrounding process technology and make capital outlays for components and ma-
terials on behalf of customers. 
Therefore, the transactions can be coordinated relatively easy based on codified knowledge 
and thus resembles simple market exchange; the power relation is relatively equal to market 
exchange since buyers and suppliers can negotiate on prices; and the costs of switching to 
new partners are also low for both parties. 
iii. Relational value chains. These networks are characterised by complex interactions be-
tween buyers and sellers, which often creates mutual dependence. Frequently, this mutual 
dependence may be managed through reputation, or family and ethnic ties. The role of spa-
tial proximity in supporting relational value chain linkages is influential, but trust and repu-
tation might well function in spatially dispersed networks where relationships are built-up 
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over time or are based on dispersed family and social groups. Relational governance arises 
when: 
 transactions are complex and require complex information to be exchanged, frequently 
through face-to-face interaction. 
 information on product specifications cannot be codified and thus results in high levels of 
asset specificity. 
 suppliers have high capabilities and motivate lead firms to outsource to gain access to 
complementary competencies. 
As a result, the transactions are characterised by high degree of coordination due to informa-
tion complexity and non-codifiability and the cost of switching to new partners are high. 
iv. Captive value chains. In this network category, small suppliers are transactionally de-
pendent on much larger buyers. Captive suppliers are frequently confined to a narrow 
range of tasks, for example, mainly engaged in simple assembly. 
 transactions exhibit high level of information complexity. 
 information regarding process and product requirements (in the form of detailed instruc-
tions) is specified in detail by lead firms. 
 supplier competences are low. Hence, they are dependent on lead firms for complemen-
tary activities such as design, logistics, component purchasing, and process technology 
upgrading. Also, due to the narrow range of tasks specific investment on production is 
high. 
Thus, the coordination of transactions requires high degree of intervention, monitoring, and 
control by lead firms. They also have to provide enough resources and market access to the 
subordinate firms. Since lead firms have to make a lot of efforts in coordinating transactions, 
they tend to build transactional dependence in order to exclude others from reaping the bene-
fits of their efforts and to prevent any opportunism behaviour. Power asymmetry in this gov-
ernance type is clearly evident due to the domination of lead firms over their suppliers. Hence, 
the suppliers face significant switching costs and are ‘captive’. 
v. Hierarchy. This governance form is usually driven by the need to exchange tacit knowl-
edge between value chain activities as well as the need to effectively manage complex 
webs of inputs and outputs and to control resources, especially intellectual property. This 
type of vertical integration is likely to arise when: 
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 products and processes are complex. 
 information on product specifications cannot be codified. 
 suppliers with high competence are not available. All these force lead firms to develop 
and manufacture products in-house. 
This leads to the predominant coordination through managerial control, flowing from manag-
ers to subordinates, or from headquarters to subsidiaries and affiliates. Power asymmetry is 
obvious since coordination and control is exercised in hierarchical format. 
Table 2-2 Key factors and outcomes of governance type according to Gereffi et al. (2005, pp. 82–
88) 
Key factors determining governance type 
 
Outcome / characteristics of 
governance type 
Governance 
Type Information 
complexity 
Information 
codifiability 
Supplier  
competence 
Degree of ex-
plicit coordina-
tion 
Power 
asymmetry 
Market Low High High Low Low 
Modular High High High Low Low 
Relational High Low High Medium Medium 
Captive High High Low High High 
Hierarchy High Low Low High High 
Source: modified from Gereffi et al. (2005, p. 87) 
2.7.3 Typology of governance according to Altenburg (2006a) 
According to Altenburg (2006a) the typology of value chain governance proposed by Gereffi 
et al. (2005) is useful, since it identifies some of the most important determinants that shape 
the form of value chain governance. However, it also ignores several other important factors 
which determine whether firms opt for vertical integration of external supply, and whether 
external supply relies on arm's-length market coordination or tighter forms of explicit, non-
market management. Moreover, the proposed key factors and their combination are not im-
perative for the emergence of certain governance type. Captive supplier, for instance, need not 
be less capable than other types of suppliers: highly capable and specialised second-tier auto 
parts suppliers may operate under more captive relations than relational producers in the gar-
ment industry. Therefore, to make a more comprehensive picture of governance that is closer 
to reality Altenburg (2006a, pp. 503–507) suggested a long list of factors influencing the be-
haviour of lead firms: 
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i. Core competences and complementary of production. In order to gain and retain inno-
vation rent firms aim at developing core competences (specialisation) and avoid their 
leakage through in-house production or limiting cooperation to trustworthy partners and 
restricting information flows; whereas non-core activities are outsourced. 
ii. Supplier capabilities. The availability of competent suppliers influences whether and to 
what degree lead firms outsource and to what extent they interfere in the production proc-
ess of their business partners (controlling). 
iii. Relationship-specific investments. Firms often need to make specific investments in 
order to engage in or extend a certain trading relationship. Such investments are risky, 
susceptible to ex-post bargaining and contractual problems, and often sunk costs. There-
fore, they have four effects on chain relation. First, they strengthen the bargaining power 
of the party which has not incurred such investments. Second, they favour vertical integra-
tion because potential suppliers may not be willing to become dependent on their custom-
ers. Third, they need to be safeguarded against opportunistic behaviour by building trust 
and reputation. Fourth, they erect entry barriers for newcomers, as they enable the supplier 
to produce at lower cost than potential competitors who have not yet made these invest-
ments. 
iv. Complexity of transactions. High transaction costs make in-house production relatively 
more profitable, under the assumption that hierarchical coordination within the firm 
avoids certain search and bargaining costs, as well as the transmission of information re-
garding products and processes. 
v. Extent to which transactions can be codified. The less is the codifiability of transac-
tions, the higher is the costs of writing, monitoring, and enforcing contracts. Such transac-
tions are preferably settled in-house or outsourced with a high degree of explicit coordina-
tion. 
vi. Market transparency and search costs. Lack of market transparency or prevalence of 
information asymmetry may involve substantial costs to search for appropriate suppliers. 
Hence, outsourcing may not be a viable option. For example, foreign investors who are 
not familiar with local business environment my find it difficult to identify and assess the 
competences of local suppliers. 
vii. Uncertainty about market development. If the availability of inputs is uncertain, this 
creates an incentive for backward integration or in-house production to safeguard against 
fluctuating availability of inputs and unstable prices. If output markets are subject to 
strong fluctuations, producers tend to avoid investment on fixed assets, retain the high-
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probability demand for themselves and pass the low-probability demand on to sub-
contractors. 
viii.Market structure. A high number of small dispersed suppliers increases the transaction 
costs of procurement and creates an incentive to produce in-house, or to support concen-
tration processes among suppliers. However, concentration among suppliers is less com-
mon. Instead, it is frequent that concentration takes place among buyers resulting in 
greater market power, more advantageous position for them; whereas the level of competi-
tion among their suppliers increases. 
ix. Institutional framework conditions. As new institutional economics has proved, eco-
nomic transactions rely on institutional framework conditions. Both formal and informal 
institutions, inter alia, can help to contain the opportunistic behaviour of contractual part-
ners which may result from incomplete contracts and thus influence heavily the outsourc-
ing behaviour of firms. On the one hand, the existence of formal regulations, such as 
property rights or standardisation, and their strong enforcement may incentivise lead firms 
to outsource with less tighter control. On the other hand, over-regulated business transac-
tions and weak enforcement of law and regulations in a certain location may deter lead 
firms from outsourcing to companies in the respective location and force them to impose 
tight control over their suppliers. Furthermore, the prevalence of informal institution like 
trust among value chain operators may complement formal contract and lower transaction 
cost. Strong social bonds may substitute formal institution and are of particular impor-
tance in places where law enforcement is weak and unreliable.  
x. Capital intensity and the cost of capital. Whenever considerable investments are neces-
sitated to perform a particular chain activity, buyers will preferably source from independ-
ent suppliers. For example, if an agro-processing company wants to extend the production 
capacity, it is more feasible to outsource than to bear high capital costs for agricultural 
land. Outsourcing also enables the buyer to shift other capital cost like warehousing to 
their suppliers. Hence, high cost of capital serves as an incentive for outsourcing. 
xi. Consumer demand. As consumers increasingly exert pressure on companies to comply 
with certain product and process standards regarding social, environmental and safety 
standards; companies are required to implement a high degree of explicit coordination and 
control to their supply chains, as well as to introduce measures ensuring the compliance of 
the standards throughout the chain. Also, the issue of traceability, e.g. for agricultural and 
forestry products, forces companies at the end of the chain (retailers) to use different com-
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binations of pressure and support on upstream companies – either directly or indirectly 
through first and second tier suppliers. 
The following figure elucidates the causal relation between each factor and the tendency for 
outsourcing and for explicit coordination and control using typical cases. 
Table 2-3 Overview of factors determining outsourcing and explicit coordination 
Factor Typical case Tendency for outsourcing 
Tendency for 
explicit coordi-
nation 
Firm focuses on the development of core 
competences 
Higher Higher Core competences and 
complementary of pro-
duction Note: non-core activities are outsourced. Core competences are kept in-house or 
outsourced with tight restriction / control. 
Supplier capabilities Firm can find highly capable suppliers Higher Lower 
Buyer firm demands products which 
require specific investments 
Lower - Relationship-specific 
investments 
Note: supplier firm tends to avoid the risks of opportunism, ex-post bargaining, 
and incomplete contracts and, therefore, would negotiate for a vertical integra-
tion with the buyer. 
Complexity of transac-
tions 
Firm needs to carry out complex transac-
tion 
Lower Higher 
Extent to which trans-
actions can be codified 
Firm can clearly codify specifications and 
requirements. 
Higher Lower 
Market transparency 
and search costs 
Firm experiences difficulties in gathering 
market information. 
Lower Higher 
Firm is uncertain about input market. Lower Higher 
Note: By in-house procurement or tight coordination the risk of fluctuating 
input availability and price can be dampened 
Firm is uncertain about output market. Higher - 
Uncertainty about mar-
ket development 
Note: firm tends to avoid investment on fixed assets, retain the high-probability 
demand for itself, and pass the low-probability demand on to sub-contractors. 
Firm faces a high number of small dis-
persed suppliers. 
Lower - 
Note: firm tends to settle business transactions in-house rather than with many 
small suppliers. 
Firm is one among few big market play-
ers. 
- Higher 
Market structure 
Note: firms in oligopolistic market have greater power and thus can impose 
explicit coordination and tight control upon their supply chain. 
Firm operates in well-regulated business 
environment with strong enforcement. 
Higher Lower Institutional framework 
conditions 
Note: strong institutional framework conditions render inter-firm business 
transactions efficient. As opportunistic behaviour is curbed, looser control and 
less explicit coordination is required. 
  23
Firm faces burdensome regulations re-
garding business transactions in a specific 
location. 
Lower - 
Note: Firm prefers to outsource to location with supportive regulatory frame-
work 
Firm is situated in low-trust environment 
with high prevalence of fraud. 
Lower Higher 
Note: If any outsourcing is feasible, then tight control is needed to curb oppor-
tunism. 
Firm needs to include a certain productive 
activity which requires big investment. 
Higher - Capital intensity and 
the cost of capital 
Note: instead of investing firm prefers to outsource activities requiring high 
capital intensity from independent suppliers. 
Consumer demand Firm needs to impose certain standards to 
satisfy consumer demand. 
- Higher 
Source: own compilation based on Altenburg (2006a, pp. 503–507) 
To sum up, the make-or-buy decision and the degree of explicit coordination and control rely 
on many factors, are frequently context-specific, and full of trade-offs. Even the interplay of 
similar factors could create different outcomes since each company has also its own internal 
policy, follows different corporate strategy, and is situated in diverse geographical and socio-
logical conditions. Moreover, it should be noticed that one single value chain can exhibit dif-
ferent patterns of governance at different stages of the chain. All of these make it difficult to 
establish a generally valid typology of governance, to predict its emergence despite the identi-
fication of certain circumstances, and to forecast how firms react to particular incentive. Al-
tenburg (2006a) insinuated that it is nearly impossible to categorise governance with its com-
plicated factors – a conclusion similar to the conclusion drawn by Benz (2004a) regarding the 
theory of governance. 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
Up to this point it is clear that the concept of governance does not and cannot have any defi-
nite, unanimous theory behind it – as it is argued by Altenburg (2006a) and Benz (2004a). 
Indeed, what commonly shared among authors is limited to the core concept. Governance 
concept from various authors contains similar notion that it deals with the manner of coordi-
nating and controlling interdependent, diverse actors with regard to a particular goal based on 
certain institutional framework; as practically all authors on value chain governance employed 
similar definition and associated identical terms with it. Nevertheless, chain governance con-
cept exhibits a wide array of variations concerning emphasised issues (e.g. typology) depend-
ing on the subject field, research question, theories employed to approach it, etc. 
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Since the complex reality of value chain governance entails diverse aspects and connections, 
it is still important to sharply distinguish different elements / aspects – as Kaplinsky et al. 
(2001) called for the differentiation between governance (setting and enforcing rule) and co-
ordination (management of regular chain activities) – in order to gain deeper insight and more 
comprehensive understanding. It is also apparent that most discussions on value chain gov-
ernance take the stand point solely of big enterprises operating globally and organising their 
supply chains across borders. However, if value chain analysis should inform policy makers 
regarding how to formulate policies supporting economic development, particularly poverty 
alleviation, and how to design interventions to achieve certain development impacts; then 
value chain approach should also make more efforts to comprehend the stand point of certain 
poor economic groups or micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) of value chains in 
developing countries. By shifting the stand point unto those groups the analysis on chain gov-
ernance may show different results concerning e.g. the circumstances under which certain 
governance type arise, the aspects influencing the processes of coordination and controlling 
along the chain, the determinant factors for chain upgrading, etc. This shift also enables re-
searchers to identify opportunities and potentials for MSMEs to initiate and drive chain up-
grading instead of always being dependent on lead firms. Furthermore, the shift of focus from 
global perspective to local or regional level – as most value chains in developing countries are 
of local or regional importance – may discover new insights into how governance is affected 
by local peculiarities, such as social embeddedness. 
Last but not least, it is also evident that the theories applied to approach value chain govern-
ance are mainly from industrial organisation theory, management theory, and transactions cost 
theory. These aspects of governance are, indeed, intensively discussed and well explained.  
Nonetheless, albeit value chain governance inherently concerns very much the setting and 
enforcing of rules – thus institution8 –; there have not been many attempts to illuminate insti-
tutional aspects of governance from the perspective of institutional theories. Some authors 
have mentioned the aspect of formal institution, en passant, but the prevalence of informal 
institutions and its effects on value chain governance have not been clearly described and ex-
plained. Therefore, it is important to extend the approach to value chain governance by apply-
                                                 
8 See Lütz (2004, pp. 148–172) for an extensive discussion about how economic governance in general is ex-
plained from the perspective of new institutional economics. 
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ing institutional theories that primarily focusing on aspects relevant to explaining the interde-
pendency between institutional framework and the economic performance of value chain. 
Nonetheless, as institutional theories are developed in different disciplines and thus contain 
different emphases, the following chapter will discuss mainly this matter and delineate the 
theoretical framework and analytical framework applied in this research. 
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3 Theoretical and Analytical Framework  
The previous section has clarified the term ‘upgrading’ and elaborated the various perceptions 
on ‘value chain governance’ and concluded with a need to examine further the concept of 
governance in the light of institutional theory. Institutional theory, however, is not represented 
by a single scholar or a school of thought, but rather by various scholars from economics, 
political science, and sociology. They advanced strikingly diverse concepts and arguments 
exhibiting as many similarities as differences. These concepts, in particular those contributing 
to the creation of theoretical framework, are briefly reviewed in the next three sub-chapters. 
The subsequent sub-chapter summarises the elaborated concepts of institution with an omni-
bus definition of institution as proposed by Scott (2008, pp. 48–50). Following this theoretical 
framework this chapter is then closed by the analytical framework Macro-Micro Model as 
posited by Coleman (1990) and Esser (1999). 
3.1 Institutional theory in economics 
3.1.1 Early institutional theory in economics 
The earliest institutional arguments in economics arose in Germany and Austria in the late 
19th century as one by-product of the famous Methodenstreit: the debate over scientific 
method in the social sciences. This debate was between Gustav von Schmoller and his His-
torical School against Carl Menger, a Viennese economist, upon whose arguments new insti-
tutional economics (NIE) later on has built its theory. Schmoller argued that economics can-
not be reduced to a set of universal laws since it operates within a social framework that is in 
turn shaped by a set of cultural and historical forces in specific time and place. He criticised 
the assumption of ‘economic man’ as being overtly simplistic and thus needs to embrace more 
realistic model of human behaviour. 
3.1.2 Old institutional economics (OIE) 
German Historical School had exerted great influence on American scholars of old institu-
tional economics (OIE) represented by e.g. Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, and Wesley 
C. Mitchell. Finding the orthodox theory unhelpful in formulating public policy and even hos-
tile to the idea that the state can ameliorate economic and social problems, they developed 
two main criticisms toward the orthodox theory: First, its predictions diverged from empirical 
reality (they identified in the real world that state policies such as trade protection contributed 
to economic growth and trade unions raised wage levels); and, second, these discrepancies 
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arose from a lack of realism in the model’s assumptions. In line with these criticisms OIE 
scholars offered – despite differences of emphases among them – their own ideas (Jacoby 
1990, pp. 318–320):  
i. Indeterminacy. Whereas the orthodox model assumed perfect competition and unique 
equilibriums; OIE scholars pointed to pervasive market power and to indeterminacy even 
under competition. 
ii. Diachronic analysis. Economic theory should be grounded on concrete reality or factual 
circumstances that are historically and locally specific, and on the dynamic changes of 
economy as a moving, changing process (diachronic). By contrast, (neo-) classical econo-
mists viewed economic theory as an abstraction from reality that isolated its transhistori-
cal and universal aspects (synchronic). OIE scholars insisted that diachronic analysis had 
to be part of economics, alongside synchronic abstraction.  
iii. Behaviour realism. Institutional theorists suggested that the model of human behaviour 
should embrace more pragmatic and psychological-realistic model. They considered that 
the assumptions of orthodox economists – derived from utilitarianism – on behaviour 
model of individuals, namely rational, hedonistic, utility-maximizing, self-interested, and 
individualistic agents, as inadequate or erroneous.  
iv. Endogenous determination of preference. OIE scholars also viewed individuals’ prefer-
ence function as not given, ‘taken for granted’, and stable. Individuals are “partially mal-
leable agents” (Hodgson 2001, pp. 248–249) whose model is subject to explanation. For 
example, the analysis of individual behaviour and preference must incorporate, e.g. habits, 
as they are a component of rationality that not only have a historical dimension (they 
cause past choices to constrain a person's present ones), but they also have social and cul-
tural origins. In contrast, orthodox economists viewed individual’s wants as given and ex-
ogenous to the realm of economic analysis.  
v. Product and producer of institution. The view of ‘atomistic’ individual behaviour – 
individuals act independently regardless any external factors outside themselves – was 
abandoned. Institutional theorists argued that individuals are shaped by the time- and 
place-specific ‘frameworks’ under which they exist. These ‘frameworks’ shaping indi-
viduals were defined as institution. These could be “collective control over individual ac-
tion” (Commons 1931, p. 649) that could be exercised in an unorganized form through 
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habit or custom and/or in an organized form through legally enforced court decisions1; or 
“habits of thought” (Veblen 1919, p. 239) that directs individual’s conduct in habitual re-
lation with his/her fellows in the group. In this regard, individuals are ‘product of institu-
tions’. On the other side, individuals are interacting among themselves and thus intention-
ally or unintentionally form and alter institutions. In this sense, individuals are viewed as 
‘producer of institution’  (Hodgson 2001, pp. 248–249). 
Notwithstanding the fruitful insights and valuable critiques to complement, correct, and ex-
tend the arguments advanced by orthodox economics, OIE did not prevail and its impact was 
blunted. Focusing on historically and locally specific circumstances scholars of OIE had in-
deed produced a large volume of descriptive work. They, however, failed to generate unifying 
explanatory theories from their extensive data2. Hence, they “overemphasised the uniqueness 
of different economic systems and underemphasised the value of analytic theory” (Scott 2008, 
p. 5). Even Hodgson, a sympathetic critic of OIE, acknowledged that Veblen exhibited “an 
explicit hostility to intellectual ‘symmetry and system-building’” (Hodgson 1998); whereas 
the arguments advanced by Commons were hampered by his own idiosyncratic terminology 
and unsystematic style of reasoning (Mitchell 1935, pp. 635, 643). This was the fundamental 
reason of Ronald H. Coase when he dismissed the OIE by commenting “John R. Commons, 
Wesley Mitchell, and those associate with them were men of great intellectual stature, but 
they were anti-theoretical, and without a theory to bind together their collection of facts, they 
had very little that they were able to pass on” (Coase 1998, p. 72); and further, “without a 
theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, 
or a fire” (Coase 1984, p. 230). 
3.1.3 New or Neo-institutional economics (NIE) 
Despite bearing the name ‘new or neo-institutional economics’, NIE has a stronger intellec-
tual kinship with the critiques of OIE, rather than with the ideas and arguments of OIE that 
were further advanced by sociologists and organisational scholars. Most of new institutional 
economists do not seek to replace orthodox economic theory, but rather to develop an eco-
                                                 
1 Cf. Commons (1931, pp. 650–657); Mitchell (1935, pp. 638–640) 
2 Cf. Jacoby (1990, p. 320) 
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nomic theory of institutions. Three common themes underlie the contributions of NIE schol-
ars (Scott 2008, pp. 26–27):  
1. The model of economic agents was extended beyond that of orthodox economics. Simon’s 
conception of ‘bounded rationality’ was utilised by Williamson in his transaction cost 
economics. 
2. The focus of economic study was shifted from economic equilibrium toward economic 
processes that evolves over time and reflects learning by economic agents. As they recog-
nised that institutions are affecting economic transactions; the emergence, maintenance, 
and transformation of institutions were considered as an important variable. 
3. Market mediation was not viewed as the sole coordination mechanism for economic activ-
ity. Rather, many other types of institutional structures influencing economic transactions 
– such as the role of governmental systems, institutional structure of organisations – be-
came important topics of study. 
These common themes are crystallised from the contributions of some NIE scholars whose 
main thoughts are briefly reviewed in the following sub-chapters. 
3.1.4 Transaction cost economics 
With his article “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase 1937) Ronald H. Coase inaugurated the 
transaction economics approach. He posed the question why some economic exchanges are 
carried out within firms under a governance structure involving rules and hierarchical en-
forcement mechanisms, rather than being directly subject to the price mechanism in markets. 
Coase (1937, p. 349) argued that the reason must be that “there is a cost using the price 
mechanism”, namely “the costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each 
exchange transaction which takes place in a market”. It is because of these transaction costs 
that firm arise.  
Albeit his article was much cited, his insight lay fallow until it was resurrected in the 1970s 
by Oliver E. Williamson. According to Williamson (1973) and Williamson (1975) transaction 
costs increase when two paired conditions arise: first, when cognitively bounded individuals 
are confronted by increasing complexity and uncertainty; and, second, when the risk of oppor-
tunism is high while no alternative exchange partners are available. In such situations ex-
changes are likely to be removed from market and brought within an institutional framework 
where more elaborate control is possible. Various institutional frameworks or ‘governance 
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systems’ are to be considered in this case, ranging from markets, hybrid organisational forms 
(e.g. franchising or alliance arrangements), to various types of hierarchical structure (e.g. uni-
fied firms or multidivisional corporations). In his view Williamson treated organisations as an 
institutional form or a governance system devised to reduce transaction costs. 
Although Williamson took seriously the effects of varying institutional contexts or govern-
ance structures on economic behaviour, he remained firmly within the neoclassical tradition 
and constructed his concept on ‘atomistic and individualistic’ approach assuming ‘opportunis-
tic’ behaviour of individuals and ignoring the variable of preference that depends on circum-
stances such as the structure and culture of the firm (Scott 2008, p. 29). Furthermore, he also 
showed little interest in the processes by which varying governance structures arise or are 
transformed. The macro-questions regarding the origins and effects of the ‘institutional rules 
of the game: property rights, laws, norms, conventions, politics’ are, according to him, the 
subject matters of economic historians and sociologists and thus treated these as ‘background 
conditions’. 
3.1.5 Economic history 
In contrast to transaction cost economists who particularly focus on micro- and meso-analyses 
of institution; economic historians focus on a macro-level of analysis and account for the 
emergence, development, and change of institutions that encompass economic, political and 
social factors; how they have played a role for economic growth and affected economic proc-
esses; and how these institutions, in turn, have been affected by ideological and non-economic 
factors. Among them the most renowned is Douglas C. North, Nobel laureate in economic 
science, who directs the attention toward wider institutional frameworks. North (1990/2005) 
defined institution as follows:   
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human ex-
change, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies 
evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change. [...] Institutions re-
duce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life. (North 1990/2005, p. 3) 
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His focus is on development and change, rather than on comparative static3. Although he em-
ploys the theory of transaction costs in analysing economic systems, he treated transaction 
costs rather as ‘dependent variables’ that are subject to the effects of wider institutional 
frameworks than as ‘independent variables’ to explain why actors choose different govern-
ance mechanisms (Scott 2008, p. 29).   
3.1.6 Evolutionary Economics  
The evolutionary economics developed by Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter put em-
phasises on adaptation and selection capabilities – analogous to biological models – of firms: 
firms have ‘routines’ that are equivalent to the genes in a plant or an animal (Scott 2008, pp. 
30–31). As historical entities firms accumulate knowledge and capabilities over time resulting 
in routines that are produced through an endogenous learning process based on experiences. 
Routines comprise both the conscious, tacit knowledge and skills held by those participants 
performing organisational tasks. In fact, the ability to reproduce and modify routines in the 
face of changing situations is the key to survive. Hence, the main concern of evolutionary 
economists is to examine how competitive processes or changes take place in firms: whilst 
firms with routines best adapted to changing conditions can flourish, those with less adequate 
adapted routines stagnate. Hence, their approach is very much process-oriented. 
Notwithstanding the absence of the term ‘institution’ in their arguments, the conception of 
organisational routines clearly exhibit a type of institutionalised behaviour. As regards the 
determinant factors shaping behaviour and structure in organisations, Nelson and Winter em-
ploy a much broader conception of factors than transaction cost economists do. 
3.2 Institutional theory in political science  
3.2.1 Bounded rationality and routines  
Herbert Simon developed the theory of ‘administrative behaviour’ to counteract individual 
rationality. He challenged the assumption that actors have complete knowledge of means and 
their consequences (the limits of individual cognitive capacity or “bounded rationality”). To-
gether with March, he developed the argument that most behaviour is guided by preset rou-
tines that greatly reduce the discretion (decision making) so that they make fewer choices and 
                                                 
3 Cf. North (1990/2005); North (1989) 
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are circumscribed in them. Value assumptions, cognitive frames, and rules and routines are 
the ingredients that conduce individuals to behave rationally (Simon 1997).  
3.2.2 Rational choice institutionalism 
The emergence of rational choice institutionalism (RCI) was inspired by the observation of 
empirical phenomena in the U.S. Congress that deviate from conventional rational choice 
theory: whilst the postulate of conventional rational choice theory predicts that “the multiple 
preference-orderings of legislators and multidimensional character of issues” would lead to 
instability or chaotic contention among legislators in the U.S. Congress; the “Congressional 
outcomes actually show considerable stability” (Hall et al. 1996, pp. 10–11). Rational choice 
institutionalists turned to institution to explain this discrepancy. 
Institutions are viewed as a rule system, both formal and informal, that constraint or structure 
the action scope of individuals behaving rational, such as: procedures, structures constraining 
the choices, information, and sequence of action of Congress members; a rule system that 
creates stability. In this respect, institutions are devised to solve the problem of collective ac-
tion. If each individual in politics attempts to maximise the attainment of his/her own prefer-
ences, this likely results in collectively suboptimal outcomes, such as in the ‘prisoner’s di-
lemma’ and the ‘tragedy of the commons’. The presence of institutions and their 
arrangements would guarantee, or at least increase the likelihood of, complementary behav-
iour by constraining the choices of action. Thus, institutions can also be seen as central 
mechanism in sustaining stability or equilibriums.  
Following Hall et al. (1996, pp. 10–13), the behavioural assumptions employed by rational 
choice institutionalists are individuals behaving rational following the logic of instrumentality 
or expediency using calculating or computational reasoning to derive strategy in attaining the 
maximum realisation of their stable preferences or interests. Building on this model of indi-
vidual behaviour rational choice institutionalists emphasis the role of strategic interaction in 
the determination of political outcomes: First, an actor’s behaviour is likely to be driven, not 
by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic calculus. Second, this calculus will be 
deeply affected by the actor’s expectations about how others are likely to behave as well. In-
stitutions structure such interactions, by affecting the range and sequence of alternatives on 
the choice-agenda or by providing information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce un-
certainty about the corresponding behaviour of others and allow ‘gains from exchange,’ 
thereby leading actors toward particular calculations and potentially better social outcomes. 
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Thus, rational choice theorists take a classic ‘calculus approach’ to the problem of explaining 
how institutions affect individual action.  
Rational choice institutionalists have also developed a distinctive approach to the problem of 
explaining how institutions originate: Using deduction to arrive at a stylised specification of 
the functions that an institution performs, they then explain the existence of the institution by 
reference to the value those functions have for the actors affected by the institution. This for-
mulation assumes that the actors create the institution in order to realise this value, which is 
most often conceptualized, as noted above, in terms of gains from cooperation. Thus, the 
process of institutional creation usually revolves around voluntary agreement by the relevant 
actors; and, if the institution is subject to a process of competitive selection, it survives pri-
marily because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors than alternate institutional 
forms. For example, by drawing on Williamson’s transaction cost theory rational choice insti-
tutionalists argued that the institutions of the Congress lower the transaction costs of making 
deals and therefore allowing gains from exchange among legislators to create the passage of 
legislation possible. In sum, the origin and maintenance or abandonment of institutions over 
time is explained by reference to the way in which it minimises transaction, production or 
influence costs.  
However, observing the evolution within the rational choice tradition Shepsle (2006) con-
cluded that the understanding of institution is moving in two continua: exogenous/endogenous 
and structured/unstructured. On the one hand, institutions can be taken as exogenous con-
straints or as exogenously given ‘rule of the game’. On the other hand, institutions can take a 
deeper and subtler form as simply ‘the ways in which the players want to play’ a game (Shep-
sle 2006, p. 25). Further, some institutions may take a structured and formalised form that is 
robust over time, e.g. political party, congress, or assembly. Some others may be less struc-
tured providing a less firm foundation for analysis, e.g. norm of senatorial courtesy, coordi-
nated arrangements and collective action; although these can be easily recognised as estab-
lished patterns and practices. 
3.3 Institutional theory in sociology  
3.3.1 Early institutional theory in sociology 
Emile Durkheim 
  34 
In his early work Emile Durkheim, French sociologist, viewed that collective order is built on 
the presumption of rational action and can be successfully negotiated in an individualistic 
way. In his later work, however, he amended his explanations by changing from instrumental-
ist and individualistic approach unto collective-, normative-framework approach: the non-
contractual element. It is the presence of, what Durkheim termed, that ‘non-contractual ele-
ment’ that makes a system of contractual relations is possible at all. It opens the possibility of 
contractual relation because, first, without it both contracting parties would have to settle all 
the implications of a contract ad hoc anew including those for curbing opportunism/fraud and 
preventing oppression/contract-signing under duress; and, second, more importantly the nor-
mative rules of the institution of contract accounts for the principal element of order that cre-
ates stability of the system. Furthermore, Durkheim’s view on institution differed profoundly 
with Veblen’s in the essential nature of institutions: instead of being complex habits they are 
normative rules ultimately dependent on common ethical values (Parsons 1935, pp. 647–650).  
Durkheim’s mature formulation emphasises the significance of symbolic systems, namely 
systems of belief and ‘collective representations’, shared cognitive frames, schemas and val-
ues. They are perceived by individuals as objective, external, and even coercive facts; al-
though initially they are subjectively created through human interaction. For Durkheim these 
symbolic systems are social institutions (Scott 2008, pp. 11–12). 
Max Weber 
Despite the fact that Max Weber never used the term ‘institution’ in all of his works, his 
thoughts reflect unanimously an extended conception of economics, inter alia, from the insti-
tutional perspective. Weber’s view on economics and its relation to other social sciences is 
insightful and groundbreaking. With his programmatic concept of ‘social economics’ 
(Sozioökonomik), he proposed that economic phenomena in general should be analysed 
through several, not one, of the social sciences. Each social science has its own strengths and 
weaknesses and therefore the analyst should choose the appropriate combination according to 
the purpose of analysis: ‘economic history’ for the in-depth analysis of a single economic 
phenomena in the past, ‘economic sociology’ for the study of a typical set of economic ac-
tions in present time, ‘economic theory’ for explaining the pure logic of interest-driven action 
during some period. 
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Standing at the crossroads of three major debates at the turn of 19th and 20th centuries, Weber 
possessed a unique theoretical stance that attempted to reconcile the contending ideas at that 
time. Scott (2008, pp. 11–12) characterised it in general as follows: 
i. Economics as a natural science vs. as a cultural/social science. Weber argued against 
an objectivistic approach – like in a value-free natural science – to economics and insisted 
instead on treating economics as social science since the object of study, i.e. individuals, 
subjectively attach meaning to events. Individuals do not mechanically respond to stimuli; 
they first interpret them based on their ‘cognitive interest’ which is a product of specific 
cultural conditions, and then determine their response (Swedberg 2001, pp. 83–84). There-
fore, understanding subjective meanings attached by individuals into their own actions are 
the key in understanding social actions.  
ii. Idealist vs. materialist view. Instead of supporting one of these conflicting views, Weber 
employed interpretative (deutende) approach to combine material conditions and interests 
with idealist values as the motivation and guidance for action. 
 
Figure 3-1 Weber’s basic analytical unit: ‘social economic action’ 
Source: modified from Swedberg (2001, pp. 84–85) 
iii. Historical School vs. neoclassical economics. Weber tried to balance the abstract in-
sights of theoretical economics (‘abstract theory’) with the insights based on empirical 
material (‘realistic theory’ or ‘empirically oriented economics’). On the one hand, he sup-
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ported the idea of Menger and the classists that theoretical models are valuable instru-
ments in formulating and evaluating general arguments abstracted from specific, complex, 
discrete, and historically embedded systems. On the other hand, he argued that economics 
should consider historical circumstances and employ comparative approach as it is sug-
gested by the institutionalists. In synthesising these conflicting ideas, he proposed that ab-
stract theory can improve the more empirically oriented forms of economics through its 
insistence on the analytical elements, especially the way in which it constructs categories 
or ‘ideal types’. Ideal types are not the reality; but rather aids in guiding analysis and in-
forming comparative studies, thereby increasing understanding of the real world (Swed-
berg 2001, pp. 82–84). More specifically, Weber treated the model of ‘rational economic 
man’ as an ideal type that evolves historically under specific cultural rules of Western 
civilisation4. Hence, for him rational economic man is a variable and not an assumption. 
Summarising Weber’s works particularly those contributing to economic sociology; Swed-
berg (2001, p. 90) delineated five basic principles of the Weberian approach to economic so-
ciology: 
i. The basic unit of analysis is social economic action. Weber built his analysis of econ-
omy on his basic definition of ‘social economic action’, namely an action by an individ-
ual, which is primarily driven by both material and ideal interests and to some extent by 
tradition/habit and sentiments/emotion, aimed at utility either in the form of a good or a 
service, and where other actors are always taken into account5 (see Figure 3-1). This ex-
plicitly states that the analysis starts with the actions of a single individual (methodologi-
cal individualism6) by also considering the behaviour of other individuals, and then pro-
ceeds with more complex social interactions, namely ‘social economic relationship’ – 
when two actors direct their economic social actions at each other – and ‘economic or-
ganisation’. 
ii. Economic action is presumed to be rational, until otherwise proven. It is important to 
note that, first, the concept of rationality employed by Weber differs with the concept of 
                                                 
4 Cf. Weber (1905/2005) 
5 Cf. Weber (1922/2005, pp. 3–18) 
6 See Sub-chapter 3.6 for methodological individualism. 
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rationality posited by (neo-) classical economics: rationality means that the actor attempts 
to realize his or her interests, instead of that the actor has perfect information. Second, 
Weber embraced a modified version of interest theory that includes ideal interest. Hence, 
economic action is primarily driven by material interest (‘instrumental rationality’) or 
ideal interest (‘value rationality’). If, however, the empirical reality deviates from the ba-
sic presumption, then another type of explanation is sought to account for the discrepancy, 
for example, by introducing tradition/habit and sentiments/emotion. Socio-economic sci-
ence is anyway, as Weber insisted, a ‘science of reality’ (‘Wirklichkeitswissenschaft’). 
iii. Struggle and domination are endemic to economic life. Economic life is characterised 
by, on the one hand, individuals struggling to realise their interests in a situation of scar-
city and, on the other hand, by domination in most economic organisations as well as po-
litical system. 
iv. Not only economic behaviour should be analysed, but also behaviour that is eco-
nomically relevant and economically conditioned. Weber argued that the subject area of 
analysis should not cover solely economic phenomena per se, but also non-economic phe-
nomena influencing the economic phenomena (‘economically relevant phenomena’)7 and 
non-economic phenomena influenced by the economic phenomena (‘economically condi-
tioned phenomena’). This stands in line with his argument that economic sphere – certain 
areas of society where economic actions predominate – does not exist independently re-
gardless with what happens in other parts of society, such as the political sphere, the reli-
gious sphere, and so on; they are indeed mutually influencing (see Figure 3-2). 
 
Figure 3-2 Economic phenomena, economically relevant and conditioned phenomena 
Source: own compilation based on Swedberg (2001, p. 90) 
                                                 
7 One famous example for ‘economically relevant phenomena’ is Weber’s creative work The Protestant Ethics 
and The Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 1905/2005). 
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Economic sociology should cooperate with economic theory, economic history, and other 
approaches – within the framework of social economics. A combination of different ap-
proaches in social sciences is needed to analyse economic phenomena comprehensively. 
Talcott Parsons 
Talcott Parsons attempted, like Weber, to reconcile an objective and a subjective approach to 
social action (Scott 2008, pp. 23–25). In his analysis of organisations he put a great emphasis 
on what he termed the ‘objective’ dimension of institution: a system of norms defining what 
the relations of individuals (or organisations) ought to be. Parsons viewed that normative 
frameworks existed independently of a given social actor. Analysts needed to take into ac-
count the ‘orientation’ of actors to them. As actors in an ongoing social relation oriented their 
actions to a common set of normative standards and value patterns, such normative systems 
becomes internalised by the actors. This is the ‘subjective’ dimension of institution, where 
individual actors internalise shared norms so they become the basis for the individual’s action, 
and even to the degree that the “conformity with it becomes a need-disposition in the actor's 
own personality structure” (Parsons 1951, p. 37 in Scott 2008, p. 14). In this sense institution-
alised action is motivated by ‘moral’ rather than ‘instrumental’ concern because the primary 
motive for obedience to an institutional norm lies in the moral authority it exercises over the 
individual. The actor conforms because of his or her belief in a value standard, not out of ex-
pediency or self-interest. 
Contemporary theorists, however, noted several kinds of limitations from Parson’s formula-
tion (Scott 2008, p. 15). First, he over-stressed the significance of cultural patterns in his con-
ception of institutionalisation and thereby overemphasizing the control exerted by values over 
conditions. Second, consequently his conception of institution underemphasised the signifi-
cance of interests and instrumental action and rational choice. Hence, his general cultural-
institutional argument was limited to value-orientation and thereby its cognitive dimension 
was neglected. Third, notwithstanding Parson’s attempt to employ objective approach to so-
cial action, he did not succeed in expounding the existence of culture as an object of orienta-
tion existing outside the individual (objectivity), since he viewed culture mainly as an inter-
nalised element of the personality system (subjectivity).  
3.3.2 Cognitive Theory  
Following Scott (2008, pp. 36–37), during the 1940s and 1950s, the stimulus-response (S-R) 
approach was revised to include attention to the participation of an active organism (S-O-R) 
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that mediated between the provocation and reaction. The idea of the human organism as an 
information processor became popular. The mind came to be viewed by many as a computer-
like apparatus that registered the incoming information and then subjected it to a variety of 
transformations before ordering a response (Markus et al. 1985, p. 141). The question be-
came, what types of “software” provide the programs and transformation rules for these proc-
esses? Several debates attempt to answer this question. 
While early social theorists, like Durkheim, insisted that ‘the framework of the intelligence’ 
or ‘mental model’ was determined by the social and cultural forms of the society into which 
an individual was born; a large and growing body of psychological theory and research sug-
gests that, rather than providing a blank slate, humans come equipped with a number of fun-
damental mental capabilities, such as conceptions of space, number, cause-and-effect rela-
tions, and recognition of categories. Even the principles of language (syntax) are not learned 
but part of our bio-endowment (Bergesen 2004). Other debate concerns whether individuals’ 
thought processes follow abstract reasoning (‘computational’) or a ‘pattern-recognition’ 
(‘connectionist’) model. The latter appears better suited to explaining the ways in which so-
cioeconomic actors cope with the kinds of uncertainties they encounter (North 2005, p. 27). 
It is also being contested whether individuals are basically competent, rational beings or 
rather experience cognitive biases and limitations. Recent cognitive theory and research has 
been to emphasise the shortcomings of individuals as information processors and decision 
makers. However, despite these limitations, cognitive psychologists have recognised that in-
dividuals actively participate in perceiving, interpreting, and making sense of their world. By 
contrast, sociologists tended to give primacy to the effects of contextual factors, viewing indi-
viduals as more passive, prone to conform to the demands of their social systems and roles. 
3.3.3 Phenomenology  
Phenomenologists accentuate the role of shared knowledge and belief systems (cognitive 
frames and cultural frameworks), as opposed to shared norms and values (normative systems). 
These meaning and belief systems are not only as internalised, subjective beliefs, but also as 
external, objective frameworks. Defining institution as symbolic systems that are experienced 
as possessing a reality of their own that confronts individuals as an external and coercive fact, 
Berger and Luckmann defined the construction of common meaning systems as three phases 
of institutionalisation (Berger et al. 1967, pp. 58, 60-61 in Scott 2008, pp. 40–41): 
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i. Externalisation. The production of symbolic structures whose meaning comes to be 
shared by the participants. 
ii. Objectification. The process by which symbolic structures become a fact, reality, ‘some-
thing out there’. 
iii. Internalisation. The process by which the objectified world is retrojected into conscious-
ness in the course of socialisation. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
Different scholars also emphasised the importance of retrospective view in analysing institu-
tion. Through the historical study it is possible to understand why the current state of institu-
tion has come about. The understanding of the emergence and change of institution obviously 
provide more solid basis than static snapshot of the present institutional condition does. 
Some institutionalists found out that certain aspect of institution may constitute the most sig-
nificant conclusion in their researches. Others do found something else. Thus, the assumption 
embraced in this research is that it seeks to differentiate things found out in the research and 
to highlight its differing factor; yet it shall try to see the logical connections between things 
and their relation. Hence, it follows an ‘inseparable yet distinguishable’ approach. On the one 
hand, an integrative view should be employed in analysing the elements of institutions; inte-
grative in the sense that it explicitly rejects the notion of privileging the supremacy of one 
element while completely disregarding another element of institution. Indeed, most empirical 
observations of institutions showed that not one, single element is at work, but rather combi-
nations of elements with diverse constellation of dominance constructing a social framework. 
How they are interdependent and reinforcing each others are in fact subject to explanation. On 
the other hand, the integrative view should be complemented by a distinguishing view so as to 
prevent the analysis from failing to identify important intrinsic differences among the institu-
tional elements. By differentiating the components of each element, e.g. underlying assump-
tions, mechanisms, and indicators, it is possible to “identify underlying theoretical fault lines 
that transect the domain” (Scott 2008, p. 51).  
From various schools of thought diverse scholars have contributed their valuable ideas and 
efforts in the endeavour to build sound theory of institution. Together they vouch that institu-
tions are indeed complex phenomena with multiple facets that need to be approached compre-
hensively. These multiple facets of institution are summarised in the omnibus concept of insti-
tution to be delineated in the next sub-chapter.  
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3.5 Theoretical framework: The institutional pillars  
The previous sub-chapters have briefly reviewed the contributions of diverse scholars from 
various disciplines or fields of study concerning institutional theory. Of course, all of these 
valuable contributions were not dealt with in their fullest richness, but rather limitedly focus-
ing on those aspects relevant to the crafting of theoretical framework for this research. It is 
also to acknowledge that the arguments and ideas advanced by different scholars rest on var-
ied assumptions and thus incorporating different emphasises – some mutually reinforcing, 
some conflicting. To incorporate the existing conceptual richness of institutional theory Scott 
(2008) proposed an omnibus definition of institution that can also systematise and structure 
those valuable contributions: 
Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together 
with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. (Scott 
2008, pp. 48–50) 
Regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive systems have each been identified as vital in-
gredient of institutions: the central building blocks of institutional structures. These elements 
form a continuum – meaning that there is no clear-cut separation between the elements – 
moving from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for 
granted (see Figure 3-3). 
3.5.1 The regulative pillar 
All scholars, in the broadest sense, underscore the regulative aspects of institutions: rule-
setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities. Many treatments of institutions emphasise 
their capacity to control and constrain behaviour. However, it is essential to recognise that 
institutions also support and empower activities and actors. Regulative rules are devised both 
to constrain undesired behaviour and to empower desired one. The conformity to such regula-
tions or the ‘monitoring’ is backed up by sanctions – in negative sense of punishment and in 
positive sense of incentive – in an attempt to influence future behaviour. 
 The primary mechanism of control is coercion – force, sanctions, and expedience responses – 
that is legitimated by the existence of informal mores or formal rules and laws. Regulatory 
processes may operate through diffuse, informal mechanisms, involving folkways such as 
shaming or shunning activities; or they may be highly formalised and assigned to specialised 
actors, such as the police and courts. In fact, few rulers are content to base their regime on 
force alone; all attempt to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy. Apart from threat of sanctions 
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they may provide inducements or incentives for compliance. The most common case involves 
the use of authority, in which coercive power is legitimated by a normative framework that 
both supports and constrains the exercise of power. The regulative and normative pillars thus 
can be mutually reinforcing. 
 
Figure 3-3 The pillars of institution 
Source: own compilation based on Scott (2008)  
Agreements can be monitored and mutually enforced, often also by neutral “third party” (im-
portant function of the state). North (1990/2005, p. 64) argued: “Because ultimately a third 
party must always involve the state as a source of coercion, a theory of institutions also inevi-
tably involves analysis of the political structure of a society and the degree to which that po-
litical structure provides a framework of effective enforcement”. He also noticed that problem 
can arise because “enforcement is undertaken by agents whose own utility functions influence 
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outcomes” (i.e., third parties who are not neutral) (North 1990/2005, p. 54). The regulative 
aspect of institutions creates renewed interest in the role of the state: as ruler maker, referee, 
and enforcer. 
As institutions comprise not only substance but also affect, they stimulate not only interpreta-
tive but also emotional reactions. The feelings induced may constitute an important compo-
nent of power of institutions. To confront a system of rules backed by the machinery of en-
forcement is to experience, at the one extreme, fear, dread, and guilt, or, at the other, relief, 
innocence, and vindication. Powerful emotions indeed! 
Emphasis on regulative pillars stems from the character of the customary objects studied by 
economists and rational choice political scientists: focus on the behaviour of individuals and 
firms in markets and other competitive situations, such as politics, where contending interests 
are more common and, hence, explicit rules and referees are more necessary to preserve order. 
Such economists and political scientists viewed individuals and organisations that construct 
rule systems or conform to rules as pursuing their self-interests – as behaving instrumentally 
and expediently. Many works in economics emphasises the costs of regulation. Agency theory 
stresses the expense and difficulty entailed in monitoring performances relevant to contracts, 
whether implicit or explicit, and in designing appropriate incentives. 
3.5.2 The normative pillar 
The normative element of institutions contains rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, 
and obligatory dimension into social life. Normative rules comprise of both values and norms. 
Values are conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of 
standards to which existing structures or behaviours can be compared and assessed; whereas 
norms specify how things should be done: they define legitimate means to pursue valued 
ends. Normative systems define not only goals or objectives, but also designate appropriate 
ways to pursue them. While values and norms are applicable to all members of the society, 
there are also group-specific normative rules, namely roles: conceptions of appropriate goals 
and activities for specific individuals or social positions. Social roles are templates for par-
ticular types of actors and scripts for action. Roles can be formally constructed – as it is in the 
case of specified right and responsibilities of a specific position in an organisation – and can 
also emerge informally through human interaction over time. Roles arise as common under-
standings develop that particular actions are associated with particular actors. Roles develop 
when repetitive patterns of action gradually become habitualised and objectified.  
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Values, norms, and roles are not simply anticipations or predictions, but prescriptions or nor-
mative expectations on how specified actors (focal actors) are supposed to behave. These ex-
pectations are held by other actors of the society and thus are experienced by the focal actors 
as external pressures. Further, these normative rules become internalised by the actors albeit 
to varying degrees. Normative systems also both constrain and empower social actions, as 
they confer rights and responsibilities, privileges and duties, licenses and mandates. The 
‘monitoring’ of conformity or violation involves self-evaluation (internalised): heightened 
remorse and/or effects on self-respect. Such emotions provide powerful inducement to com-
pliance. Monitoring can also be imposed by others (morally governed). 
Norms can also evoke strong feelings, but different to those in connection with rules and 
regulations. Trespassing of norms causes shame or disgrace; whereas exemplary behaviour 
brings pride and honour. 
The normative conception of institutions was embraced by most early sociologists like Durk-
heim, Parsons, and Selznick, because they examined kinship groups, social classes, religious 
systems, and voluntary associations, where common beliefs and values are more likely to ex-
ist and constitute an important basis for order. 
3.5.3 The cultural-cognitive pillars  
The cultural-cognitive8 pillar deals with the cognitive dimensions of human existence: the 
internal, subjective interpretative processes that are shaped by external, objective cultural 
frameworks. Each individual – thus subjective – possesses a cognitive dimension that con-
tains a collection of internalised symbolic representations of the world. The same symbolic 
representations are in the same time also perceived by other individuals – thus objective – and 
exist externally to individual actors in the collectivity. These cultural elements vary in their 
degree of institutionalisation – the extent of their linkage to other elements and the degree to 
which they are embodied in routines or organising schema. The cultural-cognitive element is 
equivalent with the “O” in the “S-O-R” model advocated by Markus et al. (1985). The inter-
nal cognitive framework in the organism (O) that mediates between the external world of 
                                                 
8 The hyphenation of ‘cultural’ and ‘cognitive’ explicitly recognizes the intimate, inseparable influence of cul-
tural frameworks in shaping the processes in human ‘cognition’. 
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stimuli (S) and the response of the individual organism (R). Cognitive frames – or alterna-
tively termed ‘patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting’; ‘software of the mind’ – enter into the 
full range of information-processing activities, from determining what information will re-
ceive attention, how it will be encoded, how it will be retained, retrieved, and organized into 
memory, to how it will be interpreted, thus affecting evaluations, judgments, predictions, and 
inferences. 
This pillar emphasises the importance of symbols and meanings: symbols – words, signs, and 
gestures – shape the meanings we attribute to objects and activities; whereas meanings arise 
in interaction and are maintained and transformed as they are employed to make sense of the 
ongoing stream of happenings. Berger (1981, p. 31) summarised: “Every human institutions 
is, as it were, a sedimentation of meanings or, to vary the image, a crystallisation of meanings 
in objective form”. This takes us to Max Weber’s central premise: an action is regarded as 
social only to the extent that the actor attaches meaning to the behaviour. To understand or 
explain any action, the analyst must take into account not only the objective conditions, but 
the actor’s subjective interpretation of them. A cultural-cognitive conception of institutions 
stresses the central role played by the socially mediated construction of common framework 
of meaning (Scott 2008, p. 59). 
Compliance occurs in many circumstances because other types of behaviour are inconceiv-
able; routines are followed because they are taken for granted as ‘the way we do these things’.  
The affective dimension of this pillar is expressed in feelings ranging from the positive affect 
of certitude and confidence to the negative feelings of confusion or disorientation. Actors who 
align themselves with prevailing cultural beliefs are likely to feel competent and connected, 
whereas those who are at odds are regarded as clueless and crazy. 
The cultural-cognitive elements of institutions are mainly represented by anthropologists like 
Geertz and Douglas; sociologists like Berger, Goffman, and Meyer; and organisational schol-
ars like DiMaggio, Powell, and Scott. 
3.5.4 Some other important elements and properties of institution  
Social activities. Apart from the three pillars as the central building block, institutions also 
encompass associated social activities or actions. Social activities are required to produce and 
sustain institutions or, in other words, institutions are inhabited by people and their interac-
tions. Isolating institutions from the individuals dwelling in them is erroneous since we gain 
  46 
empirical access to institutions by inspecting events and observing individuals; not by arrang-
ing abstracted entities into unified patterns. 
Resources. Resources are also considered as an important element of institution. Any concep-
tion of social structure should underline the importance of including both material and human 
resources, since these are needed to sustain institutions. If rules and norms are to be effective, 
they must be backed with sanctioning power; otherwise they are abandoned. Moreover, pos-
session over and/or access to certain resources are frequently the prerequisite to obtaining 
power like in the case of asymmetry of market/economic power on account of uneven distri-
bution of resources. 
Stability (state) and change (process). Institutions are durable social structures that are rela-
tively resistant to change. They tend to be transmitted across generations, to be maintained 
and reproduced. Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life giving 
solidity to social systems across time and space. However, although institutions function to 
provide stability and order, they undergo change, both incremental and revolutionary. Thus, 
inquiries should not only into institutions as a “property” or state, but also as a “process”. 
Legitimacy. To survive and thrive institutions also need legitimacy apart from human and 
material resources (Scott 2008, p. 59). Legitimacy is conceived here as social acceptability 
and credibility resulting from generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an en-
tity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within the prevailing institutional frameworks. Fre-
quently legitimacy is associated with power. Legitimacy requires support from certain (exter-
nal) power or authorities like e.g. the state. Weber (1922/2005) argued that power becomes 
legitimated as authority to the extent that its exercise is supported by prevailing social norms, 
whether traditional, charismatic, or bureaucratic. 
The three pillars elicit three related, but distinguishable bases of legitimacy (Scott 2008, p. 
61). The regulatory pillar emphasises the conformity to rules, relevant legal or quasi-legal 
requirements. The normative builds on more internalised, deeper, moral base with both intrin-
sic as well as extrinsic rewards as incentive to conformity. The cultural-cognitive underlines 
the compliance with a common definition of the situation, frame of reference, or a recognis-
able role or structural template. The cultural-cognitive mode is the “deepest” level because it 
rests on preconscious, taken-for-granted understandings. Legitimation reflects perceived con-
sonance with relevant rules and laws, normative support, or alignment with cultural-cognitive 
frameworks. 
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Institutional levels. Institutions operate at multiple levels, from the world system, societies, 
social groups, interpersonal interaction, to internal cognitive processes in individuals. Institu-
tional scholars in economics distinguish three institutional levels of rule and governance sys-
tems ranging from micro-, meso-, to macro-level. While Coase (1937) focused his inquiries 
into micro level of firm-level governance structure, Williamson (1991) scrutinised meso-level 
institutional analysis involving firms under a certain governance structure like hybrid organ-
isational forms (franchising, alliance, etc.) and hierarchical structures (unified firms, multidi-
visional corporations, etc.). North (1990/2005), an economic historian, examined the macro-
level of institutional analysis to account for the emergence and change of wider institutional 
frameworks, namely how cultural, political, and legal frameworks (“rules of the game”) affect 
economic forms (Scott 2008, pp. 27–30). 
Parsons (1956) classified three distinctive institutional levels in an organisation: the technical, 
the managerial, and the institutional. The technical level is concerned with production activi-
ties; the managerial with control and coordination activities, procurement of resources, and 
disposal of products; and the institutional with relating the organisation to the norms and con-
ventions of the community and society. Every organisation is a subsystem of “a wider social 
system which is the source of the ‘meaning’, legitimation, or higher-level support which 
makes the implementation of the organisation’s goals possible” (Scott 2008, p. 24). 
3.6 Analytical framework: Methodological individualism  
Building on the omnibus definition and concept of institution as elaborated in the previous 
sub-chapter, it is now the task to define the analytical framework for operationalising the 
theoretical framework into the empirical research process. Acknowledging that both objective 
institutional framework and subjective individuals are the key elements of institutional theo-
ries, the analytical framework for this research follows the approach of methodological indi-
vidualism. Nevertheless, since methodological individualism itself is also a contentious con-
cept, it is indispensable to first elucidate the history of development of this term and various 
understandings behind it. A clearly stated definition of this term is given at the end of the dis-
cussion. Then, building on this approach the Macro-Micro Model of Coleman (1990) and 
Esser (1999) is delineated in brief. 
3.6.1 History of development and definition  
The term ‘methodological individualism’ was coined by Joseph Schumpeter (Hodgson 2007, 
pp. 211–214; Udehn 2002, p. 484). This term first appeared in German – ‘Der methodolo-
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gischer Individualismus’ – as a chapter title in the book published by Schumpeter in 1908 
‘Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie’. One year later it ap-
peared in English in the article ‘On the Concept of Social Value’ published in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. Schumpeter employed this term to make a distinction between political 
and methodological individualist. For Schumpeter methodological individualism simply 
means that individual is the starting point for describing economic phenomena, for all things 
are demanded, produced, and paid for because individuals want them – irrelevant why indi-
viduals demand these goods. Thus, the term served rather as a method in theoretical econom-
ics than in sociology and should not be associated with many prominent versions of methodo-
logical individualism promoted after the Second World War that put the emphasis on the 
question why and how individuals take decisions and actions resulting in certain economic 
phenomena. 
Notwithstanding the frequent appearance of the term methodological individualism in con-
temporary literatures of social sciences, there is no consensus on its sense and usage (Hodg-
son (2007, p. 212; Udehn 2002). Therefore, the clarification of the definition and the notion 
behind these two words is of the uttermost importance. Containing the word ‘individualism’ 
this term has indeed the notion that the methodology of explaining social phenomena should 
be based on individuals with their actions and decisions. However, it is first important to fur-
ther specify what precisely the explanantia of methodological individualism is: are social 
phenomena to be explained entirely in terms of individuals alone or partly in terms of indi-
viduals plus other factors such as the interactive relations between individuals and social insti-
tutions? Based on this difference in explanantia Udehn (2002, p. 500) distinguished two ma-
jor versions of methodological individualism. Proponents of strong methodological 
individualism put individuals as the only exogenous variable in their model; whereas those of 
weak methodological individualism include interaction between individuals and social institu-
tions. The development of the latter makes the traditional opposition and exclusive separation 
between individualism and institutionalism/holism difficult. 
Against the strong version of methodological individualism Hodgson (2007) argued that re-
ducing explanation only to individual is untenable. First, institutions do matter in explaining 
collective phenomena because they play influential role of shaping individuals: 
Individual choice requires a conceptual framework to make sense of the world. The reception of 
information by an individual requires a paradigm or cognitive frame to process and make sense 
of that information. The acquisition of this cognitive apparatus involves processes of socializa-
tion and education, involving extensive interaction with others. [...] The means of our under-
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standing of the world is necessarily acquired through social relationships and interactions. Cog-
nition is a social as well as an individual process. Individual choice is impossible without these 
institutions and interactions. (Hodgson 2007, p. 218) 
Second, despite the fact that the proponents of strong methodological individualism do not 
consider institution as explanantia, they would still have to account for the existing institution 
shaping the individuals. These individuals, in turn, are also shaped by the previous institu-
tional set-up which is also partly a result of purposive actions from individuals, and so on. 
Then, where should the analysis stop? This infinite regress, in which neither individual nor 
institutional explanatory factors are predominant over each other, brings us to the puzzle 
‘which one comes first, the chicken or the egg?’ (Hodgson 2001, pp. 249–252). Acknowledg-
ing that there is no ‘institution-free’ nature of individuals, each social analysis must always 
and unavoidably start from individuals plus some institutions, however primitive. Both of 
these arguments are in line in particular with the cultural-cognitive pillar of institution as it is 
elaborated in the Sub-chapter 3.5.3. 
Based on these arguments, the analytical framework of this research follows the definition of 
the weak methodological individualism, namely ‘an approach to explaining social phenomena 
in terms of individuals, their interaction and social institutions’. The discourse upon methodo-
logical individualism in this sub-chapter accentuates the importance of taking individuals with 
their actions, decisions, and interactions as one of the starting points in the empirical research 
stage. This necessity of integrating both explanantia into a model useful and applicable in 
empirical research leads to the Macro-Micro Model that was proposed by Coleman (1990) 
and then further extended by Esser (1999). 
Table 3-1 Methodological individualism: A problematic label 
Although the advocates of the weak version of methodological individualism have already given clear defini-
tion and convincing arguments to abandon the too reductive, narrow view of the strong methodological indi-
vidualism, Hodgson criticised the term itself: If social institutions and structures deserve the equal importance 
of being explanatory factor as individuals, why still call the term ‘methodological individualism’? Why not 
‘methodological structuralism’ or ‘methodological institutionalism’? All of these terms are misleading, for each 
analysis has to start from both structures/institutions and individuals. 
The term ‘institutional individualism’ proposed by Joseph Agassi can better reflect the notion. However, it is to 
notice that ‘institution’ receives here the adjective status; whereas ‘individual’ has the prestige status of being 
the noun. Why not call it ‘individualistic institutionalism’? No reasons and argumentations can give the one 
primacy over the other.  
Another critique is concerning the confusion over the term as being ‘methodological’ or ‘ontological’ statement. 
Following Udehn, methodological individualism is a principle, rule, or programme about how to define collec-
tive concepts, explain social phenomena, and/or reduce macro to micro. Many advocates of methodological 
individualism, however, state it as an ontological thesis, namely that the cause, nature, and existence per se of 
social phenomena is individual; as it is stated in a well-known citation “There is no such thing as society”. 
Source: own compilation based on Hodgson (2007) and Udehn (2002)  
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3.6.2 Macro-Micro Model by Coleman and Esser  
Udehn (2002, pp. 492-496, 500-501) characterized Coleman’s version of methodological in-
dividualism as: 
i. a more objectivist approach focusing on social institutions and structures as external 
constraints upon behaviour; whereas the subjectivist approach focuses more on prefer-
ences and beliefs of individuals. Hence, the former builds upon simple assumptions about 
individual behaviour (thin psychology) while the latter relies on a richer psychological as-
sumptions.  
ii. a heuristic device or research programme orientated toward practical, empirical appli-
cation. This stands in opposition to those employing methodological individualism as an a 
priori, universal, normative principle in social scientific research – a view common among 
philosophers. 
iii. structural individualism, since it clearly distinguishes between natural persons and posi-
tion/role they occupy as corporate actors. These positions and not the persons per se are 
the elements of the social structure of corporate actors. Thus, relation between corporate 
actors is between positions rather than persons. Another point that distinguishes Cole-
man’s theoretical position is his insistence on ‘social structure’ as an additional, specific 
exogenous variable. ‘Social structure’ here is employed in a narrow sense i.e. to denote a 
set of interdependent, interrelated positions that determine the pattern of interaction be-
tween individuals occupying certain position prior to the personal encounter itself9. Al-
though typically this variable appears, if at all, as endogenous variable or consequence, 
Coleman considers this in the antecedent of social scientific explanation and thus pre-
defines any interaction between individuals. In sum, the explanatia of social phenomena 
according to Coleman are individuals, social institution, and social structure. 
Coleman’s model of methodological individualism, entitled the ‘Macro-Micro Model’, is 
characterised by two aspects. First, it makes a clear distinction between variables on macro 
and micro level. Macro level variables include phenomena observed in the society such as 
social structure, collective action of individuals, and so forth; whereas micro level variables 
                                                 
9 The distinction between ‘social institution’ and ‘social structure’ refers specifically to this passage. In other 
parts of this research both terms are used interchangeably. 
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are individuals and firms/corporate actors. Second, according to this theorem the correlation 
of two collective variables in macro level cannot be drawn directly. Rather, it can only be 
explained through referring back to the actions, orientation, decision, and behaviour taken by 
individuals in micro level. The example below will further explain the model. 
 
Figure 3-4 Macro- and micro-level propositions: Effects of religious doctrines on economic or-
ganisation 
Source: Coleman (1990, p. 8)  
For the introduction of the Macro-Micro Model Coleman (1990) took Weber’s famous postu-
late ‘the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’ to explain his propositions (see Figure 
3-4). Coleman argued that the doctrine of Protestant religion (a macro variable) is not the di-
rect cause for the dissemination of capitalism in the Occident (also a macro variable); but 
rather it has affected the individuals adhering to the doctrine (a micro variable). The doctrine 
of Protestant religion contains certain values that were then adopted by its adherents as ideal 
values for their life, in particular towards work life or work ethic (arrow 1). The adoption of 
these values had resulted in certain changes of orientation to economic behaviour (arrow 2). 
These new orientation helped bring about capitalist economic organisations in the society and 
the rise of capitalism (arrow 3)10. 
Esser (1999) generalised the method of Coleman’s Macro-Micro Model (see Figure 3-5) and 
complemented the arrows with following terms: 
                                                 
10 Cf. Weber (1905/2005) 
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i. Arrow 1: Logic of Situation is defined as typifying description of the situation by actors. 
In sociology logic of situation typically refers to the contextual effect of social situation 
toward the orientation and action of individuals. To analyse this contextual effect, one 
needs to employ bridge hypothesis to bridge between collective and individual levels. 
ii. Arrow 2: Logic of Selection describes how individuals come to their decision. This can 
be explained by several theoretical models: Esser prefers to use Wert-Erwartungstheorie 
or Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), Rational Choice Theory, Game Theory, Utility-
Maximising Behaviour, Bounded-Rationality Theory, and so forth. 
iii. Arrow 3: Logic of Aggregation describes how individual actions can lead to certain so-
cial phenomena on collective level. However, here it is important to acknowledge the so-
called “aggregation problem” – as it is frequently expressed by the notorious statement 
“the whole is more than the sum of the parts”. The term ‘aggregation’ does not mean 
merely the adding-up of each individual action; instead, it refers to a more complex com-
bination of interdependencies between individuals and existing institution producing a 
systemic outcome – all which is to be explained (Udehn 2002, pp. 494–495).  
iv. Arrow 4: Indirect correlation between ‘Social phenomena 1’ and ‘Social phenomena 
2’ is depicted by broken line to explicitly state that the correlation between these variables 
is indirect and can only be explained through the micro level. For Esser this model serves 
rather as an orientation for individualistic modelling and is thus very useful for practical 
researches.  
 
Figure 3-5 Macro-Micro Model by Coleman and Esser 
Source: Miebach (2006, p. 398)  
One fundamental result Esser achieved in his research applying Macro-Micro Model is that 
empirical processes can only be described and explained adequately when the time dimension 
of those processes are taken into consideration (Miebach 2006, p. 429). Consequently, the 
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Macro-Micro Model can be repeatedly applied to explain the gradual changes of macro vari-
ables over time.  
Further extension of Coleman’s Macro-Micro Model is the deliberation of meso level be-
tween the macro and micro level (see Figure 3-6). Meso level is of particular interest when the 
model involves more than one actor category – say “Actors A” and “Actors B” – and when 
the interactions between these actors are influential for explaining the macro variables. The 
meso level reflects the interaction system of the different actors – the “initial condition” and 
“end condition” – and is in turn explained on the individual level of the different actors – “Ac-
tors A or B” and “Actions by actors A or B”. 
 
Figure 3-6 Extension of Macro-Micro Model by Esser: Meso level in multi-level model 
Source: adapted from Miebach (2006, p. 430) 
  54 
4 Research Process and Design  
This chapter elucidates the whole research process and design. The first sub-chapter deals 
with the characterisation of the current research by delineating its outer boundaries: point of 
departure, approaches employed, and structures followed. Being empirical in nature this re-
search uses data in the form of observable, real-world experience, evidence and information. 
How the empirical processes are organised and what model of research is followed is the 
main concern of the subsequent sub-chapter. Finally, this chapter is closed by a short descrip-
tion of how the actual empirical processes are designed and carried out throughout the re-
search phases. 
4.1 Research characteristics  
In order to understand the characteristics of this dissertation, it is purposeful to first gain in-
sight into why and how this study was initiated. The point of departure in this dissertation is 
the conclusions drawn by the author in his previous research on the application of value chain 
approach in development cooperation Nugraha (2007, pp. 53–59). Whether a value chain up-
grades itself or develops through external facilitation is not solely a matter of identifying mar-
ket opportunities and exploiting them. Instead, “it is evident that the dysfunctional governance 
structures1 [of a value chain] … are the ultimate problem which nullifies all [value chain] de-
velopment efforts”. 
The governance of the value chains indeed plays a significant role in determining whether an 
upgrading takes place or not and how it proceeds. Another remarkable conclusion made was 
that such value chain approach, including its discussion on the governance, focuses so heavily 
on economic or market aspect as to neglect the importance of socio-cultural factors. This is 
due to the fact that most value chain approaches rest upon ‘homo oeconomicus’ – neo-
classical economics’ underlying assumption about human behaviour. The generalisation of 
such pre-assumption, however, should be put into question. While it may be applicable to 
chain operators of highly commercialised, globally operating value chains; economic deci-
sions and actions of individuals in rural areas of developing countries – that mainly are pre-
                                                 
1 The term ‘governance structures’ used here follows the definition of Kaplinsky et al. (2001). See Sub-chapter 
2.5. 
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dominated by economic activities in agricultural sector – are influentially shaped by the pre-
vailing socio-cultural context. 
The analysis of literatures on value chain governance in Chapter 2 has found out that hitherto 
the discussions on the concept of value chain governance concern mainly global value chains 
operating cross country borders. As a consequence, the perspective taken in such studies is 
from the large enterprises or multinational companies. Also, the discussed concept is under-
pinned by theories drawn on industrial organisation theory, management theory, and transac-
tions cost theory. These findings imply that until now there is not yet any attempt to discuss 
and explain the governance of value chains in different context, such as in developing coun-
tries in which completely different actors and structures are in place. In contrast to large mul-
tinational companies operating in global markets with more sophisticated technological status 
and more complicated market arrangements, value chains in rural areas of developing coun-
tries are predominated by economically weaker social groups – or frequently termed micro, 
small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) – with their interactions to large extent on local, 
regional, or national markets. This specific type of economic actor is, of course, situated in a 
disparate institutional setting and thereby necessitates a different theoretical approach. On 
account of the novelty of the research object this study embraces an exploratory view. 
The endeavour to introduce institutional perspective into the research on value chain govern-
ance also entails a more comprehensive approach. The theory of institution, as it is elucidated 
in Chapter 0, presents a wide range of insightful aspects – and thus complex – that can help to 
reveal important determining factors in value chain governance and in its relation with value 
chain upgrading. In other words, the theory of institution considers not only economic factors 
as the possible key factors in value chain upgrading, but also other aspects like rules, norms, 
habits, culture, and so forth. Even the dynamic interaction between these factors is also sub-
ject to explanation. Furthermore, this institutional context cannot be separated from the indi-
viduals or the actors of value chain embedded in it. These individuals, influencing and influ-
enced by the institutional structure, are indeed the focal point in explaining the collective 
phenomena. Thus, questions that may arise at this point are: Which factors are relevant and 
which are not? How are they interrelated to each others? How do individuals behave in such 
context? Given this complexity it is more appropriate to inquire into an elusive object of re-
search using a qualitative approach, as it is pointed by Punch (2005): 
Very often, the point of a qualitative study is to look at something holistically and comprehen-
sively, to study it in its complexity, and to understand it in its context. These points correspond 
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to three criticisms of quantitative social research: that it is too reductionist in its approach to the 
study of behaviour, thereby losing sight of the whole picture; that it oversimplifies social reality, 
in its stress on measurement; and that it strips away context from the data. (Punch 2005, p. 186) 
Inasmuch as explanatory propositions on the relation between the value chain governance and 
value chain upgrading are the goal of this study, the characteristics of value chain governance 
and the phenomena of value chain upgrading in different areas – i.e. the macro variables – are 
to be described first. Then, these descriptions are analysed using the theory of institution to 
discover the causal connections between those macro variables by referring back to the ac-
tions and decisions taken by individuals in different parts of the value chain – i.e. the micro 
variables. By defining the causal connections and abstracting these into more general state-
ments, explanatory propositions can be drawn regarding value chain governance and value 
chain upgrading. These explanatory propositions will have predictive value, albeit to limited 
extent, if they are transferred to other research contexts. In this regard, the research has both 
descriptive and explanatory character. 
Although the notion of value chain governance is not new, the existing concepts are not yet 
comprehensive and holistic since they virtually neglect social or institutional aspect. Hence, 
the endeavour to introduce this new aspect into governance concept can be considered as a 
theory generation. 
The research steers a middle course between pre-specified and unfolding structure2 with a 
tendency toward the latter. This applies to research questions, design, and data. Prior to the 
empirical work there are neither specific research questions about what exactly the study is 
inquiring nor pre-determined research design nor fixed categorisation of data to be collected. 
But instead, this research starts with some general questions that are derived from author’s 
previous experience in value chain research and from existing discussions on value chain 
governance (see Chapter 2) in the light of some fundamental principles highlighted in the 
theoretical framework (Chapter 0). These guiding questions, then, develop into more specific 
research questions as the empirical work proceeds. Regarding the research framework this 
study also does not start with a tabula rasa. Instead, as Chapter 2 highlighted the importance 
to view governance of value chain from institutional perspective, Chapter 0 delineates the 
                                                 
2 Punch (2005, p. 25) views the distinction between ‘pre-specified’ or ‘tight’ and ‘unfolding’ or ‘loose’ research 
structure not as a dichotomy, but rather as a continuum where various in-between positions are possible. 
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theoretical and analytical framework to explain the phenomena of value chain governance in 
relation with value chain upgrading. Building on this framework an a priori but provisory 
data categorisation is defined. Yet, here it is important to emphasise that both the research 
framework and data coding are not rigid or unchangeable; they serve rather as an orientation 
in empirical work and give much room for the infusion of particular knowledge and different 
data wording emerging in the research process. 
4.2 Model of research process and design 
Taking the explanations above as the point of departure it is now important to systematically 
construct the research process. The explication of the research process is useful for organising 
and structuring the research efforts around the research question. The organisation of the re-
search process follows the model delineated by Punch (2005, pp. 32–43). This simplified 
model of research includes two research stages: the pre-empirical and empirical stage (see 
Figure 4-1). 
 
Figure 4-1 Simplified model of research process 
Source: modified from Punch (2005, p. 40)  
4.2.1 Pre-empirical stage  
The pre-empirical research stage has the main objective to prepare the research so as to come 
to certain research questions – whether they are still in general terms or already exhibits a 
high degree of specificity. Identifying research questions is the centrepiece of a research proc-
ess because they, as pointed out by Punch (2005, pp. 36–37): 
 organise the project, and give it direction and coherence; 
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 delimit the project, showing its boundaries; 
 keep the researcher focused during the project; 
 provide a framework for writing up the project; and 
 point to the data that will be needed. 
It is important here to distinguish between general and specific research questions. General 
research questions serve as guidance in discerning what is the research trying to find out, but 
are not specific enough to be answered. Specific research questions ideally follow from the 
general ones, provide direction for the empirical stage, and are themselves the questions to be 
answered by the research. One may work deductively from general to specific questions, 
while another uses inductive approach by starting with some specific questions and then work 
back to more general questions. 
Punch’s model of research process also explicitly differ research questions from research area 
and topic. Research area refers to  
a general field of inquiry, within which we can identify different topics. A topic is a theme 
within the area, but is still very general. Within a topic, therefore, we can identify many research 
questions, general and specific. Thus there is a hierarchy of concepts [with increasing degree of 
specificity]: research area, research topic, general research questions, specific research ques-
tions, and data collection questions. (Punch 2005, p. 33) 
Again, in this hierarchical concepts the researcher can start with prespecified, specific re-
search questions and work towards more abstraction; or start from a broad research area and 
work into more specific topic and questions. Which of these approaches is used, or even if 
these approaches are combined, is not the main concern. Rather, the development of research 
questions, their placement into appropriate research area and topic, as well as their ordering 
into general and specific questions is the fundamental issue. 
The selection of research area and topic may come from any source: taxonomy or classifica-
tion in existing literatures, or even particular context like “personal experience, curiosity 
based on something in the media, the state of knowledge in a field, solving a problem (often 
associated with professional experience), social premiums, personal values and everyday life” 
(Punch 2005, p. 33). 
4.2.2 Empirical stage  
While the main objective of pre-empirical stage is to define the research questions, the main 
concern of empirical stage is how to come to the answers. As illustrated in Figure 4-1 this 
stage consists of several consecutive steps from research design, data collection, data analysis, 
  59
to answering questions. The typical, traditional workflow would follow these consecutive, 
discrete steps (illustrated by short arrows with solid line). However, there are also researches 
that would need to recurrently go back and forth through these steps (illustrated by curve ar-
rows with broken line), as it in the case of researches with unfolding structure. Even certain 
research design like grounded theory requires that the researcher proceeds in a continuous 
cycle of data collection/data analysis – a principle called theoretical sampling. Commencing 
with some initial questions the researcher collects a first set of data that will then be analysed. 
Based on the results of this analysis a second set of data are collected, analysed, and so forth. 
This process is repeated until theoretical saturation is achieved, that is when new data convey 
no new theoretical elements and confirms the already discovered theoretical elements. 
The first step in the empirical stage is to specify research design. Research design refers to a 
plan that situates the researcher in the empirical world and connects the research questions to 
data (see Figure 4-2). There are four aspects included in a research design research strategy, 
research framework, research object, and tools and procedures used for data collection and 
analysis (Punch 2005, pp. 62–65).  
Research 
questions
Research design
Data collected and analysed:
Following what strategy?
Within what framework?
From whom/what?
How?
Data
 
Figure 4-2 Research design: Connecting research questions to data 
Source: Punch (2005, p. 63)  
The term ‘strategy’ refers to “the reasoning or the set of ideas by which the study intends to 
proceed in order to answer its research questions” (Punch 2005, p. 63). In qualitative research 
there are several alternative strategies like case study, ethnography, grounded theory, action 
research, or a combination of these. If combination of strategy is employed, then it should be 
clear what elements of each strategy are used in the combination. 
With the term ‘framework’ Punch (2005, pp. 37, 53, 64) refers to ‘conceptual framework’: the 
conceptual status of the things being studied, and their relationship to each other. Conceptual 
framework may be developed ahead of the research – as it is frequently found in quantitative 
research with prespecified structure – or emerge during the research progress.  
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The third and fourth aspect of research design refers directly to the next steps in the research 
process, namely data collection and data analysis (see Figure 4-1). The explicit statement of 
these aspects in a research design encourages researchers to think about the method they are 
going to use in the empirical processes of data collection and analysis, as well as to judge 
whether this fits to the research strategy and framework. Research object concerns the ‘who or 
what will be studied’. In quantitative studies research object refers to the sampling for the 
research; whereas in qualitative ones it reflects the source of information: transcription mate-
rial of interviews and observations, documentary data, etc. 
As opposed to quantitative studies that appear relatively methodologically unanimous regard-
less their internal technical debates, qualitative studies are characterised by a great diversity 
(Punch 2005, p. 134). This diversity reflects not only contention about how to approach and 
analyse data, but also about the overarching paradigm. The method of data collection through 
interview, for example, can be classified into structured, semi-structured, and unstructured 
interview; or into personal and group interview. The same classification also applies to obser-
vation method. Another possible classification for observation method is the differentiation 
between participant observation and ethnographic observation. The ways of analysing data 
also show a wide range of variety (Punch 2005, pp. 191–196): analytic induction, the Miles 
and Huberman framework for qualitative data analysis, the groundbreaking grounded theory, 
and some others. Some of these are frequently interconnected, overlapping, and complimen-
tary; while others are sometimes mutually exclusive. 
4.3 Actual research process and design 
4.3.1 Research area and topic 
The actual research process is described here using Punch’s model of research process as de-
lineated in Sub-chapter 4.2. The point of departure in Sub-chapter 4.1 helps to demarcate the 
general questions, topic, area of the research, as well as the context of the inquiry and the lit-
eratures consulted in the pre-empirical stage. This research started with two general research 
questions: First, how can the concept of value chain governance be extended by incorporating 
socio-cultural factors into it? Second, how are the relation between prevailing value chain 
governance and value chain upgrading explained? The research topic is, thus, value chain 
governance and value chain upgrading; whereas the research area can be classified into value 
chain research. 
4.3.2 Research context 
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The context of the study takes the setting of dairy value chains in Indonesia. There are in sum 
3 dairy value chains to be studied: in Lembang, West Java; Pasuruan and surrounding areas, 
East Java; and in Boyolali, Central Java. The latest has a specific context in this research: 
During 2006-2009 the researcher had the opportunity to work as professional staff in a devel-
opment project called Regional Economic Development (RED) conducted by Gesellschaft für 
technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GTZ GmbH). Entrusted with the implementation of pro-
ject instrument ‘value chain promotion’, the researcher had the responsibility to direct the 
value chain promotion in Boyolali, Central Java, in close cooperation with local stakeholders. 
In this context the information gathered through action research, in which the researcher 
played the role both as observer and participant in intensive interaction with the local stake-
holders. The inquiries made were directed toward practical problem solving. 
4.3.3 Literatures 
The literatures consulted in the pre-empirical stage are those dealing with global value chains 
and the application of VCA in developing countries. Since at this stage the general research 
questions were already clear, the review was focused particularly on the topic of value chain 
governance and upgrading, as they are elaborated in Chapter 2. 
4.3.4 Research strategy 
The research strategy follows mainly the strategy of case study (see Table 4-1). This strategy 
fits the complex, exploratory characteristic of the research. The case consists of three small 
cases of dairy production centres in three different locations, namely in Boyolali, Central 
Java; Pasuruan, East Java; and Lembang, West Java. Each case has a visible system boundary: 
In each location dairy farmers are producing exclusively for one cooperative, so that the three 
cases exhibited different system. The strategy of using comparative cases to explain why 
some dairy production centres thrived while others stagnated provide greater opportunity to 
cross-check and verify the conclusions made for each case. To differentiate these systems the 
term ‘lesser-performing interaction system’ and ‘higher-performing interaction system’ is 
introduced here. The term ‘interaction system’ signifies that dairy value chain is composed of 
dairy farmers, cooperatives, and dairy processing industries including their interdependent 
relations. 
Table 4-1 What is a case study? 
The basic idea of case study is that one or perhaps small number of cases will be studied in detail, using what-
ever methods seem appropriate. The general objective is to develop an understanding of that case as much as 
possible. Thus, case study aims to understand the case in depth, recognizing its complexity and context. It also 
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has a holistic focus, aiming to preserve and understand the wholeness and unity of the case. Therefore, case 
study is more a strategy than a method. 
While there are various definitions of ‘case study’, all these highlight four main characteristics of case studies: 
1. The case is a ‘bounded system’: typically the case is demarcated to its context. If it is not, then the re-
searcher needs to identify and describe the boundaries of the case. 
2. The case is a case of something: it is necessary to explicitly state why the case is a case and what the case is 
about. By doing this the researcher will be able to identify and focus on the unit of analysis – whether it is 
individuals, their attributes or interaction, collectivities, state, and so forth. 
3. The case is a holistic case: while the case is approached and studied in its wholeness, unity, and integrity; 
specific focus is still required since not all things can be studied at the same time. 
4. The case uses multiple data sources and methods: studying the case in its naturalistic setting, case studies 
may use observations, interviews, narrative reports, but also questionnaires and numerical data. 
 Source: Punch (2005, pp. 142–148)  
4.3.5 Research framework 
While for Punch (2005) the term ‘framework’ refers to ‘conceptual’ framework. This re-
search, however, differentiates further between ‘theoretical’ and ‘analytical’ framework. The 
former refers to the more abstract and fundamental theoretical structure circumscribing the 
scope of study, in which the explanation of the research is grounded; whereas the latter de-
scribes the way or model how the theoretical framework is operationalised in empirical work. 
The theoretical framework is based on the overarching theory of institution proposed by Scott 
(2008) (see Sub-chapter 3.4) by considering some other valuable conceptions about institution 
posited by scholars in economics, political science, and sociology. The analytical framework 
employs the Macro-Micro Model advanced by Coleman and Esser (see Sub-chapter 3.6). 
Here, there are two different variables to be examined. The macro variables refer to the gov-
ernance of the respective value chain and the collective phenomena of value chain upgrading. 
The micro variables refer to the actors in the selected value chains that are comprised of op-
erators in different links/stages, internal supporting institutions, and external supporting insti-
tutions3.  
The question ‘what or who will be studied’ helps to define and delimit the research object. In 
relation with the first macro variable ‘governance of value chain’, the study is directed toward 
the institution of the value chain. The institution is inquired into using information about the 
                                                 
3 The terms ‘actors’, ‘operators’, and ‘supporting institutions’ of value chain follow the terminology used in the 
context of value chain promotion as described in Springer-Heinze (2007a). 
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objective existence of regulations, norms, and culture. The second macro variable ‘value 
chain upgrading’ is described based on the upgrading typology as defined by Kaplinsky et al. 
(2001, p. 38) (see Sub-Chapter 2.1). The causal links between these macro variables are 
drawn on the subjective perception of VC operators situated in the interaction system with 
other VC operators and the respective action they take. 
4.3.6 Data collection 
As the research strategy apply case study which uses all sort of data available to gain in-depth 
understanding of the case, the data collected are in various forms: minutes of meetings; pro-
ject progress reports; consultancy reports; notes taken in observation during training events; 
focus group discussions and workshops; and interviews with VC operators (see Table 4-2 ) 
and experts (see Table 4-3) on specific topic. This applies particularly in the main case of 
dairy value chain in Boyolali. In the other cases the method of data collection is mainly ob-
servations and interviews both individually and in group. The identity of persons interviewed 
is kept confidential since they may disclose sensitive information. 
Table 4-2 List of interviewed VC operators  
Category of interviewee Interviewee Number of persons interviewed 
Dairy cooperatives (Coop) Cooperative leader, treasurer, man-ager, extension staff 15 
Dairy farmers (Farmer) Dairy farmers 6 
Dairy processing industries (DPI) Director, manager, field inspector, consultant 7 
Source: own compilation 
In order to create more naturalistic setting during interviews, the local language Javanese is 
used in Central Java particularly for older dairy farmers, since many of them do not use Indo-
nesian as daily language, so that the use of language not common in their daily life would 
bring distortion to the information inquired into. Interviews with other value chain actors and 
with experts having higher academic background are conducted in Indonesian, English, and 
German. The interviews are then transcribed and translated into English. The method of data 
collection also follows the principle of theoretical sampling of grounded theory. 
Table 4-3 List of interviewed experts  
Expert interview Description 
Exp 1 Expert on tropical dairy farming 
Exp 2 Expert on artificial insemination 
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Exp 3 Expert on agricultural extension 
Exp 4 Expert on value chain promotion 
Exp 5 Expert on cooperative in Indonesia 
Exp 6 Expert in entrepreneurship for MSMEs 
Exp 7 Local government officer 
Exp 8 Expert in communication and training method 
Exp 9 Expert in community development 
Source: own compilation 
4.3.7 Data analysis 
Collected data are then analysed using the framework as delineated by Miles et al. (1994) (see 
Appendix 1). 
 
Figure 4-3 Data analysis: Concurrent and interactive model 
Source: Miles et al. (1994, p. 126) 
This method of data analysis encompasses, as illustrated in Figure 4-3, three main compo-
nents: data display, data reduction, and drawing / verifying conclusions. These three compo-
nents are operated throughout the empirical process. This method is basically similar to the 
method for data analysis used in grounded theory; although the terms used are slightly differ-
ent.
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5 Dairy Industry in South-East Asia 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 deal with the descriptive analysis of the dairy value chain. Starting with 
an overview information about Indonesia, Chapter 5 briefly characterises the overall situation 
of dairy sub-sector in SE-Asia with particular reference to regional aggregate and national 
aggregate of some selected countries. For this purpose, first, a snapshot of the current situa-
tion will be delineated using some of the most important aggregate parameters characterising 
the dairy industry. Second, the development of production, consumption, export and imports 
will be retrospectively examined and their changes over the last 45 years discussed in a con-
cise manner. A particular emphasis is given on Indonesia’s position on the regional level. 
5.1 Indonesia: Country in brief 
Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world that has 17,508 islands sprawled over a total 
area of 1.9 million km² including the ocean waters. Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Sulawesi, and 
Papua are the main islands. There are 400 volcanic mountains – which 100 of them are active 
– that dot the islands of Indonesia. Situated on the equator and between two great bodies of 
water, i.e. the Pacific and Indian oceans, Indonesian has a humid tropical climate with an an-
nual precipitation rate ranging from about 1,000 mm in Nusa Tenggara, to about 2,000 mm in 
the most of Java, to about 3,000 mm in mountainous regions; whereas the average annual 
temperature ranging from 25 to 27°C. Indonesian climate is characterised by two distinct 
monsoonal wet (October – April) and dry (April – October) seasons. 
With around 227 million inhabitants (estimation for 2008; Data Statistik Indonesia 2009) In-
donesia is the fourth most populous country in the world. Its population growth rate, i.e. 1.3% 
annually (2000-2005), is relatively modest in comparison to other developing countries. Un-
evenly distributed, around 60% of the total population dwells on Java which has only 7% of 
the total land area and thus resulting in a very high population density of around 1,000 people 
per km². Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population, since approximately 85% of its 
total population adhere to Islam; whereas around 12% to Christianity and the rest to Bud-
dhism, Hinduism, and other beliefs1. 
                                                 
1 There are different versions of statistic regarding this matter. The figures above are taken from the official 
country profile of the State Secretariat of Indonesia (Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia 2005). 
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Figure 5-1 Map of Indonesia 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2009) 
Under the national government the first level of sub-national administrative unit is the prov-
ince level. Currently Indonesia has 33 provinces (propinsi), five of which have special status. 
The provinces are then subdivided into the second level of sub-national administrative unit 
called district2 (kabupaten) and municipality (kota), which are further subdivided into subdis-
tricts – the third level of sub-national administrative unit – (kecamatan), and again into the 
smallest administrative unit, namely village (desa) or commune (kelurahan).  
Based on International Monetary Fund (2009), with a nominal Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of US$ 512 billion in 2008 Indonesia ranks 19th in the world economy. The nominal 
GDP per capita amounts to US$ 2,246 and thus ranks 116th most affluent of 170 countries in 
the world. According to Indonesian Central Bank the economic growth rate for 2008 was 
6.1% (GDP) and during the last 5 years 5-6% (Bank Indonesia 2009). Although agriculture 
sector only accounts for 13.5% of the total GDP, 42.1% of the total labour force are employed 
in agriculture sector (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). 
5.2 A snapshot of dairy industry in South-East Asia 
                                                 
2 Another English translation for kabupaten is ‘regency’.  
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Table 5-1 Overview of dairy industry in selected South East Asian countries in 2006 
Country Dairy cattle 
population 
[‘000 head] 
Production of 
fresh milk 
['000 ton] 
Consumption3 of 
dairy products 
[‘000 ton] 
Imports of 
dairy products 
['000 ton] 
Exports of dairy 
products 
['000 ton] 
Indonesia 369 6164 2,212 1,806 210 
Myanmar 1,434 883 985 102 0 
Malaysia 90 38 1,199 1,443 282 
Philippines 6 12 1,580 1,712 144 
Thailand 275 826 1,845 1,266 247 
Viet Nam 145 215 1,035 821 1 
SE-Asia 2,468 2,622 9,717 8,730 1,635 
Source: FAO (2009b) 
In terms of population of dairy cow Indonesia has the 2nd largest stock number among SE-
Asian countries, after Myanmar5 (see Table 5-1). Regarding domestic production of fresh 
milk Indonesia ranks third after Myanmar and Thailand. Indonesian consumption of dairy 
products – measured in milk equivalent – is the highest, accounting for 25% of the total re-
gional consumption. In respect of dairy products’ imports, almost all SE-Asian countries are 
dependent significantly on supplies from abroad, since the self-sufficiency rate (the ratio of 
domestic production to consumption) on the regional level is only about 25%. With a self-
sufficiency rate of around 30% Indonesia is well below Myanmar (90%) and Thailand (45%), 
yet above Malaysia (3%) and Philippines (1%). Despite the generally low self-sufficiency 
rate, there are considerable amount of exports from SE-Asian countries, excluding Myanmar 
and Viet Nam, ranging from 10 to 20% of the domestic availability (domestic production plus 
imports). Singapore constitutes a peculiar case (not listed in Table 5-1) because it has no do-
mestic production at all but exports the most among SE-Asian countries, namely 750 kt in 
2006, and thus makes up almost 50% of total exports in SE Asia. These facts imply that some 
                                                 
3 Figures for ’consumption of dairy products’ are rough estimates that are calculated as follows: Consumption = 
Production + Import – Export. The latest FAO’s statistical data on domestic consumption is limited up to year 
2003.  
4 FAO’s data on Indonesian milk production in year 2006 deviates from Indonesian official data (see Figure 7-4). 
However, to maintain the comparability with the data for the other countries, FAO data is used here. 
5 It is important to note from the outset that FAO’s statistical data on Myanmar is often subject to dispute among 
tropical dairy specialists (Moran 2005, p. 14). 
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of the dairy products imported are not only for domestic consumption but also further proc-
essing and then re-exported. 
5.3 Development of domestic production 
  
Figure 5-2 Development of whole fresh milk production in SE-Asian countries 
Source: FAO (2009b) 
On the regional aggregate the production of fresh milk has been, on average, growing at 6% 
yearly over the last 45 years. On the national level the development pattern of fresh milk pro-
duction can be roughly distinguished in three groupings (see Figure 5-2): 
 Myanmar seems to have the largest dairy production in SE-Asia since the 1960s and this 
supremacy has also been sustained hitherto thanks to its, more or less, steady production 
increase over times (5% average annual growth rate between 1961-2006). However, it is, 
again, worthy of notice here that statistical data about Myanmar is subject to dispute 
among tropical dairy specialists (Moran 2005, p. 14). 
 Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam had initially small dairy production, yet experienced 
pivotal expansion of production capacity during the last 45 years, albeit not in the same 
time period. Indonesian dairy production has experienced significant growth starting from 
the 1980’s and has quadrupled from 85 kt to 360 kt within 10 years (1981-1991). The 
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compound or average annual growth rate over the last 25 years (1981-2006) amounted to 
8.2%. Thailand production capacity commenced growing enormously from mid 1980s 
with an average annual growth rate of 13.2% over the last 20 years (1986-2006) and thus 
has improved its position from one of the smallest producers toward 2nd largest producer 
in SE-Asia in 2006. Dairy production in Viet Nam started to expand since 2001 and has 
more than tripled in 5 year; a rapid growth that was commensurate with an average annual 
growth rate of 27.1% (2001-2006). 
 In Malaysia and Philippines production capacity has virtually been unchanged over the 
last 45 years (average annual growth rate of 1%). Apparently primary production of fresh 
milk is not a prospective business in these countries or there is no particular development 
policy addressing this sub-sector. 
5.4 Development of domestic consumption and export 
Changes in domestic consumption and export6 are reliable indicators for market trend. Over-
all, consumption and export have been, more or less, increasing in the selected SE-Asian 
countries (see Figure 5-3), at least over the last 15 years. The average annual growth rate be-
tween 1961 and 2006 in the regional level was 5%; the same rate applies for Malaysia, 
Myanmar, and Philippines. With an average annual growth rate of 7% the consumption and 
export in Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam grow faster than the regional average. Starting 
from a similarly low consumption and export level in 1960s Indonesia and Thailand have now 
already surpassed Malaysia and Philippines, ranking the 1st and 2nd in the regional level, re-
spectively. The lower growth performance of Malaysia and Philippines results from weak and 
stagnant domestic production and strong dependency on import for satisfying domestic con-
sumption and export need (see Figure 5-5). 
In general, the annual per capita consumption of dairy products in SE-Asian countries is still 
far below the average level of developing countries in the world7 which lies at 75 
kg/year/person (see Figure 5-4). Moreover, there has not been any significant increase in the 
                                                 
6 The sum of consumption and export is equal to the sum of production and import (domestic potential availabil-
ity). 
7 World developing countries is taken here as a benchmark in measuring the development status of per capita 
consumption of dairy products, since there is no data available for the aggregate level of SE-Asia. 
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per capita consumption over the last 45 years, despite the fact that consumption has been 
growing 5% annually. Only Malaysia shows exceptional dynamism here and achieves rela-
tively the same level as world developing countries. Thailand also showed considerable in-
creases from around 10 to 35 kg/year/person during 1980 to 2000, although the consumption 
level declined to 30 kg/year/person thereafter. 
 
Figure 5-3 Development of domestic consumption and export in SE-Asian countries 
Source: FAO (2009b) 
Despite the fact that the absolute consumption level in Indonesia is the highest in South-East 
Asia, the annual per capita consumption of dairy products in Indonesia is the lowest in the 
region. Even the pivotal development in production capacity during the 1980’s has not 
brought observable increase in per capita consumption. This stagnation can be attributed to 
the high population number in Indonesia. Hypothetically, if Indonesia would endeavour to 
improve its annual per capita consumption from 10 to 20 kg/year/person – and thus reaching 
the same level of Myanmar and Philippines – with the assumptions that the annual growth 
rate of consumption would remain 7% and the population growth rate 1.3%; then such en-
deavour would only be attainable in not less than 13 years – indeed a daunting task to accom-
plish. 
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Figure 5-4 Development of annual per capita consumption of dairy products 
Source: FAO (2009b), FAO (2009a) 
5.5 Development of import and its share 
The development of import on SE-Asia level over the previous 45 years is characterised by an 
average annual growth rate of 5% – the same as the regional growth rate of consumption and 
export. However, regional aggregates tend to mask local peculiarities: Figure 5-5 shows dif-
ferent development patterns of imports and their share in domestic availability (production 
plus import). As Malaysia’s domestic production capacity remains the same over years, its 
increasing consumption is primarily covered by increasing imports which constantly account 
for over than 95% of the domestic availability. Thailand shows a different pattern: while the 
import volume is ever increasing, its share in domestic availability is consistently declining 
from above 90% in 1961-1985 to around 60% in 2001-2005 thanks to its rapid gain in domes-
tic production. Indonesia shows a unique development here: the import share between 1981 
and 1990 declined sharply from around 90% to 50% but picked up again, reaching steadily 
the level of 70% in 2001-2005. 
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Figure 5-5 Development of import volume and import share in domestic availability 
Source: FAO (2009b) 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
Dairy market in SE-Asia is expanding. The demand of dairy products has been increasing on 
average by 5% annually in the regional level over the last 45 years. The increasing demand of 
dairy products in SE-Asian countries has been primarily satisfied through imports, which 
grow at the same rate as the demand growth on the regional level. The persistent prevalence 
of import dependency indicates that the production increase in many SE-Asian countries has 
not been able to keep up with the consumption increase. Only in several countries like Indo-
nesia and Thailand domestic production has been experiencing considerable growth reducing 
the import share in the domestic availability.  
Despite the fact that Indonesia’s per capita consumption is the lowest in the region, Indonesia 
is the largest market for dairy products in SE-Asia, constituting 25% of the regional aggre-
gate. With an average annual growth of 7% Indonesia’s consumption of dairy product has 
been growing faster than the regional rate. The domestic consumption has been primarily – 
similar to other SE-Asian countries – satisfied through by imports of dairy products. How-
ever, the retrospective analysis of the import share in the domestic availability shows an inter-
esting development pattern: Indonesia’s production of fresh milk surged from the 80’s to mid 
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90’s, but its growth rate has been gradually declining afterwards. Such phenomenon may give 
indications about significant changes influencing the performance of dairy production in In-
donesia. The explanation of this phenomenon is dealt with in Sub-chapter 7.7. 
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6 Analysis of End Product and End Market 
In this chapter the first part of the value chain analysis is described, i.e. the analysis of the end 
market (see Figure 6-1). As delineated by Springer-Heinze (2007a), end market plays a sig-
nificant role for the whole value chain system because it, inter alia, provides the income dis-
tributed along the value chain1. Thus, this chapter first examines the diverse dairy products on 
the end market and their respective segmentation, structure, and growth. Then, a segmentation 
and characterisation of the market, i.e. the end consumers demanding certain dairy products is 
described in the second sub-chapter. The third sub-chapter analyses the demand situation and 
its trend; while the fourth the price situation and its trend. As import is the largest source for 
Indonesian dairy market – both through dairy processing industries (DPIs) and unprocessed 
directly to end consumers –, the prevalent influence of international policy on the interna-
tional dairy market is concisely described in the fifth sub-chapter. 
 
Figure 6-1 Dairy value chain in Indonesia: End product and end market 
Source: own compilation 
                                                 
1 See Springer-Heinze (2007b, pp. 2–8) for further discussion on the importance of the fundamental understand-
ing of end market and the research on end market. 
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6.1 End product: Segmentation, structure, and growth 
The end products of Indonesian dairy value chain can be roughly differentiated into milk 
powder, liquid milk, sweetened condensed milk (SCM), and other dairy-based food and bev-
erages like cheese, butter, cream, yoghurt, etc. Milk powder is the most popular and widely 
consumed dairy product type in Indonesia that has been evolving from undifferentiated to-
ward highly-segmented and specialised products: from instant full-cream and skim milk pow-
der toward formula milk for infants, toddlers, and children; functional food for weight gain, 
weight loss, or other health purposes for adults; special formulation for pregnant and lactating 
women; or calcium-rich for elderly people. The product group of liquid milk comprises UHT, 
pasteurised, homogenised, flavoured milk drinks. 
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Figure 6-2 Product groups in Indonesian dairy value chain according to BPS and USDA-FAS 
Source: adapted from Meylinah (2008); Stanton, Emms and Sia (2005) 
As far as the structure or share of the product segmentation in the end market is concerned, 
there is no official data available, because DPIs are reluctant to disclose their production and 
sales figures. Some accessible, relatively reliable information sources are interviews or state-
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ments by company spokesperson in national newspapers and business magazines2, BPS Sta-
tistics-Indonesia, USDA-FAS, as well as author’s own observation. Figure 6-2, drawn on a 
survey by BPS Statistics-Indonesia and estimation by USDA-FAS, illustrates the segmenta-
tion of dairy products in Indonesia and their respective share in the total market value. In gen-
eral, all sources stated that milk powder and SCM are the main dairy product type consumed 
with an estimated market share of 30-60% and 40-50%, respectively; whereas liquid milk 
owns the smallest share of 10-20%. BPS Statistics-Indonesia might understate the market 
share of SCM since its consumer basis and the respective distribution channel, i.e. lower-
income consumers and retail shops in sub-urban and rural areas, might not be included in the 
survey respondents.  
In respect of the growth of each product segment, milk powder has the smallest yearly gain of 
6%. Often it is estimated that liquid-milk segment would be growing the fastest (30%), while 
SCM on the contrary would be declining3. This estimation was drawn on the assumption that 
with advancing education level and income consumer preference would shift toward more 
natural and fresh products. Nevertheless, company spokespersons stated, as reported in Kom-
pas (2008) and Kontan (2008), that such estimation has been disproved as the yearly sales of 
SCM are increasing by 10-30%. This unexpected phenomenon can be explained by following 
reasons. First, the fuel price increases in 2005 and 2008 have weakened the purchasing power 
of, in particular, middle-lower-income consumers – the largest consumer segment of dairy 
products (see Table 6-1). As a result, they shifted from liquid and powdered milk to cheaper 
milk product such as SCM. Second, as one of the target markets for SCM is businesses offer-
ing culinary services (the food and beverages sub-sector) ranging from hawkers, street ven-
dors, ice-cream parlour to large restaurants; the growth in this service sub-sector also contrib-
utes to the increasing demand of SCM. 
6.2 Market segmentation by product and consumer segment 
As shown by Table 6-1, the domestic end market of dairy products is highly segmented. 
High-value milk products such as imported yoghurts, cheeses, and premium ice creams are 
sold in supermarkets, hypermarkets, or modern retail shops with integrated cooling chain. 
                                                 
2 Kompas (2008); Kontan (2008); Rauf (2008); Warta Ekonomi (2009) 
3 Meylinah (2008); Wagner et al. (2006); Meylinah et al. (2005, p. 3) 
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Middle-income consumers buy all sort of domestically produced dairy products with re-
nowned brand. A survey by Stanton, Emms and Sia (2005) that was conducted among house-
wives belonging to this market segment indicated that they are increasingly more conscien-
tious in selecting high-quality products, such as formula milk for infants and children. The 
largest consumer segment is the price-sensitive, low-income consumers demanding inexpen-
sive products like SCM and dairy products in small packaging. Due to their proximity to dairy 
farmers these consumers may have the potential as direct buyers of dairy products produced 
or processed by dairy farmers or cooperatives. The rest of the population, i.e. 100 – 150 mil-
lion people, does not possess the purchasing power for buying dairy products – this group 
mainly resides in outlying areas outside of Java and Bali where infrastructure is underdevel-
oped, thereby making the cost of distribution even higher (Rittgers 2004). 
Table 6-1 Market segmentation based on products and consumers segment 
Market segment Location Estimated market size Product 
High-income consum-
ers including expatri-
ates 
Metropolitan 
areas 
2-5 million 
people 
- Imported products  
- Pasteurised liquid milk 
- Yoghurt 
- Premium ice cream 
- High value formula and milk powder 
Middle-income con-
sumers Urban areas 
8-15 million 
people 
- All kind of branded local dairy products (Nestlé, Fri-
esche Vlag, Indomilk, Ultrajaya, etc.) 
- Increasingly imported formulas for infants and children
Low-income consum-
ers 
Sub-urban 
and rural 
areas 
60-100 mil-
lion people 
- Instant food and beverage products (dairy-based) 
- Sweetened, condensed milk 
- Milk powder and formula in small packages produced 
specially for this market 
Source: Meylinah (2008); Stanton, Emms and Sia (2005) 
6.3 End market: Demand situation and trend 
In 2006 domestic consumption was 2,212 kt while export 210 kt and thus equivalent to ap-
proximately 90% and 10% of the sum of domestic production and imports, respectively (see 
Figure 6-3). During the last 5 years domestic consumption has been growing on average 11% 
annually from 1,302 (2001) to 2,212 kt (2006); whereas export has been declining on average 
5% annually from 278 (2001) to 211 kt (2006). According to Rittgers (2004, p. 5) and Mey-
linah et al. (2005) export destinations are mainly North Africa and the Middle East, in which 
Iraq had once been a major destination but experienced a decline in trade due to the instability 
in the region. Products exported are dairy products in powder form that are imported primarily 
from New Zealand, repackaged and then re-exported. Hence, it can be concluded that the do-
mestic market is the most significant end market for Indonesian dairy value chain. 
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Figure 6-3 Dairy value chain in Indonesia: Domestic and export markets 
Source: own compilation 
Over the last 15 years increases in consumer demand have been outstripping those in domes-
tic production; hence the share of import in domestic availability (see Figure 5-5) rose from 
55 to 75 %. This enormous excess demand and ever-increasing demand trend provides un-
precedented opportunities for small-scale dairy farming in Indonesia, in which smallholder 
dairy farmers and their cooperative constitute the majority of the total primary producers4. 
Increasing demand has been fuelled by growing number of Indonesian large population, eco-
nomic growth and thus higher purchasing power, changing food consumption pattern toward 
Western diets, and strong generic promotion of milk products particularly through schools 
(Moran 2009, p. 30). Nonetheless, the per capita consumption of dairy products in Indonesia – 
around 10 kg/person/year – ranks the lowest in South-East Asia and even far below the con-
sumption level in developing countries. This condition, on the one hand, has been frequently 
discussed in the general public, thereby increasing consumers’ awareness of the importance of 
increasing milk consumption due to its nutritional benefits (Kompas 2008; Warta Ekonomi 
2009). On the other hand, it has given a clear impetus to the Government of Indonesia (GoI) 
                                                 
4 Cf. Sub-chapter 7.5 
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to enact policy supports – such as school milk programmes and soft loan programs for pur-
chasing dairy stock – boosting the consumption and production of milk products. With such 
dynamisms on both the consumer and policy-maker side the per capita consumption of dairy 
products is expected to increase in the near future. 
 
Figure 6-4 Market value and market share of imported dairy products by source 
Source: Bond et al. (2007, pp. 14–15) 
To meet its domestic consumption Indonesia relies mainly on imports of dairy products from 
Australia, New Zealand, European Union, USA, and other countries. Given their advanta-
geous proximity to and long historical presence in Indonesia's dairy market, Australia and 
New Zealand continue to dominate the import market for dairy products, accounting for over 
25% (valued at around 126 million USD) and 21% (107 million USD) of the total imports, 
respectively. Imported dairy products are mainly skimmed milk powder (SMP) and whole 
milk powder (WMP), as well as smaller amount of cheese, yoghurt, butter, and whey (Bond et 
al. 2007, p. 15). Among these products SMP accounts for about 80% of the total (Meylinah et 
al. 2005, p. 4). This is on account of DPIs’ preference to SMP as it has longer shelf life, a 
slightly lower price, and is easier to combine with other dairy products (Rittgers 2004, p. 5). 
SMP is sourced mainly from Oceania and the EU (60% of the market share) and the US 
(30%), WMP from Australia (60%) and New Zealand (15%), and whey from the US (Mey-
linah 2008, pp. 4–5; Meylinah 2007, p. 4).  
6.4 End market: Price situation and trend 
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The situation and trend of prices for end products are a good measure of assessing de-
mand/supply situation, market potentials/risks, as well as level of competition and their dy-
namic changes over time. However, since there is no statistical data available for the wide 
range of dairy products in the domestic market, the analysis of price situation and trend shall 
be drawn on the statistical data for dairy products on the international market5, as these consti-
tute the largest portion for the domestic consumption. 
 
Figure 6-5 Prices development of dairy products on international market (2003 – 2009) 
Source: Moran (2009, p. 87) 
As shown by Figure 6-5, international prices of dairy products had been more or less stable 
between 2003 and 2006, signifying a stable supply/demand situation. However, commencing 
from the late 2006 international prices soared exorbitantly and recorded a historical peak at 
the end of 2007, shocking dairy industries and consumers worldwide: within 12 months the 
international price of dairy commodities had virtually doubled from around 2,500 to 5,000 
USD per metric tonne. This dramatic price increase had been a result of substantial diminu-
tion of global supply which was caused by6: 
                                                 
5 It is, however, important to acknowledge here, that the real price trend of domestic dairy products does not 
stand in one-to-one relationship with the international price trend. Other factors would play influential role here: 
the development of exchange rate USD/IDR over time, inflation rate, etc. Thus, such associative analysis should 
be seen merely as an attempt to depict a rough picture of the reality. 
6 Moran (2009, p. 29); FAO (2009a, p. 4); Morgan (2009, p. 1); FAO (2009a, p. 4) 
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i. Policy changes in the dairy sector: the discontinuation of export subsidies for dairy ex-
ports by the EU and export bans imposed by India; 
ii. Record low levels of intervention stocks: the decline of stocks in the EU and the US due 
to stagnant milk production growth; 
iii. Adverse natural occurrences: droughts in Australia as one of the major exporting coun-
tries and floods in South America; 
iv. Changing market condition for feed supply: increasing feed grain prices on account of 
increasing demands and uses for biofuels. 
As a result of this unprecedented price increase, large dairy companies in Indonesia are in-
creasingly gravitating toward local supplies of fresh milk. This, on the one hand, demonstrates 
the attempt of dairy industries to hedge against risks of possible future fluctuations in interna-
tional dairy prices by reducing reliance on imported supplies and, on the other hand, provides 
an impetus for developing the smallholder dairy sector (Moran 2009, p. 30; Moran 2008). 
Nevertheless, such high prices were not sustained in the short to medium term as the interna-
tional prices started to abate in early 2008. The easing of prices could be in response to two 
factors (Morgan 2009, p. 1): first, the positive supply responses in both developed and devel-
oping countries; and, second, the resistance of end consumers – particularly in developing 
countries – to pay higher prices. 
In the domestic market, the soaring prices of dairy products in the international market forced 
Indonesian DPIs to gradually increase the prices of their end products up to 20% by the end of 
2007 (Meylinah 2007, p. 4). This brought about a sporadic panic buying among middle to 
upper income housewives whose infants and toddlers depend on baby formulas.  
6.5 End market: Influence of international policy 
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that the international prices for dairy products are 
severely influenced – or, more precisely said, disrupted – by the pervasive support policies for 
the dairy sector in industrialised countries, such as export subsidies. To the extent of their 
market distortion Morgan (2009) wrote:  
Historically, high support for dairy products in OECD countries have led to structural surpluses 
which, combined with the use of export subsidies and high tariffs in developed countries, have 
led to excess – and low priced – dairy products being directed to many developing countries in 
Asia and Africa. While milk consumption in developing countries is estimated at only 40 per-
cent of global totals, nearly three quarters of global shipments of dairy products are destined for 
these countries. In fact, ninety percent of milk powder exports from developed countries are 
destined for developing countries where they are estimated to supply as much as half of the 
formal or processed dairy markets. 
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The sudden and recent rise in dairy prices took the market by surprise in the late 2006 and is at-
tributed to a number of factors which include higher feed prices, drought, policy changes, etc. 
However, in various studies, it has been estimated that decades long dairy product policies and 
support for the sector in OECD countries have depressed international milk equivalent prices by 
some 25-35 percent. Consequently, while price rises may have been unexpected, they may 
likely reflect the reality of markets adjusting to a situation less distorted by government inter-
ventions. (Morgan 2009, p. 2) 
Hence, with the cessation of export subsidies in the EU, the international dairy market will 
experience a “long-term structural adjustments” (Moran 2009, p. 29) that might gradually lead 
to less undistorted and thus higher prices of dairy products. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the end product and end market of Indonesian dairy value chain has shown 
that dairy end products are highly differentiated. Milk powder and SCM are the main prod-
ucts. The former is the most popular and widely consumed, whereas the latter has – under 
current economic conditions – the fastest demand growth. With regard to segmentation of end 
consumers there are three distinguishable consumer groups forming a pyramid structure: the 
low-income (sub-urban / rural areas; SCM) forms the base of the pyramid; the middle-income 
(urban areas; branded domestic products) in the middle; and the high-income (metropolitan 
areas; imported dairy products) on the top. The own domestic market is considered as the 
most significant end market for Indonesian dairy value chain. It is characterised by an ever-
increasing demand trend and widening demand/supply gap. To satisfy its domestic demand, 
Indonesia relies mainly on imports of dairy products – such as SMP, WMP, cheese, butter, 
and whey – from Australia, New Zealand, the EU, and the US. The price of dairy products 
had been relatively stable in 2003-2006, but experienced a monumental increase during 2007, 
reached a plateau from the early to mid 2008, and started to decline abruptly afterwards. The 
unprecedented price increase was caused by the abolition of export subsidy in the EU, declin-
ing intervention stocks in the EU and the US, adverse natural occurrences, and increasing feed 
grain prices. 
Responding to these new challenges, Indonesian DPIs are increasingly gravitating toward 
domestic, smallholder fresh-milk producers to hedge against risks of fluctuating supplies and 
prices of imported products. Such condition presents greater opportunities for domestic 
smallholder dairy producers and their cooperatives to upgrade themselves and to capture more 
value-added and larger portion in Indonesian dairy value chain. 
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7 Analysis of Value Chain Operators 
This chapter describes the second part of the value chain analysis, namely the value chain 
operators. In the first sub-chapter, the overview map of Indonesian dairy value chain is de-
picted. This map characterises the chain functions and the value-adding activities involved in 
the respective chain function. Then, the number of operators along the value chain is quanti-
fied in the second sub-chapter, complementing the qualitative description, to provide more 
detailed picture of the dairy value chain. The third, fourth, fifth, sixth sub-chapters analyse 
DPIs, cooperatives, dairy farmers, and input suppliers, respectively. The seventh sub-chapter 
describes the policy environment of Indonesian dairy value chain and its change over time, 
thereby explaining the interesting phenomenon of rapid production increase and sharp decline 
of import in the 80’s and 90’s as it is described in the Sub-chapter 5.6. 
7.1 Value chain mapping: Functions and operators 
 
Figure 7-1 Dairy value chain in Indonesia: Functions and operators 
Source: own compilation 
Following Springer-Heinze (2007b), a value chain as an economic system can be defined as: 
a sequence of related business activities (functions) from the provision of specific inputs for a 
particular product to primary production, transformation and marketing, up to the final sale of 
the particular product to the consumer; or 
the set of enterprises (operators) that performs these functions, i.e. the producers, processors, 
traders and distributors of a particular product. These enterprises are linked by a series of busi-
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ness transactions in which the product is passed on from primary producers to end consumers. 
(Springer-Heinze 2007b, p. 2) 
Based on this definition Figure 7-1 depicts the dairy value chain in Indonesia. This overview 
map entails only the generic chain functions and operators that can be found in all local dairy 
value chains regardless their local specificity.  
 
Figure 7-2 Dairy value chain in Indonesia: Chain function and value-adding activity 
Source: own compilation 
These aggregated value chain functions can further be dismantled into more detailed eco-
nomic value-adding activities as shown by Figure 7-2. Not every chain operator, of course, 
performs all of the listed value-adding activities. Some value-adding activities might be cap-
tured by the antecedent or subsequent operators, or just missing. Some value-adding activities 
might also be performed in different level of intensity or quality. For example, all dairy farm-
ers might perform all value-adding activities in the chain function ‘dairy production’; but 
some might do it well according to good dairying practices and some others might even do 
not know about it. Another example, all cooperatives might have, more or less, an installed 
quality control mechanism; some, however, would apply a simple organoleptic test while oth-
ers might run regular laboratory tests. Nonetheless, the listing of such productive activities is 
beneficial since it serves the purposes of: first, making transparent all productive activities 
adding incremental value to the good, thereby providing a profound understanding for value-
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capturing strategy; and, second, identifying essential activities belonging to a certain chain 
function, thereby opening the chance of discovering missing or dysfunctional productive ac-
tivities in the value chain. 
7.2 Value chain mapping: Quantification of operators 
Since this research is primarily concerned with the issue of value chain upgrading by domes-
tic chain operators in the domestic market, the following sub-chapters are delimited by ex-
aminations on input suppliers, dairy farmers, cooperatives, and dairy processing industries 
(DPIs). The wide range of distributions channel and type is not covered here. 
 
Figure 7-3 Quantification of VC: Number of operators along the chain 
Source: compilation from various sources1 
As it has been mentioned in the previous chapter, dairy value chain in Indonesia has been de-
veloping primarily on Java Island, where infrastructure is at place. This is of particular impor-
tant since milk as extremely perishable good requires adequate treatment in the production 
                                                 
1 Number of dairy processing industries: Datasumber (2008); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Timur (2009); Direktorat 
Jendral Bina Pembangunan Daerah (2006). Number of cooperatives: GKSI Jawa Barat (2007b); BPS Jawa Ten-
gah (2008);Direktorat Jendral Bina Pembangunan Daerah (2006);Dinas Peternakan Jawa Timur (2008a). Num-
ber of dairy farmers: Direktorat Jendral Peternakan (2008). 
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and distribution: adequate equipment for milk harvesting and transporting, good access to 
roads, shorter delivery time to DPI, distribution system with cooling chain for certain dairy 
products, etc.  
Figure 7-3 entails only the numbers of operators on Java Island, grouped according to the re-
gions. The quantification of value chain operators serves the purpose of drawing more de-
tailed picture of the reality and thus complementing the qualitative description of the value 
chain. By quantifying the chain, it is possible to identify, inter alia, possible concentration of 
market power along the chain or in certain region, as well as the size of the business in certain 
value chain function. 
7.3 Dairy processing industries (DPIs) 
In stark contrast to the production function that is operated by a huge number of small-scale 
dairy farmers, the processing function of Indonesian dairy value chain is dominated by a 
handful of large, dynamic, and competitive companies2. They are situated in a fierce competi-
tion which is characterised by continuous product development and marketing efforts to open 
up new markets across the country. While it can be assumed that full market-competition 
rules in the end market, the supply market – the relationship between DPIs and their suppliers 
– is characterised by an oligopsonistic market situation. There is also criticism that to increase 
profit by reducing competition among themselves DPIs form a cartel and abuse their market 
power for price-fixing3, in this case for suppressing domestic milk price. For example, in 
2002 – 2006 DPIs unanimously retained the level of domestic price for fresh milk despite 
changing international milk price and enormous domestic supply gap. 
As far as the geographical dispersion of DPIs concerned, Central Java has the least DPIs (3) in 
comparison to West Java (15) and East Java (9). Its ratio of dairy farmer to DPI is proportion-
ally much higher (around 12,000 to 1) – relatively similar to East Java (9,000 to 1) – than 
West Java (1,600 to 1). The ratio of dairy farmer to DPI could indicate the degree of depend-
ency of dairy farmers on DPI. Only one – and the smallest – of the 5-largest DPIs is located in 
Central Java / Yogyakarta, namely Sari Husada / Nutricia (see Table 7-1). As a consequence, 
                                                 
2 See Sub-chapter 9.1 for the brief history of he 5-largest DPIs. 
3 Cf. Suksmaningsih (2005); Priyanti et al. (2008) 
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some of the milk produced in Central Java has to be delivered to DPIs in other province. In-
deed, such situation is detrimental to the milk quality since the long-distance transportation 
requires longer delivery time4.  
Among 27 DPIs there are currently five main dairy manufacturers in Indonesia, namely Fri-
sian Flag Indonesia (FFI) / Foremost Indonesia, Indolakto / Indomilk, Ultrajaya, Sari Husada / 
Nutricia, and Nestlé. These 5 DPIs account for 90% of the total sales volume (Rittgers 2004, 
p. 3; Meylinah et al. 2005) and are in fact the key players of Indonesian dairy value chain as 
they are the main buyers of fresh milk produced by the cooperatives. The comparison between 
the year 20045 and 2000 shows that in general the structure of fresh-milk demand by the DPIs 
had not changed much. 
Table 7-1 The 5-largest DPIs in Indonesia and their share in domestic fresh milk consumption 
(2004 and 2000) 
  Year 2004 Year 2000 
Company Name Location Demand for fresh milk [t/d] 
Share 
[%] 
Demand for fresh 
milk [t/d] 
Share 
[%] 
Nestlé East Java 501 47 480 53 
FFI6 / Foremost Indonesia West Java 301 28 224 25 
Indolakto / Indomilk West Java 126 12 113 12 
Ultrajaya West Java 65 6 46 5 
Sari Husada / Nutricia Yogyakarta 44 4 46 5 
Others  22 2 n/a n/a 
Source: Stanton, Emms and Sia (2005, p. 21); Moran (2007, p. 9) 
Table 7-1 shows the 5-largest DPIs’ location, daily demand of fresh milk, and share of con-
sumption of the total milk sold by Union of Indonesian Dairy Cooperatives (UIDC). Since 
both authors drew their data on UIDC, two consequences are worthy of notice here. First, 
DPIs which are not buying milk from UIDC are not included in the list. Second, suppliers of 
fresh milk which are not member of any cooperatives or UIDC – such as private dairy com-
panies with relatively larger herd that are able to deliver fresh milk to DPI by themselves – 
                                                 
4 Cf. Table 10-2 
5 Unfortunatly, no accurate, more recent data is available for this topic. 
6 Also known as ’Friesche Vlag’ 
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are also excluded. Nonetheless, such DPIs and milk suppliers are not influential in size since 
UIDC supplies around 90% of the total need of the largest DPIs (Investor Daily Indonesia 
2009). 
Other, relatively smaller DPIs produce pasteurized fresh milks with flavours, UHTs, various 
types of cheese and yoghurt sold primarily in the large supermarkets with sophisticated cool-
ing chain. Usually such companies procure fresh milk from their own managed dairy farm to 
ensure that the quality required for processing is controlled and safeguarded. However, as the 
demand for dairy products is rising, smaller DPIs are increasingly procuring fresh milk also 
from cooperatives, as it is the case of Greenfields in East Java (Sutejo 2006). 
Another interesting point is that some of the largest cooperatives have engaged in dairy proc-
essing activities for being aware that much of the value-added is created in the chain function 
of processing and trade. One of the largest cooperative in West Java, KPSBU Lembang 
(Koperasi Peternak Sapi Bandung Utara) or North Bandung Dairy Cooperative, has initiated 
a small production of yoghurt with the brand ‘Fresh Time’ since 2006 and been selling this 
product directly to end consumers through its own outlets in Bandung’s region (GKSI Jawa 
Barat 2007a). In East Java 6 of the largest cooperatives – i.e. 4 cooperatives from the District 
of Pasuruan namely KPSP Setia Kawan Nongkojajar, KUTT Suka Makmur Grati, KUD Dadi 
Jaya Purwodadi, KUD Sembada Puspo; and 2 from the District of Malang, namely KUD Dau, 
Koperasi SAE Pujon – have jointly established a DPI called PKIS Sekar Tanjung (Pusat 
Koperasi Industri Susu) in 2005 (Hadi 2005). This DPI produces UHT milk in smaller Tetra-
Pack “pillow” or pouch packaging designated for end markets initially in East Java and after-
wards outside Java Island (Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, etc.) where market competition is rela-
tively lower  (Pemerintah Kabupaten Pasuruan 2006). 
7.4 Cooperatives 
With regards to cooperative in the dairy sector there are two different organisational forms of 
cooperatives: the specialised ‘dairy cooperative’ and the multi-purpose ‘Village-Unit Coop-
erative’ – VUC (Koperasi Unit Des) – KUD). In general, cooperatives provide services – such 
as collective milk bulking, transportation, and selling; concentrate feed buying or production; 
extension advice; loan; veterinary services – to their members. Most cooperatives with dairy 
business unit are member of the secondary cooperative Union of Indonesian Dairy Coopera-
tives – UIDC (Gabungan Koperasi Susu Indonesia – GKSI). UIDC is represented on the na-
tional level as well as on provincial level, i.e. West, Central, and East Java. 
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The numbers in Figure 7-3 includes cooperatives from both types regardless the organisa-
tional form7. The 25 cooperatives in West Java, 24 in Central Java, and 50 in East Java are not 
homogenous. They are conventionally differentiated by their performance in daily production 
capacity. Based on this conventional classification Yusdja (2005) identified that most of the 
cooperatives had indeed a very small production capacity (see Table 7-2). However, perform-
ance assessment based solely on daily production capacity is not sufficient and might be mis-
leading; since higher cooperative output does not necessarily correspond to higher farm out-
put and/or animal productivity8. 
Table 7-2 Distribution of dairy cooperatives based on daily production capacity (2000) 
Class Daily production capacity Number (total = 100) 
A Above 40 t 6 
B 20 – 40 t 4 
C 10 – 20 t 17 
D 5 – 10 t 16 
E Below 5 t 57 
Source: Yusdja (2005, p. 260) 
Figure 7-4 presents the development of milk production in Indonesia and on the province 
level between 2002 and 2007. The province of East Java is the largest producer of fresh milk 
in Indonesia with a production capacity of 249 kt annually or equivalent to 682 tonne daily, 
accounting for around 45% of the national production (2007). West Java ranks on the second 
place with a production capacity of 225 kt annually or 616 tonne daily, constituting 40% of 
the total domestic production. The third is Central Java which produces 71 kt per year or 
equal to 195 tonne per day, corresponding to 12.5% of the total national production. Another 
2.5% is produced in other provinces outside Java. 
Overall, as shown in Figure 7-4, milk production in Indonesia has an increasing trend. Be-
tween 2002 and 2007 the domestic milk production increased by 47 kt or 9%. The same trend 
                                                 
7 In Chapter 9 the typical features of these organisational forms are described, analysed, and discussed as it has 
further implications on the cooperative performance. 
8 See Riethmuller et al. (1999a) for further discussion on the classification of cooperatives in Indonesian dairy 
sector. 
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applies to the provinces of West and East Java which had a production gain of 26 and 52 kt, 
respectively, between 2002 and 2007. On the contrary, production trend in Central Java is 
declining and stagnating. Starting with more or less same production capacity in 2002, East 
Java grew by 26% over the 6 years or at a rate two times faster than West Java; while in Cen-
tral Java production diminished by over than 10% in the same time period.  
 
Figure 7-4 Development of milk production in Indonesia and Java Island (2002 – 2007) 
Source: compiled and estimated from various sources9 
7.5 Dairy farmers 
Most of Indonesian dairy farmers are smallholder dairy farmers in rural areas in mountainous 
regions. Farm size is typically small with around 2-4 milking cows. The dairy cattle which are 
from Friesian Holstein breed or its crossing with local breed are reared in a small confinement 
                                                 
9 Dinas Peternakan Jawa Barat (2008a); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Tengah (2007a); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Timur 
(2008b); Direktorat Jendral Peternakan (2008); Badan Pusat Statistik (2009). 
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on the yard of the farmer’s house. Forage grasses are gathered in a ‘cut and carry’ system: 
cutting and collecting grasses from the farmer’s land, as well as along the sides of roads, irri-
gation ditches, forests or other such places10. Dairy farming is managed as a family business 
with 2-3 people working in the farm. Most dairy farmers are cooperative members11, as they 
are dependent on cooperative services particularly for business linking to DPI. Besides sup-
plying DPIs dairy farmers or cooperative sometimes also sell small amounts of fresh milk to 
small home industries, food hawkers or street vendors, and directly to local end consumers. 
Currently, there is no official data on aggregate level about the quality of milk produced by 
dairy farmers, how many percents are classified into the respective milk grading-system im-
posed by the DPIs. However, according to Meylinah (2008, p. 3) fresh milk with lower bacte-
ria content – or higher quality – is combined with imported SMP to produce full cream liquid 
milk and powdered milk; whereas those with higher bacteria content is processed into sweet-
ened condensed milk. 
In 2003 there were around 112,000 smallholder dairy farmers in Indonesia: around 24,000 in 
West Java; 37,000 in Central Java; 49,000 in East Java, and 2,000 outside Java (Direktorat 
Jendral Peternakan 2008). Assuming that at least 2 persons working in the farm and a typical 
family consists of 4 persons (parents and 2 children); the dairy sub-sector provides employ-
ment for at least around 224,000 workers12 and a source of livelihood for around 448,000 
people. 
In view of livestock population Indonesia had in 2007 around 374,000 dairy cattle (see Figure 
7-5). The largest population of around 139,000 cattle was in East Java, accounting for around 
37% of the total population in Indonesia. Interestingly, the second largest population is in 
Central Java– instead of in West Java – with around 116,000 cattle (31%), despite the fact that 
Central Java produced only 12.5% of Indonesian total milk production. West Java ranked 
third ranked third with around 103,000 cattle (28%). 
                                                 
10 See Hutabarat et al. (1994) for further discussion on the general characteristics of Indonesian smallholder dairy 
farmers. 
11 According to Direktorat Jendral Peternakan (2008), in 2004 there were 341 private companies producing milk 
that are not member of any dairy cooperative. 
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Figure 7-5 Development of dairy cattle population in Indonesia and Java Island (2002 – 2007)  
Source: compiled and estimated from various sources13 
The population of dairy stock in Indonesia did not changed much during 2002-2007, only less 
than 5% over a 6-year period. In 2003 – 2005 dairy stock even declined and picked up again 
afterwards. On the province level, only in East Java dairy population had increased constantly 
on average by around 1,500 heads per year or equal to 5% during the period 2002-2007. In the 
same period dairy population in West Java increased on average yearly by around 2,500 heads 
– albeit the moderate decrease in 2005 – or equivalent to 13% during the whole time period. 
On the contrary, population number in Central Java was, more or less, stagnating. 
                                                 
12 According to Wagner et al. (2006, p. 4) 241,800 people were involved in on-farm fresh milk production. 
13 Dinas Peternakan Jawa Barat (2008b); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Tengah (2007b); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Timur 
(2008a); Direktorat Jendral Peternakan (2008); Badan Pusat Statistik (2009). 
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Comparing the development of production (Figure 7-4) and of livestock population (Figure 
7-5), it becomes obvious that productivity increase has taken place in Indonesian dairy sub-
sector: while the production has grown by 9%, the population increase was only to less than 
5%. The production increase in West Java (13% in 2002-2007) can attributed to the increased 
population number also by 13%; whereas in East Java the growth of dairy population by 5% 
has resulted in a production increase by 26% and thus signalising improved animal productiv-
ity. A peculiar case is Central Java in which production dropped by 10% and dairy population 
slightly decreased by 3%. 
Drawing on the statistical data in the previous sub-chapters, the characteristic of dairy farm 
business in Indonesia is delineated in Table 7-3, comparing the situation in 2002 and 2007 
(with the simplifying assumption: the number of dairy farms in 2002 and 2007 are the same). 
Table 7-3 Characteristic of dairy farms in Indonesia on average values (2002 and 2007) 
Cattle per farm 
[head] 
Daily milk production per 
farm [litre/farm] 
Annual production per animal 
[litre/animal/year] Province 
2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 
West Java 3.84 4.35 23 26 2,187 2,184 
Central Java 3.29 3.21 6 5 672 612 
East Java 2.70 2.85 11 14 1,492 1,791 
Indonesia 3.29 3.44 13 14 1,455 1,519 
Source: own calculation based on cited sources 
At this point it is, again, important to emphasise, that due to the fact that the statistical data 
were not drawn from a single, official source but rather compiled from various sources (with 
sometimes contradicting figures) through meticulous triangulations, such numerical descrip-
tion of the reality should be treated as a delicate matter. Frequently there is no explicit defini-
tion about the parameter and the measurement method used: for example, the numbers of 
dairy cattle would include non-producing young stock, so that the so-called “average” produc-
tion is underestimated14. Moreover, the amount of milk given to young stock is not considered 
in the “milk production” or reported to the cooperative staff during milk collection and thus 
causing the distortion of the data for animal productivity. 
                                                 
14 Cf. Moran (2007, p. 6) 
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7.6 Input suppliers 
There are mainly 2 specific input suppliers for the dairy value chain, namely livestock and 
feedstuff provider. Livestock provider consists of those enterprises supplying calves, heifers, 
pregnant heifers, and artificial insemination. Livestock purchase takes place mainly in live-
stock market where buyers and sellers from different regions meet. The cattle traded in such 
places usually are not accompanied with any certificate or documentation of origin or pedi-
gree. There are also private breeding companies15 offering dairy cattle with documented ori-
gin and high-quality genetics, but they have limited capacity to fulfil the demand of dairy cat-
tle. Hence, imports have always been seen as a measure to increase livestock number. 
According to Direktorat Jendral Peternakan (2008) around 4.2 to 6.2 thousand cattle were 
imported yearly during 2003-2007. This data contained, unfortunately, no differentiation be-
tween beef and dairy cattle. 
Feedstuff provider includes suppliers for forage (elephant grass, maize stover, green maize, 
etc.), concentrate feed and by-products (rice bran, wheat pollard, cassava, soybean curd, 
brewer’s grain, etc.), and specially formulated concentrate. Forage and by-products are pur-
chased on local marketplaces. Larger cooperatives produce formulated concentrate by them-
selves as a service for their members. 
The service for artificial insemination is given by veterinarians or ‘mantri’ (para-veterinarian) 
from local government agency, cooperative staff, or freelancers. Semen is supplied by Artifi-
cial Insemination Centre (Balai Inseminasi Buatan – BIB) in Lembang, West Java and Singo-
sari, East Java; or by UIDC. Virtually in each village or sub-district veterinarian service is 
available. Apart from delivering artificial insemination, such specialists give veterinary ser-
vice like health check, pregnancy check, as well as extension advice on technical matters. 
7.7 Policy environment of Indonesian dairy value chain 
Indonesian dairy sub-sector had been one of the agricultural sub-sectors heavily regulated by 
GoI (Bond et al. 2007, p. 7). The justification of such support lies on the perceived advantages 
of dairy sub-sector development, such as: 
                                                 
15 According to Direktorat Jendral Peternakan (2008) there were 8 breeding companies specialised for dairy 
cattle in West Java and 3 in Central Java (2004). 
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 providing a good basis for improvement of nutrition provision in the society, 
 source of manure to supplement and/or substitute chemical fertilisers, 
 providing a good alternative of income generation thanks to the continuous milk income, 
 creates employment in rural areas, and 
 means of saving foreign exchange through substituting import. 
During 1980s and 1990s there were import programs for dairy cattle that were supported by 
government programs. Main sources of dairy cattle were from Australia and New Zealand. 
According to GKSI Jawa Timur (2008) more than 52 thousand dairy cattle were imported 
between 1979 and 1983 and then distributed to dairy cooperatives which were member of 
GKSI. According to Moran (2007, p. 6) 110 thousand were imported between 1979 and 1990. 
Such programs were accompanied by the introduction of artificial insemination with imported 
semen, extension programme, and loan programme for purchasing dairy cows.  
In 1983 GoI enacted a national policy signed by the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and 
Trade-Cooperative requiring DPIs to buy domestically produced milk apart from imported 
milk for their raw material. Designated to boost domestic dairy production, this policy – 
called Busep (Bukti Serap) or Proof of Absorption – regulates the ratio of imported and lo-
cally sourced milk. Nonetheless, this policy was abolished in 1998 through President Instruc-
tion No. 4/1998, since it was one of the requirements of IMF support programme for eco-
nomic recovery in Indonesia during the economic and monetary crisis in Asia. 
After the abolishment of Busep Indonesian dairy value chain still receives support from GoI, 
particularly from the local level (district or province), since many tasks and authorities of cen-
tral government were decentralised to the local level in the course of regional autonomy proc-
esses. Apart from regular programs for epidemic prevention, vaccination, extension services, 
and artificial insemination carried out Dinas Peternakan or local livestock service; there are 
special programme for equipment (e.g. cooling machine) purchase, as well as loan programs 
with subsidised interest rate directed to dairy farmers and/or cooperatives for purchasing local 
or imported livestock. 
Referring back to the Sub-chapter 5.6 about the interesting phenomenon of rapid production 
increase and sharp decline of import share in the domestic availability in the 80’s, it became 
apparent that this phenomenon was the result of the policy change in the Indonesian dairy 
sub-sector. On the demand side, with the introduction of Busep – the regulation on the ratio of 
imported and locally sourced milk –, dairy industries were forced to reduce their raw material 
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imports and to increase supply from local sources. On the supply side, domestic production 
was then boosted by the massive import programs of dairy cattle including all supporting 
measures of extension services, artificial insemination, and loan programs. All of these activi-
ties were driven by GoI. This condition persisted until 1998 – when the policy was finally 
lifted due to IMF’s requirement. The abolishment of this policy led to the resurgent imports of 
raw material for the DPIs (see Figure 5-2). This case demonstrates how government-driven 
support policies have not created sustainable impacts of structural development for the VC-
operators, i.e. cooperative, dairy farmers, and input suppliers. 
7.7.1 Regulation for imports of dairy products 
Table 7-4 Import tariffs of various dairy products 
Product Type Bound Tariff16 [%] Applied Tariff17 [%] 
Milk and cream, not concentrated or sweetened 40 5 
Milk and cream, concentrated or sweetened 210 10 
Yoghurt 40 10 
Buttermilk 210 5 
Butter 40 5 
Fats and oils derived from milk 210 5 
Cheese 40 5 
Source: Bond et al. (2007, p. 17) 
According to Bond et al. (2007) import of dairy products in Indonesia must face a number of 
regulations. Only specific companies appointed by GoI are entitled to procure finished dairy 
products. Prior to importing, the label of all dairy products – both packaged goods for end 
consumers and bulk products for further processing – must be approved first. Additionally, 
imported dairy products must be accompanied by original halal certificate. Like all food im-
ports, imported dairy products are subject of test and control by Agency for Drug and Food 
Control (Badan Pengawas Obat dan Makanan – BPOM). 
                                                 
16 ‘Bound tariff’ is the maximum rate of tariff allowed by World Trade Organization (WTO) to any member state 
for imports from another member state. 
17 ‘Applied tariff’ is the tariff rate actually used for imports. 
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Regarding import tariffs there are different tariffs applied for different dairy product (see 
Table 7-4). Notwithstanding the very high level of the bound tariff, the applied tariff for dairy 
products is mostly 5%, except some processed products like yoghurt and concentrated or 
sweetened milk and cream which are subject to a higher applied tariff of 10%. 
7.8 Concluding remarks 
The dairy value chain in Indonesia mainly consists of livestock and feedstuff providers, dairy 
farmers, cooperatives, DPIs, and distributors who exercise the chain functions of specific in-
put provision, dairy production, collecting and transporting, dairy processing, and distribu-
tion, respectively. More than half of all DPIs (27) reside in West Java (15). Nevertheless, 
there are only 5 DPIs possessing 90% of the total sales volume and thus indicating the con-
centration of market power in the value chain. East Java owns the largest number of coopera-
tives and dairy farmers accounting for 50% and 45%, respectively, of the total number on 
Java Island. The cooperatives have 2 different organisational form and show different per-
formance in daily output – only small part, i.e. 25%, of them produce more than 10 ton fresh 
milk daily. Fresh milk production in West and East Java has been increasing during 2002-
2007; whereas in Central Java declining and then stagnating. Also, the fresh milk production 
in Central Java is the lowest, despite this fact that the number of dairy farmers and dairy cattle 
in Central Java is higher than West Java. Characterised in milk production per farm and per 
animal, Central Java has thus the lowest productivity among all. Specific input suppliers for 
the dairy value chain are livestock and feedstuff providers. 
Indonesian dairy sub-sector had been heavily regulated – or supported by policy – due to 
some advantages perceived in the promotion of dairy sub-sector. Apart from import regula-
tion, there were national policies enacted in the 80s and 90s. They were directed to boost do-
mestic supply of fresh milk through massive dairy cattle import programme, as well as to pro-
mote domestic demand through Busep forcing DPIs to source milk locally. These policies 
were, nevertheless, abolished in 1998. The changes of these policies were then the causes of 
the rapid rise of domestic production and decrease of imports in the 80’s, as well as the resur-
gent imports in the end of 90s. 
At this point, it can be concluded that dairy value chains in the different regions face the same 
challenge with the absence of the support policy. Nevertheless, as it has been demonstrated in 
this chapter, West and East Java exhibits improving performance; whereas Central Java indi-
cates stagnation and decline. This difference in the development pattern, or the upgrading, of 
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the value chain will be further discussed in the next chapters. Some indications in this chapter 
– e.g. lower milk output albeit larger cattle population and larger farmer number in Central 
Java – will be taken up again in the discussion. The explanation of the different upgrading 
performance will be based on the difference of governance system prevailing in the different 
regions. 
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8 Comparative Cases of Higher and Lesser-Performing 
Systems 
This chapter provides a closer look at the dairy production centres in West, Central, and East 
Java. The first sub-chapter identifies the location of the production centres on Java Island and 
characterises these production centres using statistical information. The second sub-chapter 
provides further description of the production centres and distinguishes them into lesser and 
higher-performing interaction system. The initial and end condition of these systems are com-
pared to highlight the differences of the dairy value chain with and without upgrading. As the 
differences to be explained entail high degree of complexity, the Macro-Micro Model is 
modified to simplify the visual presentation and enhance the legibility of the model. The 
modification is briefly described in the last sub-chapter. 
8.1 Concentration of production centres 
 
Figure 8-1 Location of dairy production centres on Java island 
Source: modified from www.wikipedia.com (2007) 
Instead of being widespread across the island, smallholder dairy farmers are concentrated in 
certain regions, i.e. Bandung, Semarang, Boyolali, Pasuruan, and Malang (see Figure 8-1). 
These regions are situated on mountainous or elevated areas, at least 500 m above the sea 
level, where temperature is relatively lower and thus more conducive for keeping dairy cattle. 
In 2007 the largest milk-producing region in West Java is the District of Bandung which ac-
counts around 50% of the total production and 50% of the total cattle number of the province 
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(see Table 8-1 and Table 8-2). The main production centres in Central Java are the District of 
Boyolali and Semarang constituting around 40% and 25% of the total production as well as 
50% and 25% of the total dairy cattle population, respectively, of the province. In East Java 
the Districts of Pasuruan and Malang hold each around one third of the total production and of 
total population number of the province. 
Table 8-1 Development of annual production capacity [kt] of milk-production centres 
Location 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
District of Bandung      92        95        97      110       116       117   
Other districts/municipalities in West Java (22)    107      113      118        92         96       108   
Province of West Java    199      208      215      202       212       225   
District of Boyolali      31        31        31        27         29         29   
District of Semarang      25         26       24        21         18         20   
Other districts/municipalities in Central Java (33)      24        25        23        22         24         22   
Province of Central Java      80        83        78        71         71         71   
District of Pasuruan      61        71        77        78         79         81   
District of Malang      67        76        81        82         86         87   
Other districts/municipalities in East Java (36)      70        82        80        79         80         81   
Province of East Java    197      230      238      239       244       249   
Indonesia    521      553      550      536       557      568   
Source: compiled and estimated from various sources1 
Among 95 milk-producing districts the District of Bandung, Malang, and Pasuruan are by far 
the largest centres producing together at least 50% of the domestic production (2007). These 
three districts and the District of Boyolali are in view of cattle number the largest with around 
50 thousand cows in each area. The District of Boyolali shows a peculiar case here, as it has 
the largest number of dairy stock, yet the smallest production capacity: With 29 kt annual 
production and 59 thousand dairy cattle, the average production per animal amounts to 1.3 
litres per day or 499 litres per year and thus is even lower than the average of Central Java of 
                                                 
1 Dinas Peternakan Jawa Barat (2008a); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Tengah (2007a); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Timur 
(2008a); Direktorat Jendral Peternakan (2008); Badan Pusat Statistik (2009). 
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612 litres per year2; as such, Boyolali has the lowest animal productivity among the dairy 
production centres3. 
Table 8-2 Development of dairy population [000 head] of milk-production centres 
Location 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
District of Bandung  n/a   n/a   n/a   n/a   n/a      54    
Other districts/municipalities in West Java (22)  n/a   n/a   n/a   n/a   n/a      49    
Province of West Java     91        96        99        93        97      103    
District of Boyolali     64        56        58        59        60        59    
District of Semarang     28        28        31        32        33        32    
Other districts/municipalities in Central Java (33)     27        27        23        23        22        25    
Province of Central Java   119      111      112      114      115      116    
District of Pasuruan     40        41        43        43        44        45    
District of Malang     44        44        45        46        47        49    
Other districts/municipalities in East Java (36)     48        47        45        45        45        45    
Province of East Java   132      132      133      134      136      139    
Indonesia   358      374      364      361      369      374    
Source: compiled and estimated from various sources4 
By zooming-in unto the district aggregate it also became obvious that different districts – also 
in the same province – showed differentiated development patterns during 2002-2007.  While 
in general most districts, in particular Boyolali, exhibited the same trend of stagnation and 
slight decline with regard to production and dairy cattle population; the District of Bandung, 
Pasuruan, and Malang represented an exceptional case by growing constantly on average by 
4-5 kt annually. Similarly, the changes in dairy population on the district aggregate were also 
differentiated. In the District of Pasuruan, Malang, and presumably also Bandung, dairy cattle 
population steadily increased between 2002 and 2007 on average by 1,000 heads annually. 
                                                 
2 See Table 7-3 
3 See Sub-Chapter 10.2.3, in particular Figure 10-12, for the explanation of this aggregate condition 
4 Dinas Peternakan Jawa Barat (2008b); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Tengah (2007b); Dinas Peternakan Jawa Timur 
(2008b); Direktorat Jendral Peternakan (2008); Badan Pusat Statistik (2009). 
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The result of the statistical analysis on the district aggregate reinforces the justification of the 
selection of comparative cases as described in Sub-chapter 4.3: While the district of Boyolali 
represents the lower and stagnating system, Bandung and Pasuruan the higher and improving 
system.  
8.2 Comparative cases: Lesser and higher-performing interaction system 
The strategy of using comparative cases to explain why some dairy production centres thrived 
while others stagnated provide greater opportunity to cross-check and verify the conclusions 
made for each case. To differentiate these systems the term ‘lesser-performing interaction 
system’ and ‘higher-performing interaction system’ is introduced here. The term ‘interaction 
system’ refers to a system of interdependencies between two different categories of VC opera-
tor, namely between DPIs and their supplying dairy cooperatives as well as between dairy 
cooperatives and their dairy farmer members. For the lesser-performing interaction system 
empirical data were collected from 3 cases in district Boyolali, Central Java; whereas for the 
higher-performing interaction system 1 case in district Bandung, West Java and 2 cases in 
district Pasuruan, East Java. 
Both higher and lesser-performing interaction system had in the late 1990s, more or less, the 
same condition of low and stagnating performance – the initial condition. Many authors have 
examined the low performance of Indonesian dairy industry and investigated the factors in-
hibiting its further development from various analytical perspectives. For example, Moran 
(2007) and Moran (2008)  provide an extensive analysis particularly on the technical aspect of 
dairying practices and milk handling, while Stanton, Emms and Sia (2005) a comprehensive 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis covering diverse aspects of 
economic, policy, technology and research and many others. Riethmuller et al. (1999b) con-
ducted a survey in 1996 among officials – i.e. government officials from the Ministry of Ag-
riculture and Directorate General of Livestock Services, scientists from Centre for Agro 
Socio-Economic Research, and VC-operators representing DPIs, dairy cooperatives, and 
UIDC –  to identify the problems and weaknesses of Indonesian dairy industry. The most fre-
quently mentioned off-farm problem was ‘cooperative management’, followed by ‘lack of 
incentive’, presumably, of cooperatives in improving their conditions and practices. Interest-
ingly, the weaknesses identified were also mostly at the cooperative level: ‘relationship be-
tween farmers and cooperatives’, ‘corruption within cooperatives’, and ‘management of co-
operatives’. These findings are supported by testimony of a cooperative leader: 
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Our cooperative was established in 1971 and developed well until 1979. But afterwards its per-
formance had been declining and reached its nadir in 1998 because of increasing default loans 
and weak management. (Coop 1, higher performance) 
Only after early 2000s consecutively progressive changes took place in the higher-performing 
interaction system resulting in higher and improving performance – the end condition. On the 
contrary, hardly any fundamental improvement came about in the lesser-performing interac-
tion system – the end condition resembled the initial condition. This does not mean, however, 
that there were no efforts and actions undertaken to improve the low and stagnating perform-
ance, but the results of the undertakings were just discouraging. It can thus be said that the 
distinguishing line between both systems is that in the higher-performing interaction system 
VC upgrading successfully took place, whereas in the lesser-performing interaction system it 
did not. 
The most prominent indicators for measuring the performance of the interaction systems are 
the milk quality, which is determined by the bacterial contamination (milk grade) and content 
of total solid (TS), and milk price. In lesser-performing interaction system the bacterial con-
tamination persisted from early 2000s to 2008 in the range of 5 – 15 millions cfu/ml5 indicat-
ing low milk hygiene. The TS content has also not improved and remained in the range of 
10% – 11%. Even during the “turbulence time”6 it dropped below 10%, obviously indicating 
milk adulteration with water. In 2006, the milk price paid by DPIs to UIDC Central Java was 
around IDR 2,100 per litre milk; whereas milk price at cooperative level amounted to around 
IDR 1,700 and at farmer level around IDR 1,400 per litre milk.  
In comparison, one of the higher-performing cooperatives stated its upgrading achievements 
in 2006 as follows: 
Currently, 75% of our milk achieves the milk grade 17 [less than 250,000 cfu per ml milk]. In 
average, we receive IDR 2,500 from the DPI and the dairy farmers receive IDR 2,100 from us. 
This achievement was attainable in a relatively short time period of, more or less, 5 years. 
(Coop 1, higher performance) 
                                                 
5 Cf. Moran (2007, p. 38) 
6 See Sub-chapter 10.2.1.1for further description of the “turbulence time“.  
7 Cf. Wouters (2009, p. 15) 
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The price already included the bonus for TS content which was averagely 12.8%; even in cer-
tain areas it was above 13%. The daily milk output of the cooperative has also improved from 
56 kt in 1996, to 86 in 2001, and to 110 tonne in 2006. Another higher-performing coopera-
tive has also achieved considerable improvement in increasing milk hygiene. In 2006 85% of 
the milk output contained less than 0.5 million cfu/ml (milk grade 1). As for the milk price, 
the cooperative received on average IDR 2,400 from the DPI and paid its members IDR 2,000 
per litre milk. 
8.2.1 End condition: Interaction system between DPIs and cooperatives 
Within the interaction system between DPIs and cooperatives the differentiating factor be-
tween both systems is that in higher-performing interaction system an intensive cooperation 
was established between DPIs and their supplying cooperatives to achieve higher quality 
standards. Table 8-3 summarises the main characteristics of the end condition with and with-
out upgrading8. Why upgrading has occurred in some cases and not in other cases is the main 
question dealt with in Chapter 9. 
Table 8-3 Overview of upgrading in the interaction system between DPIs and cooperatives 
Aspect End condition with upgrading End condition without upgrading 
Product 
upgrading 
Lower bacterial contamination, higher TS con-
tent, higher milk price 
Higher bacterial and adulterants contamination, 
lower TS content, lower milk price 
Process 
upgrading 
within a 
chain link 
DPIs: Increased cost efficiency due to higher-
quality milk as raw material 
Coops: Introduction of improved technology for 
cooling plants and other milk equipment 
DPIs: Lower-quality milk with higher technical 
costs 
Coops: Traditional milk handling with low 
technology level inadequate for producing high-
quality milk 
Process 
upgrading 
between 
chain links 
Improved flow of technical information from 
DPIs to supplying cooperatives 
More transparent communication between both 
parties 
Joint quality monitoring 
Standard information flow through buyer/seller 
relation 
Functional 
upgrading 
DPIs provide technical (TA) and financial assis-
tance (TA) to cooperatives 
DPIs provide no TA and FA 
Source: own compilation 
8.2.2 End condition: Interaction system between cooperatives and dairy farmers 
                                                 
8 See Sub-chapter 2.1 for the typology of upgrading used in the table. 
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The VC upgrading took place within the interaction system between dairy cooperatives and 
dairy farmers covers a wide range of aspects. Table 8-4 provides the summary of the upgrad-
ing aspects in key words. 
Table 8-4 Overview of upgrading in the interaction system between coops and dairy farmers 
Aspect End condition with upgrading End condition without upgrading 
Product 
upgrading 
Lower bacterial contamination, higher TS content, 
higher milk price 
Higher bacterial and adulterants contamination, 
lower TS content, lower milk price 
Process 
upgrading 
within a 
chain link 
Coops: Improved MCCs, cooling plant, food-grade 
piping system, laboratory, SOP-oriented milk 
handling 
Increased organisational efficiency, focus on de-
veloping dairy business, fewer inactive member, 
lower propensity for corruption, highly motivated 
leaders and staff 
Dairy farmers: adoption of GDFP, more resources 
allotted for dairy farm (equipment, feedstuff, shed, 
etc.), higher animal and farm productivity, increas-
ing number of dairy farmers 
Coops: No cooling plant and laboratory, inade-
quate MCCs and piping system, inadequate SOP 
for milk handling 
High number of inactive members,  focus on maxi-
mising surplus, higher propensity for malfeasance, 
low performance of coop leaders and staff 
Dairy farmers: prevalence of milk adulteration, 
traditional dairy practices, performance stagnation 
on subsistence level, opting for suckler cow, low 
animal and farm productivity, declining number of 
dairy farmers 
Process 
upgrading 
between 
chain links 
Enforced quality regulations with quality/price 
mechanism, socio-culturally adjusted training and 
monitoring system 
Weak quality regulation with absent quality/price 
mechanism 
Functional 
upgrading 
Provision of services: training / extension and 
monitoring, veterinary service, production of fresh 
forage and concentrate feed, water reservoir 
Limited provision of collective service: occasional 
extension system and monitoring 
Source: own compilation 
Figure 8-2 and Figure 8-3 provide concrete illustrations of the conditions of and the striking 
differences between the higher and lesser-performing interaction system. Further explanations 
on these conditions are dealt with in Chapter 10. 
 
Figure 8-2 Illustration of higher-performing interaction system 
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Source: Moran (2007, p. 4) and own compilation 
The left picture above shows an example of heat water installation at a milk collection centre 
(MCC) which is used by dairy farmers for cleaning their milk cans following a milk delivery. 
The right picture above shows a clean, well-managed cow stall equipped with rubber mat for 
protection against knee injuries, adequate water for cleaning, and a ditch for effluent man-
agement. 
 
Figure 8-3 Illustration of lesser-performing interaction system 
Source: Moran (2008, p. 22), Moran (2007, p. 4), and own compilation 
The left picture above shows the traditional feeding management of giving dairy cows slurry 
concentrates mixed with water and chopped papaya trunk which is used to supplement limited 
forage supply in dry seasons. The middle picture above shows a dairy farmer – while smoking 
– milking a cow using plastic bucket in a dirty cow stall. The right picture above shows rusty 
milk can tighten with black-coloured plastic bag used for delivering milk to a MCC. 
8.3 Modified visual presentation of Macro-Micro Model 
The visual presentation of the analytical framework of Macro-Micro Model assumes that the 
explanation is done in one step, namely from ‘Social phenomena 1’ to ‘Social phenomena 2’ 
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(see Figure 8-4) and that the individuals have single perception and single action9. The cases 
to be explained in Chapters 9 and 10, however, are far more complex. There are different so-
cial phenomena – the institutional aspects of the interaction system – influencing the indi-
viduals. A single institutional aspect can result in several types of perception which, in turn, 
lead to different types of action. Also, the explanation of the end situation (end outcome of the 
interaction system) is not done in one step, but through several intermediate outcomes. Based 
on these conditions, the visual presentation of the Macro-Micro Model is modified as follows 
(see Figure 8-4). 
 
Figure 8-4 Modification of the visual presentation of Macro-Micro Model  
Source: own compilation  
                                                 
9 Figure 3-6 presents an extended version of Macro-Micro-Model by incorporating 2 different types of actors 
including their perception and action. 
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There are basically three different shapes used in the modified visual presentation, i.e. 
rounded rectangle (‘objective situation’), rectangle (‘subjective perception’), and elongated 
octagon (‘action’). The macro variable ‘objective situation’ represents the general situation 
and institutional aspect of the system. The micro variable ‘subjective perception’ and ‘action’ 
replaces the ‘logic of situation’ and ‘logic of selection’ respectively. As the outcome of the 
action – the ‘logic of aggregation’ – is also a macro variable, it is depicted by rounded rectan-
gle. A shape with grey background signifies that the respective variable is used in the expla-
nation of other intermediate outcome(s). A specific coding is used for some of the macro vari-
ables with grey background to explicitly indicate the interplay of some macro variables in the 
interaction system. The symbol ‘S’ indicates that the macro variable is a given objective con-
dition in the system beyond the influences of the actors. The symbol ‘C’ indicates that the 
macro variable is an outcome of actions by cooperatives and that this variable influences dairy 
farmers. The opposite applies to the symbol ‘F’. For better understanding of the suggested 
modification, concrete examples can be found in directly Chapters 9 and 10. 
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9 Interaction System between DPIs and Cooperatives 
Chapters 9 and 10 explain the relationship between the governance and the performance of 
the observed links of the Indonesian dairy VC, namely the interaction system between DPIs 
and cooperatives as well as between cooperatives and dairy farmers. The analysis starts with a 
brief overview of the historical development of the VC operators. Then, the prevailing gov-
ernance system of each interaction system is analysed using the theoretical framework of ex-
tended theory of institution – as delineated in Sub-chapter 3.4 – with particular emphasis on 
the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive aspects. Then, the causal relationships be-
tween the governance and the performance of the respective chain link – the macro variables 
– are explicated based on the analytical framework of methodological individualism as de-
scribed in Sub-chapter 3.6. The explanation premises on the subjective perception and se-
lected action of the different categories of VC operators – the micro variables. The interaction 
and aggregation of the selected actions, in turn, lead to the end outcome. To produce sharper 
and more verifiable conclusions, the analysis compares successful and unsuccessful cases of 
upgrading – the higher and lesser-performing interaction system. 
9.1 Brief history of DPIs 
 
Figure 9-1 Timeline: Historical development Dairy Processing Industries in Indonesia 
Source: own compilation 
In concise format Figure 9-1 presents the historical development of the five-largest DPIs in 
Indonesia1, among which three are owned by multi-national companies: 
                                                 
1 See Table 7-1 for the 5-largest DPIs in Indonesia and their share in domestic fresh milk consumption. 
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i. Nestle: Despite the fact that Nestlé’s products, e.g. “Susu Tjap Nona”, had already been 
known in Indonesia at the end of the 19th century, the subsidiary Nestlé Indonesia was first 
established in 1971 as a further development of the company Food Specialties Indonesia. 
ii. Frisian Flag Indonesia: The operation of Frisian Flag Indonesia (FFI) started in 1922 
with the import of “Friesche Vlag” (“Susu Bendera”) milk brand from Cooperative Con-
densfabriek Friesland of the Netherlands. FFI is a subsidiary of Royal FrieslandCampina, 
a multinational company producing dairy products. 
iii. Indomilk / Indolakto: Indomilk established in 1969 and Indolakto in 1997 belonged to 
the company group of Indofood. During the economic crisis both company were handed 
over to Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency and then sold to Bakti Maju Bersama 
Abadi of Marison NV. After several acquisitions by different companies, both companies 
were bought back by Indofood in 2008. 
iv. Ultrajaya: Starting with a small dairy operation in 1958 Ultrajaya Milk Industry and 
Trading Company was established in 1971. At present, this company sells 90% of its total 
production volume on domestic market. 
v. Sari Husada: In collaboration with United Nations GoI established NV Saridele in 1954 
to support the programme of nutrition improvement, in particular of protein supply. Fol-
lowing the acquisition by Tiga Raksa, the name NV Saridele changed into Sari Husada in 
1972. Sari Husada started an alliance with Royal Numico NV in 1998. At present, the 
company is under Danone after Danone Group acquisitioned Royal Numico. 
9.2 Institutional framework 
9.2.1 Regulative aspect: Regulations for product and process quality 
The regulatory framework specific to the dairy VC concerns the technical requirements for 
process and product quality parameters. For the process quality regulation DPIs establish the 
so-called ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ (SOPs) to define the technical requirements in 
milk handling by cooperatives and dairy farmers2. Of outmost importance in the product qual-
ity regulation is the determination of the milk price paid to the cooperatives based on the qual-
                                                 
2 See Sub-chapter 10.3.1.1 for further description of the process quality regulation. 
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ity3 parameters of the milk delivered. Relevant parameters for the price determination are 
concisely summarised in the following table4: 
Table 9-1 Parameters relevant for the determination of milk price by DPI 
Parameter Description Test method5 
Milk grade6 Degree of bacterial contamination or germ con-
tent per ml fresh milk 
Total Plate Count (TPC) 
 
Milk com-
position 
Indicated by: 
Total Solid (TS) 
Fat content 
Protein content7 or solid non-fat (SNF) which 
includes protein, lactose, and minerals 
 
Lactometer / lactoscan 
Gerber test / sulphuric acid 
SNF = TS – fat content 
 
Milk tem-
perature 
Milk temperature on arrival at the DPI Thermometer 
Source: own compilation and adapted from Moran (2007) 
Each DPI applies a different system of price determination for its suppliers, but in general the 
aforementioned parameters are widely used. Usually, a ‘base price’ – i.e. the “normal” price 
without bonus or penalty – is set and with decreasing germ content and increasing milk com-
position incremental price bonus is given. Correspondingly, price penalty applies for the op-
posite. Apart from the aforementioned parameters determining the milk price there are also 
rejection criteria upon arrival at the DPI’s gate: floccules indicating high bacterial contamina-
tion, indication of antibiotics or other chemicals, indication of adulterants like sugar or some 
other additive (used to increase specific gravity / milk density), and added water to increase 
milk volume (fat content below 3%). 
                                                 
3 The term ‘milk quality’ generally used in Indonesia covers both ‘milk hygiene’ and ‘milk composition’. In 
other countries, such as Australia, ‘milk quality’ refers specifically to ‘milk hygiene’, namely the levels of milk 
contamination by bacteria, chemicals, or any other adulterants (cf. Moran 2007, pp. 25–28). 
4 Cf. Moran (2007, pp. 34–36); Moran (2008, p. 22); Firman (2008, p. 6) 
5 See Moran (2007, pp. 25–28) for more elaborate description of the listed as well as other applicable test meth-
ods.  
6 The term ‘milk grade’ is a sub-category of ‘milk hygiene’ and is widely used in Indonesia to refer specifically 
to bacterial contamination. 
7 With lactose and mineral contents being relatively stable – 4.7% and 0.7%, respectively – the protein content 
can be estimated as follows: Milk protein = SNF – 5.4%. See Moran (2005, p. 54). 
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Table 9-2 Parameters relevant for the determination of milk price by DPI 
2007a 2001c 
Milk grade 
[million 
cfu/ml] 
Milk price 
[IDR/litre] 
Milk priceb 
 [USD/litre] 
Milk grade
[million 
cfu/ml] 
Bonus / 
penalty 
[IDR/litre]
TS 
[%] 
Bonus / 
penalty 
[IDR/litre] 
Temp 
[°C] 
Bonus / 
penalty 
[IDR/litre]
< 0.25 3,047 0.336 < 1 + 100 < 10.7 - 25 > 8 - 10 
0.25 - 0.50 2,947 0.325 1 - 3 + 75 10.7 - 10.9 - 20 6 - 8 0 
0.50 - 1.00 2,847 0.314 3 - 5 + 50 10.9 - 11.0 - 15 < 6 + 10 
5 - 7.5 + 40 11.0 - 11.1 - 10   
7.5 - 10 + 30 11.2 - 11.3 - 5   
10 - 15 + 20 11.3 - 11.4 0   
15 - 20 + 10 11.4 - 11.6 + 20   
20 - 30 0 11.6 - 11.9 + 30   
30 - 40 - 10 > 12 + 40   
> 40 -20     
a) This list only contains the base prices 
based on bacterial contamination, but 
not the bonus/penalty parameters. 
b) USD/IDR rate as of July 2007: 
 1 USD = 9,072 IDR 
c) This list only contains the bonus/penalty parameters, but not the base 
price. 
Source: adapted from Meylinah (2007) and Moran (2007) 
Over time the system of price determination has been changing. According to Stanton, Emms 
and Sia (2005, pp. 33–39), until 1983 milk payment was based solely on the volume. Gradu-
ally, product quality parameters were introduced – starting from fat content, to SNF, to TS, to 
milk grade, and to antibiotic contamination – from 1984 to 2004. The grading and threshold 
of bacterial contamination could also be shifted from less to more differentiated, or vice versa. 
The same also applies for the base price (see Table 9-1 and Table 9-2). The whole price de-
termination system is subject to regular review in negotiation processes between DPIs, GKSI, 
and GoI; but due to power asymmetry in the dairy value chain DPIs have been able to enforce 
their decision most of the times. Obviously, DPIs as the ‘rule-setter’ utilise the price determi-
nation system and other regulations, such as delivery quota, as an instrument of influencing or 
controlling the behaviour of their suppliers: encouraging the production of high quality milk, 
discouraging the production of lower quality milk, and increasing/lowering milk delivery ac-
cording to their supply need. 
Table 9-3 Examples of price determination system of a DPI in East Java8 
                                                 
8 The data for 2006 contains the base price only, whereas for the other years only the bonus/penalty parameters. 
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2006 2003 2002 
Milk grade 
[million cfu/ml] 
Milk price 
[IDR/litre] 
Milk grade
[million 
cfu/ml] 
Bonus / penalty
[IDR/litre] 
Milk grade 
[million cfu/ml] 
Bonus / penalty
[IDR/litre] 
< 0.5 2,400 < 1 + 150 < 1 + 100 
0.5 - 1.0 2,300 1 - 3 + 75 1 - 3 + 50 
1.0 - 2.0 2,100 3 - 6 0 3 - 6 - 25 
2.0 - 4.0 1,910 6 - 10 - 75 6 - 8 - 50 
4.0 - 5.0 1,675 > 10 -150 8 - 10 - 100 
> 5.0 1,425 
Temp 
[°C] 
Bonus / penalty
[IDR/litre] > 10 -150 
 > 8.5 -10  
 
2001 2000 1999 
Parameter 
Bonus / penalty per 
% incremental 
[IDR/litre] 
Milk grade
[million 
cfu/ml] 
Bonus / penalty
[IDR/litre] 
TS 
[%] 
Bonus / penalty
[IDR/litre] 
Fat [%] 144 < 1 + 100 < 10.9 Rejected (?) 
SNF [%] 131 1 - 4 + 75 < 11.6 - 40 
4 - 6 nil 11.6 - 11.8 - 20 
6 - 10 - 25 11.8 - 12.0 nil 
Base milk price (3.9% fat content, 
7.9% SNF, and 11.8% TS): IDR 1,480 
> 10 - 100 12.0 - 12.5 + 40 
   > 12.5 + 60 
Source: adapted from Nugraha (2007) and Moran (2007) 
Given the imbalance of market power, cooperatives tend to be a ‘rule-taker’ and have virtu-
ally small influence in the setting of quality regulations. This is exemplified by a case of 
lesser-performing cooperatives in mid 2008: While the cooperatives were still struggling to 
improve the hygiene of processes undergone by the milk to achieve higher milk grade and 
thus higher milk price, DPIs suddenly altered the determinant parameter for the milk price 
from the bacterial contamination to TS content, thereby nullifying the ongoing quality-
improvement measures of the cooperatives. This alteration was an attempt from DPIs to 
loosen their own quality criteria, so that they could to absorb lower quality milk, as they were 
contending for locally produced fresh milk on account of the surging price of imported raw 
material supplies – the “turbulence time”9. 
The monitoring of the quality regulations is carried out by the DPIs themselves; third party 
monitoring is not observable. For the product quality DPIs test every milk delivery in their 
                                                 
9 Cf. Sub-chapter 10.2.1.1 and 10.2.2.3 
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own laboratory, whereas for the process quality DPIs employ technical specialists as field 
officer that visit cooperatives and dairy farmers, inspect their dairying practices, and give 
them technical recommendations as well as warnings. Having the market power in possession, 
DPIs are also able to back-up the enforcement of rewards and punishments. For example, one 
DPI performs quality audit every 6 months to safeguard the quality of product and process. 
Based on a specified technical checklist the DPI assesses its suppliers and gives a point for 
every failure. The total sum of the points is used to determine the severity of penalty to be 
given. The most severe penalty for the suppliers is the application of the price for the lowest 
milk grade (1,400 IDR per litre milk in 2006) for 6 months or even the termination of the 
business relation. 
Additional to DPIs’ own regulations there are other binding regulations to the dairy sector, yet 
these are perceived not to be influential. Via Agency for Drug and Food Control (Badan Pen-
gawas Obat dan Makanan – BPOM) GoI defines the standards for product and process qual-
ity to ensure food safety. The agency only intervenes in the case of food scandals or outbreak 
of diseases. Also, DPIs should obtain the Halal Certificate from Indonesian Ulama Council 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia – MUI), as the majority of the end consumers in Indonesia are 
Moslems. However, these standards apply solely to the end product and the manufacturing 
processes at DPIs, but not to the intermediary product and its production or handling proc-
esses, i.e. the production of fresh milk by dairy farmers and the handling by cooperatives. 
Moreover, these regulations are perceived not to be stringent by the DPIs, as it is expressed by 
a field inspector of a DPI: 
The quality standards imposed by the government are minimal; our own company standards are 
much higher. Anyway, you just need to acquire the certificate once, which is not so difficult. 
The monitoring is also not frequent, perhaps once a year or so. (DPI 3) 
Other standards that might be important to the dairy sub-sector such as organic standards or 
certain consumer protection standards are virtually non-existent. 
9.2.2 Normative and cultural-cognitive aspect: Limited significance 
The role of normative and cultural-cognitive aspect in the interaction system between DPIs 
and cooperatives appears to be minimal. Individuals from both parties are not situated in the 
same social community. Their interaction is limited solely to business relation. Therefore, 
they do not share particular norms or habits. However, against the background of prevalence 
opportunistic behaviour and weak law enforcement in general, the issue of trust and trustwor-
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thiness is a fundamental concern in the interaction system. This is explained in the following 
sub-chapters. 
9.3 Higher-performing interaction system 
 
Figure 9-2 End outcome: Cooperation between DPIs and higher-performing coops10 
Source: own compilation 
                                                 
10 The subjective perception of ‘cooperative as change agent or pioneer’ is highlighted with gray background to 
indicate that this perception is also used in the explanation of other macro variables. See Sub-chapter 10.3.2. 
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Figure 9-2 illustrates how and why the cooperation between DPIs and higher-performing co-
operatives came about – the macro variable to be explained. This end outcome is explained by 
the aggregation of the selected action by both VC-operators – the micro variables –, namely 
that DPIs offer TA and FA for committed suppliers and that cooperatives accept the offer of 
TA and FA by DPIs. These actions are grounded in the subjective perceptions of each party 
which, in turn, are caused by the objective situation of the interaction system. The following 
sub-chapters explain separately the micro variables DPIs (upper part) and cooperatives (lower 
part of Figure 9-2). 
9.3.1 Micro variable: DPIs 
There were two occurrences that increased DPIs’ risk perception of imported supply of raw 
materials. First, the abolishment of Busep in 1998 has indeed resulted in the resurgence of raw 
material imports by DPIs to exploit their unused production capacity, but at that time Indone-
sian currency depreciated heavily against foreign currencies due to the economic crisis: From 
IDR 2,500 per USD in the pre-crisis condition in mid 1997, USD/IDR exchange rate had 
peaked at 17,500 IDR per USD in mid 1998 (Aswicahyono et al. 2009) and levelled off at 
8,000 – 10,000 IDR range ever since. Such situation caused immense increase in import costs 
for raw material. Second, the unexpected spurt in international milk price in 2008 gave DPIs a 
serious warning signal that import prices are not resistant to fluctuations caused by interna-
tional policy and market changes or adverse climatic condition11. Considering these occur-
rences, DPIs perceived that they needed to hedge against risks of possible future price fluctua-
tions by reducing reliance on imported supplies12. This prompted DPIs to establish solid 
domestic supply base. 
However, the performance of the local suppliers was low and stagnating13. DPIs, on the con-
trary, require that locally produced fresh milk meets certain quality standards in order to be 
eligible for substituting the imported supplies. Lower-quality milk is only eligible for produc-
ing SCM, but not for liquid milk or powdered milk (Meylinah 2008, p. 3; Meylinah 2007, p. 
                                                 
11 See Sub-chapter 6.4 and 6.5 for the causes of price surge on the world market. 
12 Additionally, DPIs faced another, presumably less-pressing, issue of improving food safety that encouraged 
them to upgrade their local suppliers. Cf. Jöhr (2008). 
13 See Sub-chapter 8.2 for the description of cooperatives’ low performance. 
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5). Apart from quality issue, the continuity and reliability – i.e. being free from chemical or 
antibiotic contamination – of the supply are to be guaranteed. But more importantly, high-
quality milk is the basis for increasing the competitiveness of the whole value chain, because 
lower-quality milk requires higher technical efforts and thus higher costs in the processing. A 
spokesperson of the association of DPIs stated: 
High-quality milk produced by Indonesian dairy farmers is competitive raw material for prod-
ucts of dairy processing industries, not low-quality milk. (Stanton, Emms and Sia 2005, p. 22) 
In similar vein, representatives from the DPIs stated: 
The task of our department is […] to ensure that the fresh milk supply from the dairy farmers is 
sustainable and meet our requirements. (DPI 3) 
Our company concentrates on the production of powdered milk for babies and infants. There-
fore, the quality of the raw material we need must be high and guaranteed. (DPI 2) 
As a result, DPIs decided to give technical (TA) and financial assistance (FA) to the supply-
ing cooperatives to upgrade their capability. With such decision, the quasi market relationship 
between cooperatives and DPIs that persisted until the late 1990s was transformed into a more 
hierarchical relationship14 where DPIs provided embedded service to their suppliers based on 
certain binding requirements. Nevertheless, the endeavour to upgrade suppliers did not result 
only in successful cases; the results of some cases have been discouraging. Reflecting on the 
lessons learnt drawn on their experiences in assisting their supplying cooperatives, DPIs then 
concluded that there are, at least, two conditions for a successful cooperation with the suppli-
ers. 
First, the partner cooperative must be led by leaders that are trustworthy and reliable. These 
leaders must show a strong willingness and commitment to progressively change the coopera-
tive. Also, they must be orientated toward supporting their own cooperative members and not 
pursuing their own self-interest. DPIs’ representative explained: 
What we need is an honest and simple cooperative leader, someone who has a true interest in 
developing the cooperative and its members and not making himself richer. Many coop leaders 
are not so trustworthy. It is very difficult to cooperate with such people. I think it is very impor-
tant to identify and work with committed but simple people who are willing to work toward de-
velopment. (DPI 1) 
                                                 
14 Cf. Sub-chapter 2.7.2 
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Actually it is not that we do not want to help our supplying cooperatives. We are open to coop-
eration with them. The problem is whether our help will reach its intended goal and not be mis-
used. Can you imagine, in a negotiation with a cooperative the director gave us a small note 
containing his account number and the amount he wants? We cannot play like that. We are al-
ways audited and our transaction records must be clean and clear. (DPI 2) 
These statements indicate the prevalence of malfeasance behaviour among cooperative lead-
ers15 who misused DPIs’ supports. Being oriented toward self-interest, such cooperative lead-
ers would seek and exploit any possible opportunity to bring benefits for themselves, thereby 
relegating the original goals of developing the cooperative and members to a minor agenda. 
Also, since such cooperative leaders have vested interests; they are not transparent and usu-
ally not willing to be subjected to scrutiny. Consequently, the monitoring of the upgrading 
progress through technical and financial assistances proved to be difficult. 
Another aspect required from trustworthy leaders was their commitment to continuously and 
exclusively deliver the DPI in return for the assistances provided, because DPIs had to make 
sure that their assistance, or better said their investment, does give them proper return. 
Besides, we also want a commitment that if they receive our supports they will commit to de-
liver us their milk. If not, that is a loss for our investment. (DPI 2) 
We are ready to help our suppliers to meet our requirements. But they have to commit to supply 
us continuously. Otherwise it does not make any sense. (DPI 3) 
The conviction that successful cooperation is only possible with clean leaders is also a result 
of the weak law enforcement in Indonesia. Law enforcement in Indonesia is generally per-
ceived to be ineffective by the VC-operators. Although the protection of property rights is 
more or less predictable, larger companies – like DPIs – have traditionally little faith in re-
solving disputes through legal mechanism16. Using legal contractual arrangements to bind 
suppliers is not a viable option, because although the contract conditions and consequences of 
infraction of the agreed terms are stipulated in the legal contract, its enforcement is still not 
easy: Ex-post problem settlement should follow intransparent, complex procedures and thus is 
time-consuming, costly, and not always effective. Hence, in this context preventing or reduc-
                                                 
15 See Sub-chapter 10.2.1.6 for the prevalence and acceptance of opportunistic behaviour. 
16 See Aswicahyono et al. (2009) for more elaborate analysis of the contemporary economic policy in Indonesia 
and its enforcement. 
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ing the risk of malfeasance behaviour through cooperating exclusively with trustworthy and 
transparent cooperative leaders offers a better strategy. 
The second requirement is that cooperative leaders must be willing to introduce reform into 
the organisation of the cooperative itself. One DPI stated: 
Learning from previous experiences, we changed our approach. The support is not given di-
rectly to the dairy farmers, but to the cooperatives, because basically it is the responsibility of 
the cooperatives to organise and help their members to improve their dairy business. It is not 
ours. So, we constantly liaise with the cooperatives and provide them support if they need. (DPI 
1) 
The statement was made against following background: In the early 2000 the DPI launched a 
massive supplier upgrading programme with considerable budget amount. From around 12 
coops supported, only 3-4 exhibited considerable success, 2 totally failed, while the others 
showed moderate outcomes. The programme objective was to sustainably increase the welfare 
of dairy farmers by improving their management skill, in particular in hygiene aspect. As 
such, the programme was delivered directly to the dairy farmers. However, the programme 
was not considered to be successful, since the progressive changes were not sustainable: The 
technical know-how given was only practiced by the dairy farmers when supervised and given 
incentive. As soon as the programme ended and thus the supervision and incentive stopped, 
they returned to their former practices, because the programme did not create a sustainable 
structure. With the new strategy the DPI aimed at building the structure of the system where 
the cooperative leaders and dairy farmers embedded into: the broader institutional framework 
of their interaction system, including the organisational aspect of the cooperative. The effort 
to improve of dairy farmers’ management skill was changed from temporary capacity build-
ing activities into a permanent training service provided by the cooperatives. Similarly, the 
provisional incentive-giving was institutionalised into a reward and punishment system17. 
Another DPI also emphasised that their task in providing assistances focused on the empow-
erment of the cooperatives so that they were enabled to provide services for their own mem-
bers. For example, the quality regulations delineated by the DPI were to be socialised by the 
cooperatives. The capacity building required to change dairy farmers’ practices as well as the 
                                                 
17 See Sub-chapter 10.3 for further elaboration on the improvement of the institutional framework. 
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monitoring of the compliance was also to be performed by the cooperatives. Such approach 
reflects the strategy of empowering the institution of the cooperative. 
Based on these perceptions, DPIs offered their TA and FA only to selected suppliers which 
satisfy their conditions. To access the supplier upgrading programme the cooperatives should 
follow the procedure as described by a DPI representative:  
 The cooperative leader should express the commitment to supply the DPI continuously. 
Important is also the willingness to accept the quality regulations (quality/price mecha-
nism and SOPs) defined by the DPI as well as the recommendations given by the DPI. 
This necessitates the readiness from the cooperative side to change the existing practices. 
 The DPI then conducts field visit examining the conditions and practices at dairy farms 
and MCCs. A gap assessment is made to analyse the discrepancy between the existing and 
desired practices and conditions as required in the quality regulations. 
 From the results of the gap assessment the DPI derives technical recommendations on 
how to improve the existing practices and conditions in gradual steps toward the ideal 
ones. Since the improvement measures also entail investment in equipment and infrastruc-
ture, the DPI provides several loan alternatives. 
 After discussing and negotiating the loan alternatives the cooperative leader can decide on 
the most suitable alternative with the specification of the credit volume, interest rate, and 
tenor. The repayment is made through deduction from the milk sale to the DPI. 
The technical assistance (TA) provided by DPIs covers aspects required for building the ca-
pacity of the cooperatives to meet the quality regulations. Technical guidelines specifying 
step-by-step improvement measures are given to the suppliers. For TA purposes DPIs assign 
field officers that regularly visit supplying cooperatives, discuss the progress of improvement 
measures, provide technical inputs and collect feedbacks for the DPIs. Through this embed-
ded service the flow of technical information – including the introduction of new technology 
and innovation such as improved variety of fodder grass, silage production, and applicable 
milk test methods – from DPIs to cooperatives was significantly improved. Capacity building 
is also provided for extension workers and cooperative staff working at the MCCs. A com-
prehensive quality audit on product and process parameters is conducted every 6 months. 
The financial assistance (FA) aims at the upgrading of inappropriate equipment and infra-
structure. The delivery mechanism of FA is different among DPIs: While some DPIs use the 
service of commercial bank and provide guarantee for the loan procedure, others use their 
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own fund and provide the loan directly to the cooperatives. For the case that the loan was pro-
vided directly by the DPI (2006), no interest rate was applied for the purchase of equipment 
dealing directly with milk quality, such as cooling machine and food-grade piping system. As 
Indonesia is not a typical milk-producing country and thus the dairy technology is underde-
veloped, the DPI also helped with the sourcing and import of such equipment, usually second-
hand equipment from typical milk-producing countries. For the improvement of infrastruc-
ture, such as renovating or building new MCCs, the DPI charged an interest rate of 6% which 
was half of the interest rate for commercial loans at that time. 
9.3.2 Micro variable: Higher-performing cooperatives 
Leaders of higher-performing cooperatives are aware that DPIs are and will be their main 
buyer, because the demand for fresh milk on local markets has been too low. Also, in the long 
run DPIs have the capacity to absorb additional milk produced by the dairy farmers, provided 
that DPIs are willing to substitute imported supplies for locally produced milk18. Therefore, 
for cooperative leaders it is important to understand and satisfy the requirements posed by 
DPI, in particular milk quality, to establish a sustainable business linkage with DPIs. 
To comply with DPIs’ requirements cooperative leaders needed to build the capacity of the 
cooperative to provide collective services required for the attainment of high-quality milk 
production – cooperative as the change agent or pioneer. The reform of the cooperative was 
perceived as the first and highest priority in the endeavour to expand the dairy business. Such 
endeavour, however, was in fact a daunting task since it required a wide range of resources. 
Cooperatives needed technical advice on how to gradually achieve the quality standards and 
what improvement measures to take. They needed capacity building for the extension workers 
who will disseminate GDFP, train dairy farmers, and monitor their practices as well as for the 
cooperative staff working at the MCCs. Specific dairy technology is an important issue in the 
installation of cooling plants and piping system. The establishment of own laboratory for milk 
tests also required equipment and specific know-how. Most importantly, the improvement of 
equipment and infrastructure also required considerable amount of financial resources. 
                                                 
18 See Figure 6-3 for the proportion of the imported to locally produced raw material for DPIs. 
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Against this background cooperative leaders perceived that the TA and FA offered by DPIs 
can provide significant support in, and thus is of great use to, the endeavour to build coopera-
tive capacity to provide collective services. Cooperatives did not have to pay additional costs 
for the services delivered through the TA. As for the FA, cooperatives could access loans, 
particularly those managed and provided directly by the DPI, with much more favourable 
conditions than regular commercial loans: simpler procedure, presumably without guarantee, 
subsidised interest rate, and repayment through deduction from milk payment. In return, co-
operatives had to accept the conditions that, first, they were subjected to strict monitoring and 
scrutiny; and, second, they were necessitated to continuously and exclusively sell the milk to 
the DPI they cooperated with. However, as the conditions did not stand in conflict with their 
perception and orientation19, the cooperative leaders willingly accepted the offer of TA and 
FA, thereby establishing an intensive cooperative with DPIs. 
9.4 Lesser-performing interaction system 
Due to the general acceptances and prevalence of opportunistic behaviour in lesser-
performing interaction system20 DPIs perceived higher risk of the misuse of TA and FA by 
the leaders of lesser-performing cooperatives. Therefore, DPIs hesitated to offer TA and FA 
to these cooperatives, thereby reducing the possibility of cooperation between both parties. 
On the other hand, the cooperative leaders decided to ignore the cooperation opportunity with 
DPIs based on their own perception of their situation. As a result, the cooperation between 
DPIs and lesser-performing cooperatives did not come about, although there were attempts to 
facilitate the establishment of intensive cooperation between DPIs and lesser-performing co-
operatives. 
The cooperative leaders also were not so enthusiastic to accept the strict conditions for TA 
and FA, namely being necessitated to provide transparent information and subjected into rig-
orous control by DPIs, because in such condition the pursuit of vested interests is more diffi-
cult. The reluctance of the leaders to engage in cooperation with DPIs was also indirectly 
                                                 
19 See Sub-chapter 10.3.2 for more detailed elaboration of the orientation and perception of the leaders from 
higher-performing cooperatives. 
20 See Sub-chapter 10.2.1.6 for the prevalence and acceptance of opportunistic behaviour in lesser-performing 
interaction system (LS2). 
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caused by the misconception of cooperative principles21: The main orientation of these leaders 
in cooperative management is to maximise surplus from diverse business units they have, 
including the dairy business. Compared to other business units, dairy business exhibits much 
higher complexity since it involves complicated quality regulations, procedures, and requires 
intensive resource allocation for its further development. Furthermore, as the business pros-
pect of dairy business had been declining due to the increasing number of dairy farmers that 
stopped selling their milk to the coop22, the leaders perceived that the efforts required to de-
velop dairy business outweighed the expected benefits. As a result, they did not make the ef-
forts to approach and engage in cooperation with DPIs to expand their dairy business unit.  
 
                                                 
21 See Sub-chapter 10.2.2.3 and 10.2.1.2 for further elaboration on the misconception of cooperative principles. 
22 See Sub-chapter 10.2.2.3 and 10.2.3.1 for further explanation on LF1. 
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Figure 9-3 End outcome: No cooperation between DPIs and lesser-performing coops23 
Source: own compilation 
Another important factor is the specific situation during the “turbulence time”24 where price 
competition among DPIs and milk intermediary traders were escalating. In this situation the 
commitment to supply – as prerequisite for TA and FA – was perceived as a negative condi-
tion by coop leaders. By supplying exclusively one DPI they lost the flexibility to shift to 
other buyers willing to pay higher milk price. Obviously, coop leaders considered the short-
term benefit of the price margin to be more important than the mid- and long-term benefit of 
utilising the TA and FA to build the dairy business – this is consistent with their orientation as 
described above. 
These arguments are underpinned by a peculiar phenomenon observed in the lesser-
performing interaction system: The lesser-performing cooperatives are located near to a DPI. 
Theoretically, their proximity to the DPI provides a great comparative advantage of shorter 
delivery time from the production site to the processing plant. This can significantly restrain 
the bacterial growth25 as the milk deterioration process can be shortened, even if the milk 
tankers are not equipped with cooling capacity. The distance to the respective DPI is around 2 
driving-hours and this is much more efficient, also from cost perspective, than selling to other 
DPIs in other province which requires not less than 10 driving-hours. Thus, in mid-term per-
spective an intensive cooperation with the respective DPI can bring substantial benefits. How-
ever, the cooperation beyond buyer/seller relation did not come about. Even the DPI, for some 
time periods, chose to source fresh milk from other province due to quality concerns. A repre-
sentative of the DPI commented: 
Actually, we have approached and given them [leaders of lesser-performing cooperatives] ad-
vice on how to improve milk quality. But they are not interested in this. On the contrary, they 
frequently asked us whether we can provide them with loans. But as we are not a financial insti-
tution, we cannot do that. Of course, we can help to link them with banks. But the question is 
whether they have the commitment to improve milk quality and to become our supplier. (DPI 2) 
                                                 
23 The objective situations are highlighted in grey to indicate that these are also used in the explanation of other 
macro variables. See Sub-chapter 10.2. 
24 See Sub-chapter 10.2.1.1 for further description of the “turbulence time“(LS3). 
25 See Table 10-2 for the significant influence of time on the geometrical bacterial growth. 
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The perception of the cooperative leaders is also strongly influenced by the situation of the 
community where they live, their role and responsibility in the cooperative as an organisation, 
and their relation with dairy farmer members. These aspects are dealt with in greater detail in 
Sub-chapter 10.2. 
9.5 Concluding remarks 
In the interaction system DPIs act as ‘rule setter’ and ‘rule enforcer’, whereas cooperatives 
‘rule taker’. The role of DPIs, however, is not only limited to rule setting and monitoring, but 
also to enable suppliers to meet the requirements by providing TA and FA. Obviously, the 
setting and enforcing of rules alone is not enough to upgrade the value chain; DPIs have to 
specifically provide assistances to upgrade their supplier capacity. 
For the cooperatives the TA and FA delivered provided significant supports in advancing 
their performance. In this respect, DPIs are the source for technical know-how, innovation, 
new technology, and, perhaps most importantly, financial supports with extremely favourable 
conditions. 
The success of supplier upgrading programme depended on the quality of the cooperative 
leaders: Only transparent, accountable, reliable, and member-oriented leaders would and 
could utilise the assistances to build their cooperative capacity. This highlights the signifi-
cance of strong commitment and trustworthiness of leaders against the background of the 
prevalence of opportunistic behaviour and weak law enforcement in general. 
The lessons learnt drawn on DPIs’ experiences in supporting their suppliers also underline the 
necessity to follow a systemic approach of empowering the institutional capacity of the coop-
eratives. Rather than providing capacity building directly to the dairy farmers, DPIs supported 
the cooperatives to establish services required by the members. Only through this way the 
improvement measures can be delivered permanently and continuously – institutionalising the 
improvements. 

  127
10 Interaction System between Cooperatives and Dairy 
Farmers 
Similar to Chapter 9 this chapter first describes the historical development of dairy farming 
and dairy cooperatives in Indonesia because the understanding of their emergence and change 
over time provides better insight into the institutional frameworks to be examined. The second 
and third sub-chapters provides extensive explanations on why no upgrading took place in the 
lesser-performing interaction system and on why it did occur in the higher-performing inter-
action system. The explanations are based on the analysis of the institutional aspects (regula-
tive, normative, and cultural-cognitive) of the respective value chain governance. Then these 
macro variables are linked through Macro-Micro Model examining VC operators’ perception 
and action embedded in the interaction system. 
10.1 Retrospective view in analysing institutional condition 
The history of dairy farming and dairy cooperative in Indonesia can be distinguished in five 
phases. These are described in more detail in the following sub-chapters: 
i. 1905 – 1945: Dairy farming under foreign estates  
ii. 1945 – 1960: Initiation and dissemination of smallholder dairy farming 
iii. 1960 – 1980: Establishment of dairy cooperatives 
iv. 1980 – 1996: Quantitative expansion of dairy farming 
v. 1996 – 2000: Temporary decline due to economic crisis 
10.1.1 General history of dairy farming in Indonesia 
Like other populations in South-East Asian (SE-Asian) countries Indonesian people are tradi-
tionally not typical consumer of fresh milk, be it from cows, buffaloes, goats, or horses. 
Rather, they consume ‘milk’ from coconut. According Sulastri et al. (2002, p. 19), it was the 
Dutch who had introduced dairy farming to Indonesia in around the late 19th century or 1905 
(see Figure 10-1). Dairy farm estates were established in mountainous regions first in Central 
Java (Boyolali, Salatiga, and Ambarawa) and then expanded to West Java (Bandung area near 
to Jakarta) and East Java (Nongkojajar, Malang, and Batu). These large dairy farms with 100 
to 300 milking cows were owned by the Dutch and designated exclusively to fulfil their own 
need for fresh milk and milk products. According to Ajron A. (2008), milk production in 
Bandung region, West Java had been well developed at that time: 
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In 1938 there were 22 dairy farms producing approximately 13,000 litre milk daily. All of the 
milk produced was collected by Bandoengsche Melk Centrale for processing (pasteurisation) 
before selling it to consumers in Bandung or outside. [...] Apart from producing fresh milk and 
dairy products like ice cream and chocolate milk, BMC also processed milk into butter, cheese, 
and cream for cosmetics. (Ajron A. 2008; translation by author) 
 
Figure 10-1 Timeline: Historical development dairy farming and cooperatives1 
Source: own compilation based on Sulastri et al. (2002, pp. 34–35) 
Although dairy farming was relatively well-known in West Java, the habit of consuming fresh 
milk had not been adopted by indigenous people. Due to the fact that milk was consumed ex-
clusively by Dutch people, consuming fresh milk was negatively associated with the ‘imperi-
alist or coloniser’. Even if few people did consume milk, milk powder was more favourable 
than fresh milk. In 1920 the Dutch government in Indonesia imposed the so-called Melk-
Codex that regulated the technical standard of fresh milk suitable for consumption. One of the 
main requirements was that edible fresh milk without further processing should contain less 
than 1 million bacteria contamination per ml. However, since in general the quality of the 
milk produced did not reach this standard, fresh milk was then processed into milk powder 
and consumed with warm water. 
Only after Indonesian independence in 1945 the local farmers began to keep Holstein Friesian 
dairy cows, when these dairy farm estates were dissolved and the dairy cattle distributed to 
                                                 
1 Regarding the number of imported cattle, the figures provided by Sulastri et al. (2002, pp. 34–35) are consistent 
with those by Moran (2007, p. 6) and Yusdja (2005, p. 259), yet not with GKSI Jawa Timur (2008). 
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surrounding smallholder farmers. However, their intention keeping cattle was primarily to 
produce manure for fertilising their crop by utilising harvest residues and by-products of 
vegetable production as animal feed.  
Afterwards, the expansion of dairy farming in Indonesia was mainly government driven. GoI 
imported dairy cattle in 1960s – 1970s to stimulate the local economy. During the 1st and 2nd 
Five-Year Development Plan of GoI (1969-1979) (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun – 
Repelita) artificial insemination and feed improvement programme was introduced to enhance 
milk production (Sulastri et al. 2002, p. 20). However, in spite of these efforts the develop-
ment of the dairy sub-sector had not yet taken off, as Moran (2007, p. 5) noted that by the late 
of 1970s there were only 3,000 milking cows on less than 1,000 farms2.  
The real surge was during the 1980s when GoI had been supporting large import projects of 
around 110 thousand dairy cattle from Australia and New Zealand. Along with these imports, 
new policies were enacted to boost the expansion of dairy farming: Busep3 (regulation on the 
ratio of imported and locally sourced milk which was used to force DPIs to source locally 
produced milk); subsidised credit schemes for purchasing equipment; establishment of artifi-
cial insemination centre in Lembang, West Java and in Singosari, East Java; disease investiga-
tion centre in Yogyakarta; and dairy training centre in Batu, East Java and Baturaden, Central 
Java. Again, despite the massive investments using public funds, the development target 
stipulated in the 3rd and 4th Five-Year Development Plan, namely to achieve 50% self-
sufficiency rate (to satisfy 50% of domestic milk demand through locally produced milk), was 
not accomplished. 
During the 1990s dairy farming in Indonesia continued to expand yet experienced a decline in 
1997, as the financial and economic crisis severely struck Indonesian economy. Following 
FAO (2009b), the population of dairy cattle sank sharply from 348 in 1996 to 322 thousand 
                                                 
2 Moran (2007, p. 5)’s estimation of the size of dairy population is consistent with Yusdja (2005, p. 259)‘s fig-
ure, but not with Sulastri et al. (2002, p. 19) that noted “By 1978 there were 11 dairy cooperatives throughout 
Indonesia with estimated around 2,800 cooperative members keeping 48,600 dairy cows“. 
3 See Sub-chapter 7.7 on Busep. 
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heads in 19984, particularly in West Java5, and then recovered slowly over time, reaching in 
2001 the pre-crisis condition. The causes of this decline were, inter alia, the soaring prices of 
basic consumer goods that forced smallholder dairy farmers to sell their stock to temporarily 
bridge the fulfilment of their daily needs.  
10.1.2 General history of dairy cooperative in Indonesia 
The first dairy cooperative6 in Indonesia was the cooperative SAE (Sinau Andadani Ekonomi) 
Pujon, in Malang, East Java established in 1962. Until the end of 1970s, other dairy coopera-
tives were founded particularly in places where the local farmers have already kept dairy cat-
tle (see Figure 10-1). Nevertheless, during the time period from 1960s to 1970s, dairy coop-
eratives were experiencing many challenges. Selling milk to the dairy industry was a daunting 
task, since they had to compete with the uncontrolled importation of cheap milk powder. An-
other challenge of competition was brought by the middlemen who buys directly from the 
dairy farmers and might have offered more attractive payment than the cooperatives. Hence, 
cooperatives became less active and some ceased the operation. 
Despite the fact that the formation of cooperatives was intended, ideally, to provide services 
related to dairy activities – such as milk collection, delivery, loan, extension and training – to 
the members; Sulastri et al. (2002) made an insightful remark on the underlying reason of the 
establishment of dairy cooperatives, in particular the first dairy cooperative SAE Pujon, 
namely to curb the prevalence of opportunistic behaviour among dairy farmers: 
                                                 
4 FAO’s figures differ from those of Yusdja (2005, p. 259) that introduced a differentiation between the number 
of dairy cattle owned by cooperative members and non-cooperative (private company). Yusdja’s figures show a 
diverging pattern: while the population of dairy cattle owned by cooperative member experienced a sharp de-
cline, that of non-cooperative exhibited a steep increase. Interestingly the degree of decline and increase were 
approximately the same, thereby indicating a transfer of ownership from cooperative members to non-
cooperative. Unfortunately, Yusdja (2005) failed to mention the data source for further clarification. 
5 Cf. Stanton, Emms and Sia (2005, p. 16) 
6 Actually, already in 1949 a group of farmers in Pengalengan, Bandung, West Java formed a “cooperative“ 
called Gappsip (Gabungan Petani Peternak Sapi Indonesia Pengalengan) or literaly translated Uniof of Farmers 
Rearing Dairy Cattle in Pengalengan. This “coooperative” was then dissolved in 1961 (Masdien.2009) or 1963 
(Baga 2004, p. 277). 
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Purposes of cooperative establishment were to eliminate the problems of unfair competition 
among the dairy farmers in pricing of milk, bad quality of cows, low milk production and low 
quality of milk. Before the dairy cooperative was established in 1962, the farmers were compet-
ing with each other by decreasing the milk price but mixing the milk with the water in order to 
get more profit. (Sulastri et al. 2002, p. 19). 
In 1978 dairy cooperatives from different provinces established Board for Coordination of 
Indonesian Dairy Cooperatives (Badan Koordinasi Koperasi Susu Indonesia – BKKSI) that 
later on evolved into Union of Indonesian Dairy Cooperatives or UIDC (Gabungan Koperasi 
Susu Indonesia – GKSI) in 19797. This organisation was formed with the main purposes (Su-
lastri et al. 2002, p. 20): 
 to give guidelines to dairy cooperatives on how to provide different services to dairy 
farmers (dairy cow supply, fresh milk marketing, technical support, feedstuff production, 
basic veterinary services, milk equipment, milk tankers, milk processing and training) and 
to upgrade the services rendered; 
 to strengthen both cooperative personnel and system; 
 to provide loans in the form of equipment like cooling machines, milk cans, tankers, and 
motorcycles; 
 to give advise to GoI on policy making in the dairy sub-sector (such as in the case of 
Busep); 
 to negotiate with the DPIs regularly about the pricing arrangements based on the milk 
quality; and 
 to facilitate the importation of dairy cattle for dairy cooperatives and farmers. 
However, the performance of services rendered by UIDC was considered to be inferior and 
insufficient by the interviewed cooperative leaders, particularly when compared to the service 
costs demanded by UIDC. To cover the service costs UIDC deducts a certain amount from the 
milk payment by DPIs to cooperatives8. Particularly in Central Java the issue of transparency 
                                                 
7 Cf. Baga (2004, pp. 78–79) 
8 Cf. Nugraha (2007: 45) 
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and accountability in managing the funds9 contributed by cooperative members has been in 
the limelight of dairy VC stakeholders’ attention. 
During the 1980s dairy cooperatives were involved intensively in various government support 
programs. On the one hand, dairy cooperatives acted as the beneficiary of such programs, as 
in the case of grants e.g. for cooling or pasteurisation machine. On the other hand, and per-
haps most importantly, coops had been systematically directed towards playing the role as 
‘intermediary institution’ in the ‘cooperative model’ introduced in 1983 (see Figure 10-2): 
 
Figure 10-2 The cooperative model introduced in 1983: Cooperative as intermediary institution 
Source: own compilation10 
As depicted in Figure 10-2, dairy cooperatives played a significant and strategic role within 
government support programmes. Apart from managing the collection of milk delivered by 
                                                 
9 The issues of transparency and accountability are closely related to the prevalence of opportunistic behaviour. 
See Sub-chapter 10.2.1.6. 
10 Cf. Kartadihardja (1988) in Sulastri et al. (2002, p. 20) 
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dairy farmers and its delivery to DPIs, dairy coops organised the collective buying of dairy 
cattle and concentrate feed and their distribution to the dairy famers (see the ’flow of goods’). 
The costs incurred for these services were covered through the deductions from the milk 
payment to the dairy farmers. 
Predominantly, dairy coops were the only gateway for any flow of money towards the dairy 
farmers (see the ‘flow of money’). Subsidised loans by GoI were disbursed through mainly 
state-owned banks which in turn disbursed these either via UIDC or directly to the coopera-
tives. The cooperatives managed such loans either in ’executing’ or ’channelling’ model: In 
the first model the coops as the loan recipient received the fund, managed it by themselves, 
set the interest rate, and assumed the risk of any loan default; whereas in the latter the coops 
acted as a ’broker’ supporting the bank in organising the loan, mediating the dairy farmers as 
the loan recipient, received some fees, but did not assume the risk of any loan default. The 
loans were not given to the dairy farmers as cash fund, but as dairy cattle purchased by the 
cooperative. There were, however, cases where the banks directly disbursed the loans to the 
dairy farmers or farmers groups (depicted by the arrow with broken line in grey colour). In 
such cases, the role of cooperative was limited only in giving recommendations for the dairy 
farmers or farmers groups to get the loan directly from the bank. 
Sulastri et al. (2002, p. 21) argued that thanks to the effective implementation of this coopera-
tive model, dairy farming took root and started to take-off in Indonesia during the 1980s. This 
is indeed true, yet in the sense of quantitative dimension: The number of dairy farms and cat-
tle rapidly increased and the domestic milk production grew significantly (see Figure 5-2). 
Nonetheless, in other dimensions, such as qualitative and organisational improvement, dairy 
co-operatives and dairy farmers had not yet achieved significant development. On-farm prac-
tices were and are generally still inefficient, hygiene problems raged on, and even many dairy 
cooperatives were involved with high incidence of bad debts11. 
10.2 Lesser-performing interaction system 
In the lesser-performing interaction systems, value chain upgrading has not taken place. It 
does not mean, however, that there were no attempts to initiate improvements and introduce 
                                                 
11 Riethmuller et al. (1999b, p. 19); also in Stanton, Emms and Sia (2005); Moran (2007); and many others 
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changes. But rather, the actors or individuals in such systems chose to maintain the existing 
condition. 
10.2.1 Macro variable: Institutional framework 
10.2.1.1 Regulative aspect: Regulations for product and process quality 
The interaction system between cooperative and dairy farmers entails VC-specific regulations 
concerning product and process quality which are relatively complex. The product quality is 
determined through several basic tests – in contrast to the more sophisticated tests at the DPI 
– at the milk collection centres (MCCs) that require simple tools and can be performed with-
out any laboratory equipment. The basic test parameters and methods are shown in Table 
10-1. Such simple tests also serve as rejection criteria: should a milk consignment fail one of 
the tests, it will be rejected by the cooperative. With regard to process quality there is hardly 
any regulation, despite the fact that processes in dairy farming utterly influential in determin-
ing the milk quality12. 
Table 10-1 Basic tests of product quality performed at the MCC 
Parameter Description Test method 
Physical properties Trained MCC staff taste, smell, and visually assess the milk 
consignment for any abnormality 
Sensory / organoleptic 
test   
Milk acidity The milk is mixed with an equal volume of 68% ethanol; ab-
normal milk forms floccules indicating high level of acid as a 
result of microbial activities. 
Alcohol test 
 
Milk density or spe-
cific gravity 
The milk density is measured and values below a certain 
threshold signify adulteration with water. The test also includes 
temperature measurement to guarantee the comparability of the 
test results. 
Lactodensimeter and 
thermometer 
Source: own compilation 
The weak or absent regulation for product and process quality (LC2) impedes the transmis-
sion of  the technical information pertaining the quality standards and product requirements 
delineated by the DPIs backwards along the chain, i.e. toward cooperative staff and dairy 
farmers. As a result, the coordination along the chain is more difficult since the VC-operators 
are not aware of and able to comply with the technical requirements. 
                                                 
12 On the contrary, process-quality regulation exists in higher performing cooperatives. See Sub-chapter 10.3.1.1. 
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Lesser-performing interaction system in general does not have quality/price mechanism in 
place (LC3). All dairy farmers in a cooperative receive the same milk price regardless the 
milk quality they delivered. Some cooperatives have already applied milk price differentiation 
for larger groups of one or several MCCs with hundreds of dairy farmers.  
The basis for price differentiation is, however, not the result of quality tests but instead the 
“loyalty” of dairy farmers (LC1): The cooperatives give price incentives to dairy farmers who 
continuously deliver their milk to the cooperatives. Such price differentiation became highly 
relevant during the “turbulence time” in 2007 – 2008, namely when the competition among 
DPIs, particularly through milk intermediary traders, for securing domestic raw milk supply 
escalated (LS3) as the milk prices in the international market soared13. In such circumstances, 
getting higher quantity of milk was much more important than getting higher quality. Also, 
the most significant quality parameter has also shifted: when previously bacterial contamina-
tion was in the limelight of quality improvement measures, total solid (TS) suddenly became 
the sole quality determinant as it is the main ingredient needed for the manufacturing of dairy 
products. 
10.2.1.2 Regulative aspect: Organisational format of the dairy cooperative 
There are two different organisational format of cooperatives14 engaged in the dairy value 
chain: first, Village Unit Cooperative (VUC) translated from Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD) as 
multi-purpose cooperative at village or sub-district level; and specialised dairy cooperative as 
single-purpose cooperative specialising on the dairy business as the core business. All of the 
cooperatives observed (4) in the lesser-performing interaction system has the VUC organisa-
tional format; whereas those in the higher-performing interaction system specialised dairy 
cooperative. Besides the dairy business unit, VUC generally runs other business units such as 
loan service for various purposes, public transportation service (minibuses), payment of elec-
tricity bills, retail shop selling daily consumer goods, and so on. As it will be later on ex-
                                                 
13 Cf. Sub-chapter 6.4 
14 Throughout this work, the term ’dairy cooperative’ refers generally to cooperative engaged in the dairy value 
chain. For the sake of clear distinction between the two organisational formats of cooperative, this sub-chapter 
employs the term ’KUD’ and ’specialised dairy cooperative’. 
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plained, the multi-purposesiveness of VUC is premised on an erroneous understanding about 
the essence, role, and function of cooperative itself.  
But before delving into a more elaborate analysis about the organisational format of VUC, it 
is necessary to review shortly the historical development of cooperative movement in Indone-
sia, as it will cast some light on the current, ambiguous state of cooperatives, in particular 
VUC. Following Masngudi (1990), the first cooperative in Indonesia was established in the 
late 19th century during Dutch colonisation. Afterwards, other cooperatives followed and then 
the cooperative movement developed further and evolved through several historical phases 
(see Figure 10-3). 
 
Figure 10-3 Historical development of cooperative movement in Indonesia 
Source: adapted from Masngudi (1990)  
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From the historical development – particularly the latest development under the New Order 
regime – and the observations and interviews conducted, it can be concluded that the current 
organisational format of VUC has contradictory principles in itself15. The contradictions be-
tween the actual principles vs. the ideal principles16  – which are explained further in the fol-
lowing sub-chapters – are listed as follows:  
i. Top-down vs. bottom-up establishment 
ii. Surplus maximisation vs. cost reduction 
iii. Government- vs. member-defined programme 
iv. Dependent vs. self-help and self-reliant organisation 
v. Accountability to government vs. to members 
The contradictory principles discovered in the organisational format of VUC is a complex 
problem that results from, inter alia, its history of development with dominant government 
interventions. While in general the society has comprehended that cooperative should have a 
unique characteristic, in practice it closely resembles either a capitalistic enterprise or a de-
pendent social organisation. A cooperative expert in Indonesia stated that the general under-
standing of basic principles of cooperative is limited only to abstract ideological understand-
ing. Despite the fact that cooperative is frequently associated with jargons like ‘collective 
business’, ‘democratic’, ‘reciprocity’, ‘equality’, ‘cooperation’, etc; there is virtually any con-
crete application of such ideals in the management of the cooperative. He concluded: 
There is a big discrepancy between the concept and practice of cooperative in Indonesia, result-
ing in an ambiguous existence of cooperative. The main cause is the inability to translate basic 
concepts of cooperative into an operational framework which can be applied in the practical 
world. (Exp 5) 
10.2.1.3 Normative aspect: Social norm of pakewuh 
One of the most remarkable norms influencing the whole system is the social norm of ‘ewuh 
pakewuh’ or ‘pakewuh’ in Javanese or ‘sungkan’ in Indonesian (LS1). There is no literal 
translation of this word in English, yet it can be conceptualised as a reluctance to take any 
                                                 
15 Cf. Suradisastra (11-15 September 2006) 
16 The basic identity, values, and principles of cooperative can be found in International Co-operative Alliance 
(2007). 
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action or say something because it can insult the feeling of others or lead to conflict or hurt 
the relationship among individuals. This norm is built on the social value of ‘preserving har-
monious relationships’ (‘rukun’)17 and associated with other norms like ‘politeness’ (‘san-
tun’), ‘empathy’ (‘tenggang rasa’), ‘avoiding conflict’ or ‘compliant’ (‘ngalah’), as well as 
the Indonesian-typical cooperative principle of ‘familialness’ (see Sub-chapter10.2.1.2). 
Hence, the meaning of this term can be described as the opposite meaning of the term ‘asser-
tive’ that means ‘describes someone who behaves confidently and is not frightened to say 
what they want or believe’ (Walter 2008). 
Pakewuh does not apply only to the interaction of individuals in the same social group / 
status, but also to those from higher to lower social group / status and vice versa. While such 
social value is prevalent throughout Indonesia, the intensity or degree of reluctance is differ-
ent in every region or ethnic group. In the dairy production centre in West Java the dominant 
ethnic group is Sundanese, in Central Java Javanese, and in East Java both Javanese and 
Madurese. Among these ethnic groups the adherence to pakewuh is the strongest in Javanese 
culture in Central Java, as it is indicated by frequent referring during interviews and observa-
tions. 
However, a question may arise: why is the adherence to pakewuh among the Javanese ethnic 
group in Central Java is more intensive than among the Javanese in East Java or other ethnic 
groups? There are several possible explanations for this difference. First, the observed region 
in Central Java is more intensively influenced by the ‘court culture’ that set great store by the 
Javanese cultural values and norms than in any other region. This is on account of the geo-
graphical proximity to Yogyakarta and to Surakarta18, i.e. the centres of Javanese court cul-
ture and thus the “barometer” (“pakem”) of Javanese culture. In fact, the observed dairy value 
chain in Central Java was historically under the authority of the Sultanate of Surakarta during 
Dutch imperialism. It is generally said that the Javanese culture of the regions surrounding 
                                                 
17 Cf. Zeitlin (1995, pp. 95–141) for similar description of Javanese culture 
18 Yogyakarta is the only province in Indonesia still governed by the pre-colonial monarchy, i.e. the Sultanate of 
Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat. Surakarta was governed by the Sultanate of Surakarta Hadiningrat. While at present 
the royal families and the court still exist, they no longer hold any political power. Both Sultanates were descen-
dants from the Kingdom of Mataram. 
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Yogyakarta and Surakarta is ‘finer’ or ‘more delicate’, including the Javanese language as 
well as the social values and norms guiding the behaviour of individuals in the society.  
Second, the development of the normative system – under which pakewuh is subsumed – in 
Central Java has a different historical background from that in East Java. The Javanese culture 
in Yogyakarta and Surakarta historically originated from the Kingdom of Mataram, while the 
Javanese culture in East Java from the Kingdom of Majapahit and its successors. Mataram 
was predominantly characterised by an agrarian economy with large cities in inland areas 
along the river, whereas Majapahit based its economy predominantly on commercial trades in 
its large ports on the northern coastal areas of Java. As a result, Majapahit was relatively more 
exposed to external influences, more open toward foreign cultures, and had higher tendency 
for culture mixing. The openness of Javanese culture in East Java is frequently associated 
with its character tendency toward being more straightforward in expressing opinions or more 
assertive (‘blak-blakan’). In contrast, the agrarian communities in Mataram were built upon a 
normative system of mutual help or cooperation (‘gotong royong’) and collectiveness (‘sam-
batan’), for example, during the labour-intensive activities of trans-plantation and harvest in 
the irrigated rice farming system. Such system necessitates harmonious, conflict-free relations 
of individuals to function – situations where pakewuh play a significant role. Furthermore, in 
order to sustain the functioning social structure and thus livelihood, agrarian societies were 
dependent on the preservation of such social values over generations – it explains why the 
internalisation of pakewuh in individual behaviour is more intensive in Central Java. 
Third, the normative system was historically a fundamental strategy for survival. There is an 
interesting fact that the Sultanate of Yogyakarta and Surakarta were the only ones in Indone-
sia that had succeeded to co-exist along with Dutch imperialism. While other kingdoms or 
sultanates were destroyed or dismantled during Dutch imperialism, both sultanates were able 
to retain their monarch structure and rule. The strategy for the co-existence was to behave 
cooperatively and to pose no threats to the hegemony of Dutch rule. This was primarily done 
in two ways. First, instead of establishing a solid military power which could potentially pose 
a threat to the Dutch, the efforts had been concentrated on developing arts and culture – this 
also explains why the courts have achieved higher status of art and culture development. Sec-
ond, to avoid conflict with Dutch colonist the leaders of both sultanates had to cultivate social 
values and norms that guide individuals to behave accordingly. Of course, such normative 
system should apply not only to the court families, but also to the larger communities. The 
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widespread and successful internalisation as well as the maintenance of the normative system, 
again, over generations was indeed the key to survive under the given circumstances. 
10.2.1.4 Cultural-cognitive aspect: Dairy farmer as a profession 
In Indonesian context, dairy farming is not a traditional profession. Also, regular consumption 
of fresh milk is not a traditional habit. Dairy farming was primarily introduced by large Dutch 
dairy farms in the late of 19th century19. Initially, keeping dairy cattle was primarily intended 
to produce manure for fertilising crops through utilising harvest residues and by-products of 
vegetable farming; whereas the milk was regarded as additional income from keeping cattle. 
Keeping dairy cattle was used for filling the time gap between labour-intensive harvest times 
(every 3 – 4 months). As such, dairy farming was considered as sideline job. 
There is an indication that the dairy farmers identify themselves more as ‘crop farmer’ rather 
than ‘livestock keeper’. The term ‘farmer’ in English is used to refer to both crop farming and 
livestock farming (e.g. dairy farmer). This is, however, not the case in Indonesian. The literal 
translation of ‘farmer’ is ‘petani’ which is associated mostly with ‘crop farmer’, whereas 
‘livestock farmer’ has a specific terminology, i.e. ‘peternak’. Thus, the phenomena that dairy 
farmers are frequently referred to as petani – instead of peternak – may denote that crop farm-
ing is more probably the main source of livelihood. 
There is no such profession like ’dairy farmer’ (’peternak sapi perah’). There is only farmer 
(’petani’) doing a sideline job keeping dairy cattle. The profession 'livestock keeper' (‘peter-
nak’) is not existent, because they are basically crop farmer producing maize, tobacco, or others. 
They do not name their own group ‘group of dairy farmers’ (‘kelompok peternak’), but instead 
‘group of famers’ (‘kelompok petani’). (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
The method of keeping dairy cattle is following the ‘common practices’ that developed from 
traditional practices in keeping indigenous cattle. The observance of common practice denotes 
the cognitive process of pattern recognising – as opposed to computational or calculative rea-
soning – since it involves finding a pattern or regularity through observing and comparing 
certain behaviour and the respective outcomes of such behaviour. However, since the ‘tradi-
tional practices’ concern mainly practices in rearing cows and buffaloes which are usually 
used for tilling land, transportation or as saving; such practices did not adequately consider 
                                                 
19 See Sub-chapter 10.1.1 for the history of dairy farming in Indonesia. 
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the specific requirements of dairy cattle and dairy farming, e.g. in hygiene aspect or feeding 
management.  
Moreover, considering the fact that most dairy farmer and their household members also do 
not consume their own-produced fresh milk, there is an indication of the lack of understand-
ing that milk – as an extremely perishable product designated for human consumption – re-
quires appropriate treatment and that inappropriate treatment of milk may pose serious health 
risks for the consumers. Thus, it can be said that the awareness and practices of good dairy 
farming were absent from the outset. 
Initially, dairy farmers in Boyolali were tobacco farmers. Frequently they address themselves as 
'petani' as opposed to 'peternak'. They keep dairy cows with the purpose of getting manure for 
fertilising their tobacco plant and not to get milk. Consequently, they treated and managed their 
dairy cows as common indigenous cows without taking much care of specific things to be man-
aged in dairy farming like hygiene or feeding management. To change their initial practice in 
dairy farming is therefore very difficult. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
Regarding the perception of the profession as dairy farmers there is a dichotomy identified. 
On the one hand, dairy farmer is associated with poverty, traditional or non-professional man-
agement, low productivity, dependency and neediness of supports, or dirty job (in literal 
meaning). On the other hand, it is associated with prosperity and prestige. As cattle are treated 
as saving in a traditional system, those individuals possessing many cattle are regarded as 
prosperous and enjoy higher socioeconomic status in comparison to other villagers. On fur-
ther inquiry into this discrepancy, it can be concluded that, more or less, cattle ownership (lac-
tating cow) of total 3 or lower is associated with the first; whereas 4 or more with the latter. 
Nonetheless, since the majority of the dairy farmers have a maximum of 4 cattle, it can be 
said that most of them are associated with poverty. 
10.2.1.5 Cultural-cognitive aspect: Traditional economy  
Farmers are a special category of VC operators, because mostly they are situated in a tradi-
tional system of subsistence economy, as opposed to other VC operators who are usually situ-
ated in a more (semi-) commercial system. Farmers in traditional system are 
[…] subsistence people living and working in village communities who are not commercially 
oriented. They simple sell their excess of production to the local market and many rural as well 
as urban consumers rely on that kind of supply. So that is a non-commercial economy in a way. 
(Exp 4) 
In traditional system, the first and foremost objective of agricultural production is to satisfy 
farmers’ own household needs. Thus, agricultural production is in the first place not oriented 
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toward market demands, requirements, and opportunities. Moreover, non-commercial orienta-
tion of economic activity is frequently associated with the lack of entrepreneurship: the inca-
pability of identifying the own potentials and resources, assessing the environment and utilis-
ing business opportunities, implementing innovations, and taking risks. 
Nevertheless, non-commercial orientation is not only a problem of skill, but has rather a 
deeper underlying cause: the fundamental preference in economic pursuits by traditional 
farmers is not to continuously improve the business and achieve higher economic status, but 
to generate a ‘sufficient’, ‘enough’, and ‘decent’ livelihood for the household: 
The most problematic thing [that hampers the business development of traditional farmers] is 
that usually traditional farmers feel content with what they already have, with the existing con-
dition. So, they do not have the desire or expectation to improve their business further. The most 
important thing for them is to have enough food for the family, enough money for the education 
of the children and for the daily living; that’s all. […] Indeed, the local proverb “mangan ra 
mangan sing penting ngumpul” [which means “it does not matter whether the family can eat or 
not, the most important thing is that the family stays together”] exists vividly in the mind and 
actions of rural people, especially among traditional farmers. (Exp 6) 
The economic strategy applied in traditional economy is not specialisation on and maximisa-
tion of a single source of income, but rather ‘livelihood strategy’ that aims at the minimisation 
of risks through combining different sources of income. 
In most places you will find that farmers do not rely only on one product, not just milk. You 
have to find out what else makes up the livelihood of these people, because people optimise 
their livelihood, they do not optimise their milk production. If you are a commercial milk pro-
ducer and you don't do anything else and milk is your main product, then you can apply your ra-
tionality to your milk production. But in most cases, particularly in poor rural areas, we are talk-
ing about livelihood. The strategy of the people is how I can survive, what my best livelihood 
strategy is. That includes other options: wage labour; if they are close to a tourist attraction they 
might do some tourist guide work; or something else like go fishing, whatever it is. (Exp 4) 
Another particular characteristic of the traditional system is that economic concerns are inex-
tricably intertwined with the own household and social concerns. Subsistence farmers do not 
separate financial resources for business and household needs. Consequently, farmers are fre-
quently not aware – at least not in numbers – of the costs incurred in production (including 
the work hours of family labours), the cost structure, as well as the income generated from 
milk sale and the respective gross margin. 
Traditional economy is an economy in which economic and social aspects are very much inter-
related. So, especially in traditional farming you have that. What I am referring is not only to 
the value chain but also for individual households because traditional farmers sell their produc-
tion, but then of course the whole production itself is closely interrelated with household con-
cerns. There are different sources of income and they are not kept separate. So if I can earn a lit-
tle bit being a wage labourer, that money will get into my farm production. Then, again I'm 
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using some of the profits from farming for other purposes. So, household and the business are 
not separate. The same also applies to social relations: I use my family as a source of credit; if I 
need services I go to my uncle. This means a close interlinking of social and economic con-
cerns. That characterises a traditional economy. (Exp 4) 
10.2.1.6 Cultural-cognitive aspect: Prevalence and acceptance of opportunistic 
behaviour 
 
Figure 10-4 Macro variable: Prevalence and acceptance of opportunistic behaviour 
Source: own compilation 
Figure 10-4 explains, first, why the internalised social norm pakewuh paves the way for the 
prevalence of opportunistic behaviour20; and, second, why opportunistic behaviour through 
recurrent and widespread practices becomes habitualised collective practice. The prevalence 
of the social value ‘preserving harmonious relationship’ through the observance of the social 
norm ‘pakewuh’ (LS1) exerts strong influence on the orientation and thus behaviour of indi-
viduals in the interaction system. For them, any action or expression that could insult the feel-
                                                 
20 The following explanation does not signify, however, that the social norm pakewuh is the one and only cause 
of weak rule enforcement, prevalence of opportunistic behaviour, and acceptance of opportunistic behaviour. 
Weak law enforcement is already a general problem in Indonesia. The social norm of pakewuh reinforces the 
already weak low enforcement. 
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ing of others or potentially lead to conflict should be avoided. The higher the degree of inter-
nalisation, the more is such action perceived as inconceivable. Hence, in general individuals 
tend to avoid rule enforcement if it is fraught with the potential of inflicting inter-personal 
conflicts, thereby making any rule enforcement difficult. 
The fact that opportunistic behaviour does not face any serious consequences like punishment 
either by legal coercion or social pressure, combined with the perception that opportunistic 
behaviour offers additional benefits prompts individuals to opt for opportunistic actions. With 
increasing number of individuals doing so, opportunistic behaviour becomes prevalent. Now, 
when opportunistic behaviour is repeated over time by many individuals, it reinforces indi-
viduals’ perception that opportunistic behaviour is indeed “justified”. Opportunistic behaviour 
is amplified by the perception that, first, “everybody is doing it” meaning that there is a col-
lective interest in it; and, second, “it has always been like that” meaning that it is not a serious 
problem since it can continue uncontrolled and uncurbed. Consequently, more individuals are 
convinced to take opportunistic actions. This leads to the acceptance and tolerance of oppor-
tunistic behaviour (LS2) by the society which in turn encourages, again, more individuals to 
behave opportunistically, thereby creating a vicious circle. 
The practice and acceptance of opportunistic behaviour is not only a problem of one category 
of VC-operator but rather a systemic problem, including local government as supporting insti-
tution for the dairy VC. Some examples are described as follows. 
Dairy farmers 
In the areas where lesser-performing cooperatives are operating, opportunistic behaviour 
among dairy farmers is prevalent. The most common malpractice is adding water – not boiled 
water suitable for drinking, but “fresh” water drawn from the well or river – to increase the 
bulk volume of milk21. Such malpractice had even already been identified during the early 
days of cooperative establishment22. When asked about the prevalence of milk adulteration 
with water and the respective risk of being detected in the milk density test, a coop leader 
responded: 
                                                 
21 See Sub-chapter 10.2.3.2 for further explanation on milk adulteration practices. 
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Such practice is common here. It can be easily identified during milk delivery in the MCC. As 
we can see, many milk deliveries can reach an exact amount of litres [integer amount23]. Dairy 
cows cannot produce exactly ‘x’ litres of milk. The farmers add water to make the amount exact 
‘x’ litres. [...] They already know from experience how much water they can add and yet the 
milk is still accepted by the cooperative. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
When asked about the practices of milk adulteration and the response of the local government 
upon such case, another coop leader expressed his indulgence and indifference: 
Well, actually it is already a public secret. Local government agencies also know about this. But 
what can they do? Many dairy farmers do such practices. Anyway, the milk price recently has 
been very low albeit rising living costs, so that such price burdens many poor dairy farmers. I 
think they just turn a blind eye to this fact. (Coop 7, lesser performance) 
Another remarkable example of opportunistic behaviour is the high incidence of bad debts 
among dairy farmers and VUCs as a result of loose regulation concerning e.g. collateral re-
quirement, selection criteria, and credit disbursement of the subsidised loan programmes pro-
vided by GoI. On the one hand, such high incidence was caused by incorrect perception of the 
programme.  
There was high incidence of loan default because many dairy farmers were feeling not obliged 
to pay back their loan. The loan programme was called “President's help” (Bantuan Presiden). 
So, if it is a "help" why should they pay back? [...] It was not purely the fault of the farmers, but 
also of the inappropriate programme socialisation. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
Several dairy farmers even commented that it is as a matter of course that dairy farmers did 
not pay back, because they were basically poor smallholder farmers needing help or grant, not 
loan, from GoI. On the other hand, the high incidence of loan default was caused by weak rule 
enforcement that was reinforced by the social norm pakewuh. 
Actually it is the dairy farmers who still owe money to the VUC. However, since legally VUC 
was the guarantor for the loans taken by the dairy farmers, eventually VUC had to pay the loan 
with any possible means. Thanks to God VUC had paid off the loan from the bank, although de-
layed for several years. [...] There are indeed farmers who intentionally do not pay back the lo-
an, because they know there is hardly any consequence for it. [...] Some farmers gave their land 
certificate as guarantee. But it is impossible for VUC to sell these certificates to cover the loan 
repayment. We don't wan to offend them. Anyway VUC also has good relationship with them. 
(Coop 5, lesser performance) 
                                                 
22 See Sub-chapter 10.1.2 for milk adulteration practices in the early movement of dairy cooperatives. 
23 This means that the amount of milk delivered is e.g. not 12.7 or 15.3 litre, but exact 13 or 16 litres. 
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Nevertheless, it also important to note here, that in some cases VUCs could not demand loan 
repayment from the dairy farmers since the dairy cattle given to the farmers had died just sev-
eral months after the handing over. Obviously the cattle were already sick and not of good 
quality – this was a result of malfeasance by coop leaders and staff (see below). 
Cooperative leaders and staff 
During a survey into a specific area infamous for prevalent practices of milk adulteration, it 
was discovered that cooperative staff working in a MCC was adding hydrogen peroxide 
(H2O2) as antimicrobial agent into milk to reduce bacterial growth, thereby increasing the 
shelf life of low-quality milk. Despite the fact that hydrogen peroxide in low concentration, 
such as 3%, is safe and frequently applied in domestic uses, the unsupervised use of this 
chemical for food material is hazardous24. Furthermore, the use of chemical to preserve milk 
is prohibited by law. 
In the same area, another case of malfeasant behaviour among farmers is also prevalent: forc-
ing beef cattle to take-in water as much as possible – until the animal dies – before slaughter-
ing to increase the body weight. Such malpractices are already known by the people residing 
in that specific area, including government officials. When asked about how their opinion on 
such malpractice, the common perception expressed was that such practices are “cheating; 
causing tremendous, unnecessary pain to the animals; and should be stopped”. However, 
given the fact that such practices are still continuing despite occasional inspections by the 
local government officials, it seems that in general such unlawful actions are not consistently 
confronted, controlled, and punished. 
Against the background of the weak law enforcement and inadequate remuneration25 for co-
operative leaders and staff, earning additional money through malpractices and malfeasance 
may indeed be more alluring. Reported cases are, first, the misuse of position and access in 
the cooperative to get personal benefit by taking commission from the conclusion of a loan 
agreement or by deducting a portion (larger than the officially agreed) of the loan disbursed to 
                                                 
24 See Lück (1962) for a concise yet comprehensive discussion on the use of hydrogen peroxide in dairy indus-
try, in particular in developing countries with limited infrastructure. 
25 See Sub-chapter 10.2.2.2. 
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the dairy farmers. Annoyed dairy farmers were complaining that they were not given any 
other choice than to accept such condition, since the options were either to take the loan in 
reduced amount or to leave it. Second, as loan programmes for dairy farmers were sometimes 
delivered as dairy cattle instead of money26, coop people responsible for the purchase of dairy 
cattle had the opportunity to take advantage from the purchase. By giving dairy farmers low-
quality, cheaper dairy cattle; they could keep for themselves the value difference between the 
agreed loan and the actual purchase value. 
Interestingly, the most common responses toward such malfeasance were “that is just normal 
here” or “it is a usual thing”. Such tone denotes familiarity, tolerance, acceptance, – and to 
some extent – apathy, and indifference. The understanding behind the responses may be that 
such malfeasance has occurred frequently and is already well-known, yet is not corrected or 
intervened, so that it continues unchecked. The gravity of the opportunistic behaviour is even 
perceived to the extent that it is incorrigible, as expressed by an expert in community devel-
opment who has been providing support to the dairy farmers in the area: 
I think it is useless to improve the existing system [of cooperatives and dairy farmers]. It is al-
ready too corrupt; it is too difficult to correct. It has always been like that. It is better to form 
new dairy farmer group or cooperative with those dairy farmers really willing to grow. Such 
people can benefit from our support. (Exp 9) 
Local government 
It was also identified that many government support programs were not adequately addressing 
the needs of dairy farmers and cooperatives; and that there were indications of misused sup-
port programs by government officials or cooperative leaders. In the lesser-performing inter-
action system there was a case of equipment grant, i.e. pasteurisation machine, from the local 
government to VUCs. However, the machines were not usable at all because they had funda-
mental, irreparable technical deficiencies; although the VUCs had already proposed adequate 
technical requirements for the machine. During the verification process VUC leaders had ac-
tually the chance to report the technical deficiencies, yet they were reluctant to do so. 
                                                 
26 The intention of such programme was actually to reduce the risk of loan default. By giving money to the dairy 
farmers the probability that the loan is spent for something else than buying dairy cattle is higher. Such cases had 
already occurred previously. 
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Like in the case of the tender of pasteurisation machine by the government, when I was asked 
by the controller whether the machine is functioning properly, I would and could not give any 
answer. I just told them to check by themselves, even though I knew the answer. If I had said 
the truth, I might have offended the feeling of the tender-winner and their group. This would 
have damaged my relation with them and I don't want to have such problem. (Coop 4, lesser 
performance) 
Similarly, government officials involved in the invigilating of the tender process had opted for 
avoiding any conflict potential which could place them into an inconvenient situation. An 
invigilator had to obey and sign the invigilation report because it was his superior that had the 
interest in the legal settlement of the tender transaction as the tender winner was a close rela-
tive of the superior. 
Indeed, he is a victim of pakewuh. His superior is now even a special staff of the district head, 
so that it becomes more difficult to correct the tender project through legal ways. […] Although 
he is clean, he could be involved in further trouble because he has signed the report as invigila-
tor due to pakewuh. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
In a similar vein, Riethmuller et al. (1999b) concluded in a survey among decision makers in 
the dairy value chain: 
The finding that government policies are regarded as strength of the industry by four of the 12 
respondents is not surprising. The reason for this is that these respondents may well be involved 
in the administration of the policies, giving them a vested interest in ensuring the policies are 
seen in a favourable light. (Riethmuller et al. 1999b, p. 25) 
10.2.1.7 Other institutional factors: availability of natural resource 
Apart from the institutional aspects described above, the availability of natural resources for 
the dairy farming also plays an important role. In areas with higher altitude sourcing water 
both from ground water (well) and water spring (river) is difficult, particularly in dry seasons. 
This situation also negatively restricts the availability of feedstuff, in particular green forage. 
10.2.2 Micro variable: Leaders and staff of lower-performing cooperatives 
10.2.2.1 Intermediate outcome: Weak regulative aspect of the interaction system 
Against the background of increasing number of dairy farmers who stop delivering their milk 
to the coop27 (LF1), coop leaders need to find a solution to the situation: decreasing milk de-
livery from the dairy farmers is critical for the sustainability of the overall cooperative busi-
                                                 
27 See Figure 10-9. 
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ness, as the dairy business constitutes 30 – 40% of the total cooperative turnover. The decline 
was detrimental, reaching more than 50% of the initial milk output of the coop. 
These days it is not possible to impose price differentiation based on milk quality. If we give 
lower price due to lower quality, then the dairy farmers will stop delivering milk to the coopera-
tive and sell it instead to middlemen. The cooperative will have much more losses. Several 
years ago our production capacity was still around 10 thousand litre per day, but now it is only 
around 3 – 4 thousand. (Coop 5, lesser performance) 
 
Figure 10-5 Intermediate outcome: Weak regulative aspect of the interaction system 
Source: own compilation  
To hamper and reduce the incidence, coop leaders offered higher price to those dairy farmers 
willing to continue selling milk to the cooperative – to “loyal” dairy farmers.  
We now have price differentiation, albeit small. There are some locations where the dairy farm-
ers are good and loyal. We give them a slightly higher milk price than other locations. (Coop 5, 
lesser performance) 
I admit that some locations receive higher milk price although their milk quality is not better. 
But this is necessary to appreciate them who have been delivering milk to the cooperative for a 
long time and being good dairy farmers. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
However, since the assessment of “loyalty“ is not performed transparently based on a set of 
well-defined and socialised criteria but rather exclusively by coop management, it was heavily 
criticised that those loyal farmers receiving higher price were relatives of or those having 
good relation with coop leaders and staff. On the contrary, coop management asserted that 
they monitored the track record of each dairy farmer and thus had the capacity to make a 
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sound judgement. The result of this action was the establishment of a “price differentiation“ 
system, yet not based on quality but rather on subjective criterion of loyalty (LC1). 
Situated in an escalating competition for milk against intermediary traders (LS3), securing 
milk supply from the dairy farmers was more pressing, than achieving higher-quality, to sus-
tain the dairy business of the cooperative. If the VUC were to give warnings, price penalty, or 
reject the milk delivery which could not satisfy the quality requirements; such measures 
would not achieve the desired result of giving a negative incentive to the dairy farmers for 
low-quality milk, because the same milk delivery would still be accepted by the intermediary 
traders. Such measure would only deter the dairy farmers from selling milk to the VUC, 
thereby causing more losses for the VUCs. 
Nowadays, milk quality does not count anymore. Everyone needs milk and is willing to buy 
milk in any quality. (Coop 5, lesser performance) 
As a result, coop leaders had to set aside quality requirements. Measures for quality im-
provement – which previously had been the key issue for sustainable development of the 
dairy value chain – were abandoned and the ongoing endeavour to establish quality regula-
tions was nullified (LC2). 
As described in Sub-chapter 10.2.1.3, individuals who internalised the norm of pakewuh 
(LS1) are inclined towards avoiding any action which potentially cause conflict or insult the 
feeling of others and thus impair inter-personal relationships. Such orientation is further am-
plified by the low-degree of anonymity in smaller, rural communities.  
Imposing price differentiation [based on quality] is not an easy task. For example, in some loca-
tions we have dairy farmers who have good relationship with the cooperative. They have been 
member for a long time, do not have any loan default, and never caused any trouble. Even 
though their milk quality is not too good, it is impossible to give them lower milk price. We 
don't want to insult their feeling. (Coop 5, lesser performance) 
Hence, in societies where pakewuh predominates, the enforcement of any rule that entails 
negative incentive, punishment, or sanction is difficult; the same applies to the enforcement of 
product and process quality regulations which entails warnings and sanctions, as well as of 
the quality/price mechanism which includes price penalty. The avoidance of rule enforcement, 
combined with the abandonment of quality improvement measures, results in weak regulation 
of product and process quality, since every single rule necessitates enforcement to function. 
Another macro variable (objective situation) that indirectly causes the weak regulative aspect 
of the interaction system is the vested interest of coop leaders. Individuals who hold the posi-
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tion as coop leaders have the strategic access to reach the masses particularly in a rural area, 
since many of rural inhabitants are member of VUC. Therefore, if coop leaders can imple-
ment ‘popular’ cooperative programme like subsidised loan programme, they can attain popu-
larity and social support. On the contrary, ‘unpopular’ cooperative programme like quality 
regulations or price penalty for low-quality milk can blacken their image. Hence, the more a 
coop leader is striving for popularity, the less likely the coop leader will implement quality 
regulations and quality/price mechanism. 
10.2.2.2 Intermediate outcome: Low professional performance of cooperative 
One of the unique cooperative principles invented in Indonesia is the ‘principle of familial-
ness’28 (literal translation of ‘asas kekeluargaan’). This principle means that inter-individual 
relations in a cooperative should reflect or resemble the relations of individuals in a family: 
harmonious relationship among individuals has the highest value, mutual help is expected, 
and differences or conflicts should be settled through discussion and consensus.  
While per se such principle is by no means detrimental for the cooperative performance; there 
is, however, negative implications in the management of personnel. As employer/employee 
relation is regarded as an informal mutual help among family members, the remuneration sys-
tem does not build on formal-professional basis which follows, at least, the government regu-
lation on minimum salary. 
[…] Well, you cannot expect much [salary] from the cooperative. Our cooperative is small and 
not able to pay professionally. Colloquially said, the staff we have right now is just some people 
helping us and we give them in turn some compensation. But it is not much, not sufficient for 
securing the family’s livelihood. (Coop 5, lesser performance) 
The recruitment of cooperative staff is frequently not based on selection criteria of profes-
sional skills and competences. Staff is recruited among members (or their families) who have 
good track record (e.g. no loan default) or from those having good relation with or family 
connection to coop leaders (nepotism). Also, there is an indication that the employment by the 
VUC is not based on the prevailing personnel needs; employment is rather considered as a 
                                                 
28 The term ‘familial’ means ‘of, relating to, pertaining to, or characteristic of a family’. ‘Familialness’ is the 
noun. 
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reward (giving additional income) for loyal members. As a result, the number of cooperative 
staff is higher than what is actually necessitated: 
Another interesting finding is that the number of cooperative staff is also relatively high, namely 
around 20% of the number of dairy farmers. It is obvious that such high number is not rational, 
indicating high inefficiency. (Yusdja 2005, p. 260; translation by author) 
 
Figure 10-6 Intermediate outcome: low professional performance of cooperative 
Source: own compilation  
Considering the need of reducing operational costs while employing an unnecessarily high 
number of personnel, coop management has thus to lower the salaries. Consequently, coop-
erative directors and staff have usually other sources of income besides that from the coopera-
tive. Assuming that in this case coop staff and leaders would allocate their resources and ef-
forts for the job in proportion to the income generated from the job, they would deliver 
minimum professional performance equivalent to the minimum remuneration. This is more 
likely to happen when the position held in the VUC is considered as the sideline job. Also, 
against the background of weak rule enforcement, malfeasance may be considered as a feasi-
ble alternative to generate additional income. Moreover, such perception is empowered by the 
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widespread acceptance and tolerance of opportunistic behaviour and its recurring – thus 
habitualised – occurrences. 
Another important finding is that in rural areas the position as cooperative leader is closely 
associated with high social – and to some extent political – status: individuals considered as 
senior, experienced, and possess higher social status (village elders, social or political leaders) 
are usually elected as cooperative leaders. However, these individuals are not necessarily the 
right persons who have, first, the motivation and incentive to develop the cooperative; and, 
second, the vision, profound understanding of the business, commitment and capability to 
lead and introduce progressive changes into the cooperative. Nevertheless, it is important to 
emphasise at this point, that the selection criteria described above are not necessarily inade-
quate insofar as professionalism (competency, commitment, etc.) is guaranteed. 
The selected actions, in turn, explain the low professional performance of cooperative staff 
and leaders. The collective problem of lack of professionalism is reflected by some observed 
indicators: 
 Among 5 lesser-performing cooperatives only one employs a professional manager to run 
the daily business operations of the cooperatives, while in the other VUCs the function of 
operational manager is performed by the cooperative directors.  
 While the normal work hour is 40 hours per week (5 work days @ 8 work hours), VUCs’ 
daily operation generally starts at around 7 or 8 am and ends already by noon. Moreover, 
during visits to the VUCs it was observed that the working capacity of the cooperative 
staff was not optimally exploited – many of them were idle.  
 When cooperative staff was asked for written documentation on some basic information 
such as number of cooperative members, MCCs, livestock population, milk quality test, 
and delivery recordings; such data were not available and had to be collected extra. 
Indeed, such findings are confirmed by many other researchers concluding that the lack of 
professionalism or – cushioned in a softer term – the limited quality of human resource is an 
influential inhibiting factor of cooperative development29. 
                                                 
29 Firman (2008, p. 7), Suradisastra (2006, p. 14), Stanton, Emms and Sia (2005, pp. 88–95), and many others. 
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10.2.2.3 Intermediate outcome: Inadequate service provision to dairy farmers 
 
Figure 10-7 Intermediate outcome: Inadequate service provision to dairy farmers 
Source: own compilation  
In 1988 the Minister of Cooperative enacted a decree that the support policies for VUCs 
should aim at the achievement of the so-called “independent VUC” or “KUD Mandiri” 
(Masngudi 1990, p. 31) (LC4). One of its assessment criteria was that the number of VUC 
members should be at least 25% of adult population in its working area – indeed a daunting 
task. As the fulfilment of the requirement was one of the prerequisites to access the govern-
ment support policies, VUCs – at least those observed in this study – needed to recruit as 
many members as possible. This prompted VUCs to artificially inflate the number of coop 
members by also registering the family members of one family business – as it is the case for 
dairy farming –, although the membership regulation was ‘one business one membership’. 
The number of members had indeed increased, but the number of actual businesses remained 
the same. 
With such action VUCs have indeed many members, but a large proportion of them – if not 
most of them – are inactive, i.e. not running dairy farming. While inactive members do not 
contribute to the coop business, they are still expecting and officially entitled to the annual 
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surplus distribution. This means that VUCs have to bear additional “burden” of generating 
more surpluses to be distributed to the members: 
We have currently 8,672 members; among them less than 1,000 are active members. So, if we 
go back to the basic principle of cooperative ‘from, by, and for the members’, such principle 
does not work. Because the around 7,600 inactive members are burden for all. It is difficult to 
apply the cooperative principle purely, because on the one hand we are obliged to increase the 
welfare of only active members but on the other hand we have also to increase the welfare of 
inactive members – this is a heavy burden. Very often the business is not by members but the 
gain is for members. For example, we have now loan service for purchasing motor bikes or 
electronic goods. This is not run by members, but the gain is for members. (Coop 4, lesser per-
formance) 
To cope with such situation, VUCs are then forced to reduce the operational costs, including 
the costs for providing services to dairy farmers. Consequently, the services provided by the 
coop tend to be minimal and inadequate (LC5). For example, dairy farmers complained that 
the quality of concentrate feed provided by the VUC had been deteriorating, presumably 
caused by decreasing protein content due to increasing raw material price, so that they had to 
source from elsewhere. 
Usually with 1 kg additional concentrate feed we could get additional 2 litre milk, but nowadays 
it is not possible anymore. With additional 2 kg concentrate we can only have additional 3 litre 
milk because the quality of the concentrate feed is declining. (Dairy farmer 2, lesser perform-
ance) 
With regard to the misconception of cooperative principle, there is a common fallacy about 
cooperative that its chief end is to maximise surplus (mostly it is even called “profit”). Such 
erroneous conception is further reinforced by the regulation of performance indicators deline-
ated by GoI. These indicators – the number of members, turnover, and most importantly sur-
plus or profit – are used as assessment criteria in determining whether a VUC is classified as 
potential, capable, and thus eligible for receiving government supports or subsidies.  
Unfortunately, the indicators give a wrong incentive to maximise surplus instead to concen-
trate on providing collective services to support members’ business and thus increase mem-
bers’ welfare – what actually the ultimate goal of a cooperative. 
Although it has always been said that the main purpose of cooperative is to improve the welfare 
of its members, hitherto none of cooperative's performance indicators addresses this fundamen-
tal aspect. From many reports of cooperative performance we have been reviewing more than 
95% even never mentioned the improvement of members’ welfare. (Exp 5) 
To maximise surplus VUCs thus follow two main strategies. The first strategy is to minimise 
the costs incurred for operational activities, including the costs for providing services to the 
members like extension, veterinary services, training and quality monitoring system. The sec-
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ond strategy is to search for and invest in other “profitable” businesses than the dairy business 
– this is the underlying reason of the multi-purposiveness of VUC. In fact, the multi-
purposiveness of VUC is even perceived as a hindrance to further develop the dairy business. 
Toward the question about factors inhibiting the growth of dairy farming one coop leader re-
sponded: 
There are several factors. One of them is the organisational aspect of the cooperative itself. 
First, dairy business is a responsibility of the dairy unit in the cooperative. So it is only one 
among so many business units. The income from dairy unit does not return only to dairy farmers 
but to all members. Say, if we have 9.000 members, among them are only 200 dairy farmers. So 
from organisational point of view this is a disadvantage for the dairy farmers. This is a common 
situation in Central Java. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
In similar tone, another coop leader stated: 
Actually, it is not the case that the cooperative does not have any resource at all to support the 
dairy farmers. But the problem is that dairy farming is only one part of the VUC. There are still 
many parts of VUC to be considered. These also require resources. So, the problem is not that 
simple. (Coop 5, lesser performance) 
Besides the dairy business unit, VUC generally runs other business units such as loan service 
for various purposes (e.g. purchasing electronic goods or motorbikes), public transportation 
service (minibuses), payment of electricity bills, and retail shop selling daily consumer goods. 
The VUC’s services are not exclusively for its members, but rather for everyone who happens 
to need the services. Hence, in this regard VUC closely resembles a regular business organisa-
tion seeking the maximisation of profit. When asked about his opinion on the criticism that 
VUC in general is doing business just like a normal enterprise, a cooperative leader re-
sponded: 
Yes, true. I am forced to do this [running various business units rather than concentrating on 
providing services to the members], because in practice my cooperative is demanded to yield 
profit. But if we only rely on the businesses by members, their contributions are too small. They 
do not possess the awareness of being a cooperative member or of partaking in the cooperative. 
(Coop 4, lesser performance) 
Since the ultimate goal of VUCs is to maximise surplus through the optimisation of different 
business units, VUCs allocate their limited resources (including the ‘efforts’ and ‘time re-
sources’ of cooperative leaders) in accordance with their perception of the business unit’s 
prospects. Now, the prospects of dairy business – particularly during the “turbulence time” – 
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had decreased because while the relatively high complexity30 of dairy business remains the 
same and even increases, the return from dairy business decreased since an increasing number 
of dairy farmers stop delivering the cooperative in the course of fierce price competition 
against intermediary traders (LF1). Thus, the motivation and drive to search for and invest in 
other profitable businesses became higher. The more intensive the efforts and time resources 
allocated for other coop businesses, the less are available for the dairy business. As a result, 
coop management allocate less efforts and time resources to optimise the services provided to 
its members (LC5) – collective services which are necessary to reduce the operational cost of 
each member and thereby improving their businesses performance. 
10.2.2.4 Intermediate outcome: Lack of improvement measures in VUCs 
 
Figure 10-8 Intermediate outcome: lack of improvement measures in VUCs 
Source: own compilation  
The brief historical analysis of cooperative development31, in particular VUC, has shown that 
the role of and intervention by GoI had indeed been highly influential on cooperative devel-
                                                 
30 Dairy business exhibits higher complexity compared to other coop businesses (e.g. payment service for elec-
tricity bills) as it involves complex quality regulations, quality/price mechanism, service provision for a large 
number of dairy farmers, and so on. 
31 See Figure 10-3. 
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opment. Apart from defining guidelines, principles, and programs for VUCs; GoI had also 
provided many supports and subsidies. These, unfortunately, had undermined the ability of 
VUCs to create and sustain their own programme and activities using member contributions. 
VUCs had been unable to exercise the basic cooperative principle of self-help and self-
reliance: after the fall of the New Order regime the number of VUCs sharply declined from 
9,635 in 1997 to 6,946 in 2000, meaning that more than 2,500 VUCs were shut down within 3 
years32. 
For coop leaders – particularly those who have experienced the “golden time” of cooperative 
development programs by GoI in 1980s – VUCs are an institution of poor and marginalised 
farmers in rural areas that needs constant support from the government to function properly. 
During interviews and meetings with coop leaders and dairy farmers it was frequently stated 
that the development of VUCs depends on the willingness and intensity of government sup-
port. The decline of VUCs in recent years was attributed to the diminishing government sup-
ports as opposed to the full-support given during the New Order era – the “golden time”. 
Nowadays, VUC experiences difficulties to develop further. VUC is comprised of "small peo-
ple" [ordinary or poor people having no power]. They need supports. If VUC could get govern-
ment support like it did during the time of Mr. Bustanil Arifin [the Minister of Cooperative in 
1983-1993], I am sure VUC can help its members more. (Coop 8, lesser performance) 
Based on such perception, coop leaders put – to some extent – the responsibility of develop-
ing VUC on external supports. Internal potentials and efforts by coop leaders, staff, and mem-
bers are not viewed as a driving factor for improving coop performance. As a result, there is 
hardly any progressive change introduced by coop leaders. 
Instead of being initiated by individuals who were willing to improve their business collec-
tively, VUCs were established through government interventions (LC6). Furthermore, the 
working area of VUCs also follows the formal administrative borders of the respective village 
or sub-district where they operate. Similarly, as the establishment was government-driven, 
VUCs’ programme and activities also followed the government programme.  
Yes, during 1979 – 1983 we received not grant but loan for purchasing dairy cattle from central 
government […]. But this programme was a significant initiation step of dairy production in 
Boyolali. Afterwards the national Union of Indonesian Dairy Cooperatives (UIDC) was founded 
                                                 
32 See Suradisastra (2006). 
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in 1982. Milk produced throughout the district of Boyolali was managed only by 'Milk Central' 
(MC); this was the embryo of our VUC. After the establishment of UIDC Central Java every 
VUC in Boyolali was instructed by the government to collect milk produced in their own work 
area. That was the beginning of 6 VUCs running dairy business until now. Actually, there were 
more, but only these 6 have survived. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
During the green revolution in 1970s – 1980s, VUCs’ prime role was to implement the gov-
ernment programme of achieving self-sufficiency in rice production, namely by assuming 
functions of distributing subsidised inputs (seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides), executing loan 
programs, and participating in the extension system. This does not necessarily mean, though, 
that these services were not required by the farmer members. The downside, however, was 
that from the outset VUCs did not orient its policy toward providing services required by the 
members and did not learn the capability to adjust their programme to the dynamic needs of 
the members; VUCs just followed the programme delineated and instructed by the govern-
ment. 
Another factor contributing to the limited ability to design and implement programme for 
members is the fact that many VUC leaders have limited knowledge and experience with 
dairy business, as they are elected from individuals possessing higher social status in rural 
area who are not necessarily the right person for the position33. 
It is difficult to get a cooperative policy that supports the development of dairy business. Be-
cause the directors themselves are not dairy farmer, they do not understand the business. This is 
different from specialised dairy cooperatives in West and East Java, where cooperative mem-
bers are exclusively dairy farmers. Since this is a prerequisite of cooperative membership, every 
elected member of the board of directors is automatically dairy farmer who knows well the 
business, difficulties, and opportunities. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
For such leaders, limited knowledge or information about the dairy business means that they 
are not able to objectively assess the economic potentials and opportunities of the business. 
As any improvement measures requires resources or investment, the absence of adequate in-
formation heightens the subjective risk-perception from such undertaking. Hence, for the coop 
leaders it is better to preserve the pre-existing practices with a certain outcome, albeit not the 
most optimal, rather than to embark on an investment with uncertainty. 
                                                 
33 See Figure 10-6 
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The last macro variable causing indirectly the lack of improvement measures in VUC is the 
fact that coop leaders and staff need other sources of income on account of the low remunera-
tion standard. Premising on general assumption that individuals follow instrumental rational-
ity in pursuing material interest through their profession, the low remuneration given by 
VUCs does not provide enough incentive of material interest for coop leaders and staff to 
make extra efforts to introduce innovative and progressive changes into the pre-existing prac-
tices. As a result, improvement measures are unlikely to be introduced by coop leaders and 
staff. 
10.2.3 Micro variable: dairy farmers 
10.2.3.1 Intermediate outcome: More dairy farmers stop delivering milk to coop 
 
Figure 10-9 Intermediate outcome: more dairy farmers stop delivering milk to coop 
Source: own compilation 
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Against the situation that VUCs should recruit as many members as possible to comply with 
the government requirement of ‘independent VUC’ (LC4), VUCs ran socialisation in rural 
areas to introduce VUC and to attract prospective members. However, the challenge was that 
the cooperative as well as its principles were foreign to rural people. Arguing that with low 
education standard rural farmers would anyway not be able to understand the basic principle 
of cooperatives, VUCs “simplified” the introduction of VUC by promoting mainly the bene-
fits of being VUC member: access to government programs like subsidised loans as well as 
receiving annual distribution of surplus.  
The socialisation of such “simplified” yet incorrect coop principles were indeed understood 
by the dairy farmers. They registered for cooperative membership with the motivation to re-
ceive surplus distribution annually and the expectation to access government subsidies. 
Well, the only benefit is getting surplus distribution. […] We got subsidy for veterinary ser-
vices. There was even “apel sapi” [an event where dairy farmers bring their cattle together on a 
field for health inspection or pregnancy check]. But at present we do not receive such thing 
anymore. (Dairy Farmer 1, lesser performance) 
Hence, from the outset the dairy farmers have a false understanding of how cooperative func-
tions and what their role, rights, and responsibilities as member. Ideally, that VUC buys dairy 
farmers’ milk and then sell it again to DPIs should be understood as the provision of collec-
tive services for dairy farmers, i.e. milk collection and bulking, cooling down (if any), trans-
portation to DPIs, and administration for transaction. These services are paid by the member 
contributions, namely the deduction from the milk price paid by DPIs or, in other word, the 
price difference between the milk price received by VUC and the farm-gate milk price. The 
same member contributions are used for paying other services like provision of concentrate 
feed, veterinary service, artificial insemination, training and quality monitoring system, etc.  
Nevertheless, in reality dairy farmers do not perceive the situation in such way. They perceive 
VUC as a regular milk-buyer similar to other milk buyers. They are also not aware of the re-
sponsibility to deliver member contribution and the right to access collective services paid 
from the member contribution. Moreover, as VUCs were established by the government 
(LC6) and thus indicating weak initiative of and minimum involvement by the members, the 
sense of ownership is also low, meaning that the advancement or decline of VUC is not their 
concern. In this respect, the dairy farmers feel no or weak obligation to sell their milk exclu-
sively to the VUC. 
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On the other hand, the competition for dairy farmers’ milk had been escalating (LS3). This 
was indicated by the proliferation of intermediary traders or middlemen. The middlemen were 
able to provide better incentives to the dairy farmers. First, they offered a higher price than 
the VUCs which applied considerable deduction from the milk price paid by the DPIs for pay-
ing the organisational and operational costs as well as the repayment of loan by the dairy 
farmers34. Second, selling to the middlemen reduced the complexity of and resource use for 
dairy farming, because the middlemen were the ones visiting the dairy farmers (no resource 
used for delivering the milk to the MCC) and milking the dairy cows (no resource used for 
milking and maintaining the hygiene). The downside, however, was that the milk quality was 
jeopardised: the middlemen added chemical preservatives to prevent the milk from spoiling 
since they operated door-to-door, thereby requiring much more time to collect milk before it 
is cooled down or delivered to the DPIs. Moreover, the middlemen also suggested the dairy 
farmers to adulterate milk with water to get higher milk income. 
Yes, there are such farmers [who adulterate milk with water]. Even sometime ago it was done 
openly. The milk middlemen offered us to add water into the milk, for example 9 to 1 [90% 
milk – 10% water]. The end price was of course better than the price given by the cooperative. 
Those selling pure milk were interested to play along. (Dairy Farmer 1, lesser performance) 
The conditions offered by middlemen were, of course, more advantageous for the dairy farm-
ers, in particular those viewing dairy farming as a sideline job: higher milk income, less com-
plexity, and less resource use for dairy farming. Even for those selling pure milk, selling to 
middlemen was also an alluring option, because pure milk did not receive higher value. As a 
result, many dairy farmers opted for selling milk to the intermediary traders, thereby resulting 
in the decline of milk delivery to the VUC (LF1).  
10.2.3.2 Selected action: Adulterate milk with water 
With the general acceptance of opportunistic behaviour35 (LS2), dairy farmers perceived that 
opportunistic behaviour is a viable alternative of action which brings additional benefits, yet 
faces hardly any negative consequence. With such situation and perception, not behaving op-
portunistically is even a lost: not only honesty is not rewarded; it bears the opportunity cost of 
                                                 
34 There is an indication that VUCs applied higher milk price deduction than actually required to repay the de-
fault loans by dairy farmers. See Sub-chapter 10.2.1.6 for the incidence of default loans. 
35 See Sub-chapter  10.2.1.6 for the prevalence and acceptance of opportunistic behaviour. 
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losing e.g. 10% of the milk income – the additional milk income that can be generated 
through adding water. As a result, there are double incentives for the dairy farmers to adulter-
ate milk with water. 
 
Figure 10-10 Selected action: Adulterate milk with water 
Source: own compilation 
Similarly, since the price differentiation is not based on quality (LC1) and the quality/price 
mechanism is absent (LC3), dairy farmers receive the same price for both low and high qual-
ity milk. Hence, there is incentive to produce low quality milk and to adulterate it with water 
to get higher milk income. 
Why dairy farmers opt for adulterating milk with water is also caused by their limited knowl-
edge of good dairying practices and quality regulations. As dairy farming is not a traditional 
profession, the practices in keeping dairy cattle follow traditional management which does not 
consider the specific requirements in handling milk. Thus, in such situation dairy farmers re-
quire information from outside their traditional system about how dairy practices should be. 
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The provision of such information should be one of the main responsibilities of the coopera-
tive. But since VUCs provide inadequate training and extension service (LC5), most dairy 
farmers do not know about good dairy farming practices (GDFP). The same also applies to 
the limited knowledge of quality regulations. Most dairy farmers are not aware that the buyers 
of their milk (DPIs) require certain quality characteristics, that adding river or well water into 
milk can jeopardise the quality, and that higher quality milk should receive higher price and 
vice versa. Such ignorance is, again, the result of weak regulation of product and process 
quality by the cooperatives (LC2) 
Consuming fresh milk is not a habit for dairy farmers’ household and the community where 
they live. Thus, in general dairy farmers have a low awareness of treating milk for human 
consumption. Milk is produced not for own consumption but for sale. Therefore, in daily life 
farmers’ household has limited experience with the consumption of milk, how to handle this 
extremely perishable foodstuff, and what health hazards can result from inappropriate treat-
ment of milk. With such low awareness dairy farmers have no scruples about adulterating 
milk with water.  
10.2.3.3 Intermediate outcome: Production of low-quality milk 
The practice of milk adulteration with water introduces more contaminants into the milk – a 
further addition to the pre-existing contaminants due to low hygiene standard. Since the water 
added is taken from the same water source used for cleaning the shed or animal, i.e. from well 
or river, for sure is the bacterial and, to certain extent, chemical contamination magnified. 
Thus, the quality of milk adulterated with water is lower than that of unadulterated milk. 
The same factors encouraging dairy farmers to adulterate milk – i.e. the absence of price in-
centive for high-quality milk, ignorance of both good dairying practices and quality regula-
tions, and low awareness of treating milk for human consumption – also encourage them to 
handle cow and milk with low hygiene standard. 
The initial intention of keeping dairy cattle was to produce manure using crop residues, while 
milk was considered as additional income from keeping cattle – dairy farming was regarded 
as sideline job. It seems that such intention is still present among dairy farmers, in particular 
among those who have crop farming as the primary source of income. With such orientation, 
dairy farmers perceive milk production as a supplementary activity and thus have no particu-
lar intention to produce high-quality milk. 
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As dairy farming is not a traditional profession36, the method of keeping dairy cattle basically 
follows traditional practices in keeping indigenous cattle with several additional activities in 
milking. The practices in dairy farming were developed through trials and errors, since there 
was not any formal introductory training or extension service specifically dealing with dairy 
farming. The practices were then transmitted primarily through observation, imitation, inter-
action, and exchange of experiences among dairy farmers. With increasing number of dairy 
farmers adopting the practices over time, they are established as ‘common practices’. 
 
Figure 10-11 Intermediate outcome: Production of low-quality milk 
Source: own compilation 
For dairy farmers, the common practices serve as an orientation that defines how dairy farm-
ing should be practiced. As an orientation, common practices are thus hardly put into question 
                                                 
36 See Sub-chapter 10.2.1.4 for the cultural-cognitive aspect: dairy farmer as a profession. 
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whether they are correct and already optimal, whether further improvements are necessary – 
they are taken for granted: during discussions with dairy farmers about why they are doing 
certain practices and why they are not doing other practices, the typical answer given was 
“that is how we do things here” or “that is what usual here”. Such responses reflected the high 
degree of internalisation of the practices into their cognitive pattern. 
Examples of common practices related to hygiene are37: using cooking oil or soap as lubricant 
in milking process, piling-up manure in the milking area for months before cleaned, using 
plastic bucket or jerry can to store milk – all are detrimental to hygiene. Such practices, albeit 
inappropriate, have been repeated over time and thus habitualised38. Once practices became 
habit, they are more difficult to change, since a particular characteristic of a habit is its inertia. 
Of high importance in attaining acceptable hygiene standard is the adequate availability of 
water. This, unfortunately, is not the case in several areas of the lesser performing interaction 
system, especially during dry seasons. Particularly in areas with higher altitude, ground-water 
level can reach more than 50 m beneath the earth surface and thereby making the pumping 
difficult and costly, at least for individual dairy farmer. Water sources are available, but not 
many, and they usually dry out during the dry season. Therefore, since the household also has 
needs for water, dairy farmers have limited water available for cleaning the shed and cows. 
Apart from limited water resource, the availability of feedstuff, particularly green forage, is 
restricted in dry season. Dairy farmers have to buy additional water and green forage which 
are costly and thus create additional burden for the household. These, however, are required 
for sustaining the current level of hygiene and productivity. Therefore, for those dairy farmers 
with severely limited working capital, spending more money – and thus higher risk for the 
livelihood situation – for purchasing water and green forage is not a feasible option. As a re-
sult, they opt for an alternative which is viable with the restricted conditions, i.e. changing the 
orientation from milk production unto calf rearing. Dairy farmers buy young calves and then 
feed them with the milk produced by the dairy cow they already have – thus ‘suckler cow’. As 
                                                 
37 See Moran (2007) for an elaborate description of the technical conditions of dairy farming in Indonesia. 
38 Of course, common practices are not merely a repetition and widespread acceptance of ‘meaningless’ actions; 
they are in fact ‘meaningful’ solutions build on the subjective perception of individuals which in turn are shaped 
by the specific circumstances e.g. limited resource availability and limited information.  
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the milk is used for feeding calves, lower hygiene standard and lower milk productivity are 
still acceptable. The milk reminder – in a small amount and low quality – not used for calf 
feeding is sold to the cooperative. 
For the dairy farmers, such practice is indeed a good solution for the limited availability of 
water and forages as well as the limited working capital. But for the VUCs and the dairy value 
chain, such practice cannot provide a sound basis for the production of raw material of high-
quality fresh milk in adequate quantity and continuity. 
10.2.3.4 Intermediate outcome: Low animal and farm productivity 
 
Figure 10-12 Intermediate outcome – low animal and farm productivity 
Source: own compilation 
The fact that dairy farming is not a traditional profession also signifies that dairy farmers are 
not aware of the specific management requirements for dairy farming39, in particular appro-
priate feeding, reproductive, and health management which are the basis for productivity. The 
information for good feeding, reproductive, and health management should, ideally, be pro-
                                                 
39 See Figure 10-13  for the main aspects of smallholder dairy farm. 
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vided by the cooperative because, first, the provision of such information through continuous 
extension and veterinary services is a collective need of dairy famers; and, second, the pro-
ductivity improvement of every dairy farm is in fact the main reason why the cooperative is 
established, i.e. to improve members’ business. In particular for reproductive and health man-
agement, smallholder dairy farmers are more dependent on veterinary services, since they are 
not able to perform these services by themselves, e.g. artificial insemination, pregnancy con-
trol, and mastitis test – all which are influential in determining the conception rate, calving 
interval, mastitis prevention and treatment; and in the end the animal and farm productivity. 
However, since VUCs do not provide such service (LC5), dairy farmers have limited specific 
know-how about good dairy farming management and have thus to orientate their manage-
ment practices toward their previous experiences in keeping indigenous cattle – the habitual-
ised common practices. The orientation toward common practices plays an influential role on 
the feeding management, e.g. what kind of feedstuff and how much it should be given to the 
dairy cows. The common practices, unfortunately, entail feeding practices which are inappro-
priate and, to some extent, ‘superstitious’. Some examples are as follows: 
i. During dry seasons dairy farmers feed their cattle with chopped papaya trunk, as it is gen-
erally believed that it can substitute green forage or at least it can make the cattle feel full. 
(The fact: papaya trunk has low content of energy and protein but high fibre content. 
While it may make the cattle feel full, it cannot satisfy the nutrient requirements for milk 
production and thus is not appropriate for feeding) 
ii. Concentrate feed like rice bran or wheat pollard is not fed dry as it is, but diluted with 
water producing a slurry mixture (‘komboran’). The perceived assumptions behind this 
are that, first, giving concentrate feed in dry form will limit dairy cows’ intake or appetite; 
and, second, giving concentrate feed as slurry will increase its digestibility. (The fact: add-
ing water into concentrate feed will not increase its digestibility. It can, on the contrary, 
limit cow’s appetite, thereby reducing feed and thus nutrient intake) 
iii. Generally it is believed that increasing milk production is only attainable through feeding 
more concentrate feed, whereas fresh forages are regarded as irrelevant for milk produc-
tion. As a result, most dairy farmers feed limited amount of fresh forages, i.e. around 20 
kg per animal and day. (The fact: the basis of economic efficiency in dairy farming is, 
first, to optimise the production and utilisation of quality forages; and then to supplement 
with concentrate feed, because on energy basis, quality forages are cheaper than concen-
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trate feed. With improved forage quality and more forage in the ration, e.g. 50 kg/d/cow, 
milk yield can be improved with lower marginal feed cost.) 
 
Figure 10-13 Main aspects of smallholder dairy farm management 
Source: modified from Moran (December 2008, pp. 33–35) 
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Traditional practices do not prescribe artificial insemination. Thus, proper heat detection – as 
an integral part of successful artificial insemination – is an additional skill which has to be 
learned by dairy farmers. Traditional practices are also more oriented towards curative meas-
ures and less toward preventive measures. Consequently, dairy farmers seek veterinary ser-
vice after diseases have already manifested and caused production decline. The poor health 
and reproductive management is indicated by high occurrence of sub-clinical and clinical 
mastitis, high calving interval (ranging from the best at 13 months to the worst of 18 even 24 
months with an average of around 15 months), and high services per conception of 2.5 in av-
erage. 
Similar to Figure 10-11, as dairy farming is regarded as sideline job dairy farmers do not pos-
sess particular intention to attain higher level of animal or farm productivity. As a result, dairy 
farmers restrict resource allocation for dairy farming to the minimum level. For example, cow 
shed is build arbitrarily without proper design; fodder is obtained from crop residues or low-
quality, cut-and-carry green forages40.  
The practice of keeping ‘suckler cow’41 reduces further the already low farm productivity, 
because larger portion of the milk is fed to calves. A calf suckles two or three times or is fed 
with 2-5 l milk daily for a time period reaching to 12 – 16 weeks. As in general a dairy farm 
has 2-3 milking cows with low animal productivity of below 10 l/d/cow, the majority of dairy 
farms keeping ‘suckler cow’ produce only around 5 – 15 litres milk daily. Apart from this, 
keeping ‘suckler cow’ is also associated with the notion ‘Boyolali as service centre’ (‘bengkel 
sapi’) for dairy cattle42. Less productive dairy cattle from other regions are relocated and sold 
with lower price to Boyolali. These cattle – which are less demanding in management re-
quirements than milking cows – are then bought and reared by the dairy farmers. After the 
body condition is improved and/or the cattle are pregnant, they are sold again with higher 
price and relocated to other regions.  
                                                 
40 At this point it is important to note that inappropriate milking, feeding, and herd management is also a conse-
quence of limited resource use for dairy farming. This is further discussed in Figure 10-14. 
41 Also in Figure 10-11 
42 Cf. Moran (2008, p. 25) 
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Boyolali is perceived as one of the main sources of good heifers. If there are programs for 
sourcing heifers, people from West and East Java will come to Boyolali. They are pragmatic 
people and will buy pregnant heifers instead of rearing by themselves. Because the process of 
rearing calves takes a lot of time and resources, they usually sell their calves to Boyolali and 
buy them again when the heifers are pregnant and ready for milk production. Dairy farmers in 
Boyolali particularly do this rearing in dry season. (Exp 2) 
The explanation above also presents the clarification why the Province of Central Java, in 
particular the District of Boyolali, has the lowest average animal productivity among the pro-
duction centres, as it is concluded in Table 7-3 and further elaborated in Table 8-1 and Table 
8-2. The large population number in Boyolali – the largest among dairy production centres – 
and the low production capacity is explained by, first, the application of inappropriate dairy 
management and limited resource allocation; and, second, the preference of dairy farmers for 
rearing dairy stock – be it calves from other cows or low performing dairy cattle – to milk 
production.  
10.2.3.5 Intermediate outcome: Stagnation of dairy farm 
 
Figure 10-14 Intermediate outcome: stagnation of dairy farm 
Source: own compilation 
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Embedded in a traditional system, dairy farmers have subsistence orientation that is closely 
associated with the higher valuation of family and social concerns above economic concerns. 
The higher valuation of family and social concerns signifies that individuals possess higher 
willingness to sacrifice economic resources for satisfying household or social needs. During 
interviews with the dairy farmers on the retrospective development of their dairy farm, it was 
identified that the decrease of cattle number was not only caused by adverse economic (e.g. 
price surge of concentrate feed) or climatic conditions (e.g. extended drought), but also by 
family and social concerns: dairy cows are sold to finance wedding reception, circumcision 
celebration, or to buy a new motorbike for the children of the family. Apart from being a fam-
ily concern, celebrative events and ownership of certain goods are of social importance for the 
family, since it represents the social status and reflects the prosperity which in turn is impor-
tant for social acknowledgement and prestige. However, viewing such action from business 
perspective, the expenditure of one or more dairy cows from the already small herd on family 
or social occasions can, first, hinder the accumulation of capital which is required for expand-
ing the dairy farm; and, second, even undermine the dairy farm performance to the extent that 
its sustainability is at stake. 
Compared to urban societies, rural societies in general are more reliant on well-maintained 
family and social relations for sustaining the livelihood. Also, they consider economic con-
cerns less important than urban societies do. For example, individuals in urban areas have a 
higher tendency to allocate more time resource for working and more efforts to pursuit higher 
economic performance, thereby making their resources less available for family and social 
concerns. On the contrary, for individuals in rural areas the first and foremost objective of 
economic activities is to generate and secure sufficient livelihood for the household. Insofar 
as the individuals perceive that they have successfully achieved sufficient livelihood, they 
prefer to retain the already attained livelihood situation and to allocate the remaining re-
sources for family and social needs. Consequently, although they may identify or be aware of 
opportunities to improve their business, their preference of generating ‘just enough’ liveli-
hood prevents them from investing more resources - i.e. more money, time, or effort – to ex-
ploit the opportunities. Such preference seems to be more pronounced among older people: 
There are indeed dairy farmers who never improve their farm. These are not always older farm-
ers, but many of them are. When given advice, they typically response, “Well, I have been 
working this way all the time”. That means that they feel satisfied with what they have right 
now. (Exp 2) 
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Situated in a transaction condition where higher quality milk does not receive higher price 
(LC3), dairy farmers receive low external price-incentive to specialise on dairy farming. As 
they have other more preferential sources of income, dairy farmers are inclined to allocate 
resources just enough to sustain – but not sufficient to improve – the dairy farming on mini-
mum level. 
In traditional economy economic actors follow the strategy of livelihood optimisation, i.e. 
combining different sources of income to minimise risk, instead of specialising on and maxi-
mising a single source of income. Risk management seems to be one of the main concerns for 
smallholder dairy farmers. During discussions in training sessions with dairy farmers, it was 
identified that the current production intensity was not yet optimum: the marginal milk in-
come from increased milk production was still higher than the marginal cost of additional 
concentrate feed. When asked about the reason why they left such available potential produc-
tion capacity and thus income improvement unexploited; the main answer – apart from “that 
is what usual here” denoting the orientation toward common practices – was “it is too expen-
sive”. 
There is an important consideration behind such answer. The intensification of the feeding 
management, i.e. the working capital, would constantly drain more financial resource from 
their limited cash flow and thus has at least twofold consequences. First, it entails greater 
business risks, namely greater lost if the intended benefits do not accrue or an unexpected, 
negative incident happens to the dairy farm. Since traditional farmers are generally risk 
averse, the perceived risk tends to be higher than the objective risk. And if the perceived risk 
exceeds their threshold risk, then such option is considered as non-preferential undertaking for 
livelihood improvement. Second, the more resource used for the dairy farming, the less is 
available for other sources of income. Such option can undermine the performance of other 
sources of income. As long as there is any other source of income with higher priority or pref-
erence – e.g. on account of lower risk –, dairy farmers will unlikely opt for intensifying the 
dairy farm, in particular if the dairy farming is regarded as sideline job43. 
                                                 
43 Cf. Moran (2007, p. 7) 
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Another factor that causes the restricted resource allocation for improving dairy farm is the 
weak self-identification as dairy farmer which in turn is caused by the fact that dairy farming 
is treated as sideline job, that milk consumption is not an integral part of farmers’ household, 
and that the profession as dairy farmer has a negative association. How someone identifies 
his/her own profession exerts influences on his/her own professional performance. If someone 
is convinced that he/she is doing the right and good things, believes that his/her work has val-
ues for himself/herself or the family or the society, enjoys doing the work, and is proud of 
what he/she is doing; there is a great motivation and incentive to achieve the highest perform-
ance and to improve continuously. The same also applies for the dairy farmers.  
Either you like milk or you don't like milk. A dairy farmer must like his milk. He has to be a 
milk drinker and to be part of the milk himself. Because otherwise it does not make sense, you 
have to like and to be proud of what you are doing. You have to believe in it. So I think this is 
true: an industry will only have success if they believe in themselves. What they are doing has 
to do something with themselves. (Exp 4) 
With weak self-identification, dairy farmers have thus weak internal motivation and incentive 
to make themselves successful dairy farmers. As a result, it is unlikely that dairy farmers 
make great efforts and invest more resources to expand the existing dairy farm. 
Last but not least, the low participation of younger generation, which presumably have better 
educational background and higher motivation to improve, in dairy farming also contributes 
to the stagnation of dairy farm in general. As dairy farming involves strenuous physical works 
and “dirty” activities – in literal meaning – like cleaning dirty animal or scrapping manure in 
a place with pungent smell, younger generation considers it as an inferior job. Combined with 
other factors of diminishing farmland availability due to urbanisation and increasing opportu-
nity cost of labour on account of improved education, younger generation prefers other pro-
fessions to dairy farming. As a result, labour availability, particularly family labour, for dairy 
farming is continuously declining44. 
All in all, the selected actions described above lead to the stagnation of dairy farming. This is 
indicated by, inter alia, stagnating small herd-size, no improvement in milk equipment, and 
animal shed. 
                                                 
44 Cf. Moran (2007, p. 7) 
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10.2.4 End outcome: Low and stagnating chain performance 
 
Figure 10-15 End outcome: Low and stagnating chain performance 
Source: own compilation 
As depicted by Figure 10-15, the combination of the intermediate outcomes, which resulted 
from diverse macro and micro variables as described in the previous sub-chapters, lead to the 
end condition. The intermediate outcomes of ‘production of low-quality milk’ and ‘low ani-
mal and farm productivity’ explain the low performance of the chain, whereas the ‘stagnation 
of dairy farm’, ‘lack of improvement measures’, and ‘low professional performance of coop 
staff and leaders’ explain the stagnating performance of the interaction system. 
The logic of aggregation which establishes the causal relations between the selected actions 
and the respective outcome is already included in the explanation of each intermediate out-
come. An intermediate outcome resulting from the selected action based on certain perception 
by dairy farmers can constitute a new situation for VUC, and vice versa. In this respect, both 
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dairy farmers and VUCs are mutually influencing in intensive interaction processes. Also, 
there are macro variables of the system which influence both the dairy farmers and VUCs. 
The interaction of these variables is exemplified by Figure 10-15: The ‘production of low-
quality milk’ by dairy farmers was indirectly caused by, inter alia, their ignorance of GDFP 
and quality regulations as the cooperatives did not provide ‘adequate service provision, in-
cluding extension service, to dairy farmers’ (LC5). The minimal provision of service to the 
members, however, was a necessary decision taken by VUCs since there was ‘increasing 
number of dairy farmers stops delivering coop’ (LF1) which brought VUCs into an adverse 
financial situation. That dairy farmers opted to sell their milk elsewhere was prompted by the 
situation of ‘escalating competition for milk regardless quality’ (LS3) where middle men of-
fered higher milk price than VUC. Their option was also caused by the feeling of low owner-
ship for the cooperative as the ‘cooperative establishment was government-driven’ (LC6). 
10.2.5 Overview of the variables in the lesser-performing interaction system 
Figure 10-16 provides the overview of the variables in the lesser-performing interaction sys-
tem. Almost all macro and some important micro variables are listed here. 
10.3 Higher-performing interaction systems 
10.3.1 Macro variable: Institutional framework 
10.3.1.1 Regulative aspect: Regulations for product and process quality 
Within the interaction system between cooperatives and dairy farmers, quality regulations can 
be distinguished into two groups: product and process quality regulations. Product quality 
concerns the characteristics of milk delivered by dairy farmers to cooperative. These are, 
more or less, equivalent to the product-quality parameters defined by DPIs, namely milk 
grade or milk hygiene and milk composition or milk content. Therefore, in contrast to lesser-
performing cooperatives which perform only basic tests of product quality (see Table 10-1); 
higher-performing cooperatives run additional tests to assess bacterial contamination (using 
MBRT or Resazurin Test45) and TS content. 
                                                 
45 MBRT and Resazurin Test cannot provide an accurate but rather approximate value of the degree of bacterial 
contamination, yet is simpler and cheaper. TPC test performed by DPIs, on the other hand, is able to provide a 
more accurate value, yet requires more sophisticated equipment and is much more expensive. 
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Figure 10-16 Overview of the variables in the lesser-performing interaction system 
Source: own compilation 
To assess the milk quality, cooperative takes two random samples, one from the morning and 
one from the afternoon delivery, in a time period of 5 to 10 days. The number of samples 
taken and time period are adjusted to the quality improvement progress and monitoring need. 
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For example, in the early phase of the introduction and enforcement of quality regulations, it 
was necessary to break the habitualised practices of milk adulteration by the most dairy farm-
ers. Therefore, milk test was conducted in shorter time period of every 5 or even 3 days with 2 
to 4 random samples. The samples are then tested in the cooperative laboratory and based on 
their results the price is determined. 
Such quality/price mechanism is the backbone for the enforcement of the product quality 
regulation since it is the one which provides both positive (price bonus) and negative incen-
tive (price penalty) for dairy farmers. The farm-gate milk price is basically composed of the 
base price which is determined by the milk grade and the bonus or penalty which is deter-
mined by the TS and fat content. Sometimes temporary price bonuses are also given accord-
ing to the prevailing circumstances, e.g. extended dry period or increased fuel price. By estab-
lishing a mechanism of price determination based on milk quality, the cooperatives pass on 
the quality/price signal from DPIs backward the chain to dairy farmers. 
In the higher-performing interaction system two distinct price determination systems were 
observed, i.e. individual price and group price. Cooperatives currently applying individual 
price also used group price during the establishment process of the quality/price mechanism. 
Generally, price differentiation was started from larger to smaller groups: from large group of 
several MCCs, to one MCC, to several large groups, to many smaller groups, to individual 
dairy farmers. 
Dairy farmers can choose how they would like to have their milk price paid. The farmer we 
have just visited chose the group pricing. [Which one is more advantageous for dairy farmers, 
the individual or group pricing?] It depends. If the group is solid and good, the advantages 
gained by the improvement made by one member will benefit the other members. So, it encour-
ages farmers to improve their practices. New, improved, or innovative practices will be dis-
seminated more easily in a group, as we conduct training and monitoring in groups. But on the 
contrary, if one member of the group cheats or behave not appropriately, then all members of 
the groups will suffer from price penalty. So, there is a kind of social pressure where group 
member do the monitoring among themselves, and thus less monitoring from cooperative side. 
(Coop 3, higher performance) 
Monitoring in groups is possible since the group size was small and manageable consisting of 
8 to 10 members. By maintaining the group small, intensive interaction – which is a prerequi-
site for the internal group control – between members is enabled. 
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The process quality regulations – also frequently termed ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ 
(SOPs) – include rules pertaining to good dairy farming practices (GDFP)46, such as milking 
hygiene and post-harvest milk handling by dairy farmer, and milk handling by cooperative 
staff responsible for MCC and milk transportation. In these regard, SOPs are oriented toward 
improving the quality of processes undergone by the milk. Additionally, SOPs are also deal-
ing with practices indirectly related to milk hygiene, such as technical recommendation for 
animal shed design, feeding management, and animal health management.  
 
Figure 10-17 Interdependent activities influencing the milk hygiene 
Source: own compilation 
Figure 10-17 lists some main activities or processes influencing the milk hygiene. As depicted 
in the figure, milk hygiene is determined by a chain of activities performed by various opera-
tors. Given the fact that milk is highly perishable on account of the exponential growth of 
bacteria (see Table 10-2), improving and maintaining milk hygiene is thus a complex process 
and requires well-concerted activities between dairy farmers and cooperative staff. The im-
provement of dairy practices by the dairy farmers (also its maintenance), if not followed-up 
                                                 
46 IDF/FAO (2004) provides a brief guideline to good dairy farming practice (GDFP). 
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by the improvement of milk handling by cooperative staff, will not achieve the expected out-
come; and also vice versa. 
Table 10-2 Factors influencing the growth of bacteria contaminating milk 
Factor Description 
Food Milk contains nutrient required for bacteria growth; milk rests on utensils not 
cleaned properly are ideal growth medium for bacteria. 
Temperature 
(warmth) 
Despite specific optimal temperature for each species, bacteria grow well 
within the range of 20-40°C – average temperatures in the tropics. 
Water (moisture) Apart from milk rests, water rests on utensils not-properly dried facilitate bac-
terial growth. 
Time Supplied with food, water, and a temperature of 37°C; the reproduction of bac-
teria follows a geometrical progression. One bacterium will grow over time to:  
1 hour → 8 
4 hours → 4 thousand 
6 hours → 262 thousand 
8 hours → 6.7 million 
10 hours → 1 billion 
Source: adapted from Moran (2007, p. 31) 
The concept of SOPs is usually introduced by the DPIs to their supplier cooperatives, which 
in turn pass the information on to their staff and members. After the introduction and first 
application of the SOPs, higher-performing cooperatives have more influence in designing the 
revision of the SOPs. Technical requirements that are hard to achieve by the dairy farmers due 
to, inter alia, infrastructure restrictions47 are discussed and the reported as feedback to the 
DPIs. Then, the SOPs are adjusted first to achievable standards, yet gradually elevated unto 
reaching higher process quality. Such transmission of information is more effective in induc-
ing changes along the value chain, because it involves an information-feedback mechanism or 
a bidirectional information transmission which allows step-by-step improvement and its con-
tinuous monitoring. 
Similar to the price bonus/penalty for the enforcement of product quality regulations, the en-
forcement of SOPs is backed-up by a reward and sanction system to empower good practices 
as well as to deter bad practices. Dairy farmers in compliance with the SOPs can retain their 
membership in the cooperative and are thus entitled to the collective services provided, in 
particular loan service both for working capital or personal consumption. On the contrary, 
                                                 
47 See Sub-chapter 9.3.1 for financial assistance given to improve infrastructure and equipment. 
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incompliant practices shall receive penalty with gradual severity: first verbal and formal 
warnings, then rejection of milk delivery; and, if no correction is made although technical 
assistance is already given, as final penalty the dairy farmer will be dismissed from the coop-
erative. 
10.3.1.2 Normative aspect: Social pressure backing-up regulative aspect 
In the case of group pricing, the regulative pillar – i.e. the written, formal price determination 
system – is backed-up by the normative pillar of social pressure among the group members. In 
group pricing, the action of each group member brings consequences to other members, be it 
negative or positive. 
If the group is solid and good, the advantages gained by the improvement made by one member 
will benefit the other members. […] But on the contrary, if one member of the group cheats or 
behave not appropriately, then all members of the groups will suffer from price penalty. So, 
there is a kind of social pressure where group member do the monitoring among themselves, 
and thus less monitoring from cooperative side. (Coop 3, higher performance) 
A basic necessity of functioning group pressure is the high degree of trust among dairy farm-
ers in the group. Trust, in turn, requires high degree of familiarity and thus is stronger in 
groups which are established based on the initiative of the members and whose members are 
selected by the members themselves. Apart from this, geographical proximity and intensive 
interaction among members are also a prerequisite for effective mutual-control as well as dif-
fusion of information among the members. Hence, group pricing is only possible in small 
groups. 
Ideally a group should have a maximum of 8 dairy farmers so that the training and monitoring 
activities can run intensively. Also, social control is more effective in smaller groups. Currently 
there are 650 groups of dairy farmers. Dairy farmers in one group receive the same milk price. 
(Coop 1, higher performance) 
Additional to the social pressures in dairy-farmer groups, a social role48 of good dairy farmer 
was also cultivated by the cooperative. Socialisations were run to give understanding to the 
wider community that dairy farmers have the function of producing milk which is used as raw 
material for producing dairy products designated for human consumption, so that the quality 
generated by dairy farmers will affect the consumer of the dairy products. Moreover, the co-
                                                 
48 See Sub-chapter 3.5.2 for the definition of social role. 
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operatives encouraged the community to consume fresh milk produced by dairy farmers. 
Also, one of the higher-performing cooperatives produces yoghurt for local market in order to 
introduce milk consumption particularly for children. 
10.3.1.3 Cultural-cognitive aspect: Communication, culture, and social structure 
Training or extension system was one of the most important pillars in the establishment of 
effective quality regulation system, because there was a wide gap between the actual dairy 
practices and those required by the quality regulations. In essence, the ultimate goal of the 
extension service was the sustainable adoption of GDFP by the dairy farmers. This necessi-
tates, of course, that the information on GDFP is effectively communicated to the dairy farm-
ers – communication is a central issue in extension service. However, communication is more 
than just providing understandable information; it covers a sequence of important aspects in a 
process, as stated by an expert on communication and training method: 
In the context of communication or training it is frequently assumed that when the information 
is successfully imparted, then the task is already finished. But it is not that simple. If something 
is said, then it is not always listened to. If it is listened to, then it is not always understood. If it 
is understood, then it is not always agreed to. If it is agreed to, then it is not always done. If it is 
done, then it is not always applied sustainably. Between imparting an information and sustain-
able change of behaviour there are in-between stages to be considered. (Exp 8) 
The statement above implies that inducing sustainable behaviour changes is more than just a 
matter of enabling the dairy farmers to cognitively comprehend the content of GDFP. It re-
quires that, first, the information reaches the dairy farmers and that they have interest in, at-
tention to, and perceive the significance of the information. Then, they should be able to ab-
sorb, digest, and retain the information. If they agree and accept that the information is useful, 
beneficial, or valuable; then they will once try to apply the information. Last but not least, 
upon reflection about the costs and benefits of the application, they will decide whether to 
sustainably adopt or to abandon it. 
Considering these important aspects of effective training, the dissemination of GDFP in the 
higher-performing interaction system is analysed (see Figure 10-18). During the initial stage 
of the introduction of quality regulation, higher-performing cooperatives experienced con-
straints in disseminating GDFP. Similar to the lesser-performing system, the objective situa-
tions of ‘dairy farming as non-traditional profession’, ‘no habit of consuming milk in the 
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household’, and ‘dairy farming as sideline job’49 hampered the abandonment of inappropriate 
practices such as handling cow and milk with low hygiene standard.  
 
Figure 10-18 Intermediate outcome: Ineffective dissemination of GDFP among farmers 
Source: own compilation 
On top of that, there was a unique problem of cross-cultural communication issue. In rural 
areas where different ethnic groups live in somewhat separated and homogenous groups, 
cross-cultural communication and interaction may prove difficult. Each culture group has 
different ways of communicating. While one culture group is more open to information from 
outsiders, the other may not be so. While in one culture group the advice of social leaders are 
sought after, listened to, and followed (more hierarchical); in other culture group social lead-
ers may not exert such function (more egalitarian). In this respect, communication is influ-
enced by the prevailing socio-cultural conditions of the community (HS1). A problem of 
cross-cultural communication was the case in the higher-performing interaction system in 
East Java. While the board of management and cooperative staff is mostly of Javanese ethnic 
group, the dairy farmers in several areas are of Madurese ethnic group. 
We had experienced difficulties in improving milk quality through training and monitoring in 
areas where dairy farmers are predominantly of Madurese ethnic group. They were unwilling to 
accept recommendations for improving dairying practices, because they feel that they are al-
ready well-experienced and know very well about dairy farming, since the have inherited this 
profession [livestock keeping] over generations. (Coop 2, higher performance) 
                                                 
49 See Figure 10-10 and Figure 10-11. 
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As depicted by Figure 10-18, the resistance against the adoption of new practices was par-
tially grounded in the historical occupation of Madurese people. Traditionally Madurese are 
not staple-crop farmer, since their place of origin – the Madura Island – has barren and non-
arable lands. Thus, one of their primary means of sustaining livelihood has been – apart from 
coastal fishery, tobacco, and salt production – traditional livestock keeping which in some 
aspects is fundamentally different from GDFP. Having long-standing experience in livestock 
keeping, the dairy farmers were not interested and willing to pay attention to the dissemina-
tion of GDFP, because they perceived such information as redundant. Additionally, as the 
socialisation was conducted by extension workers which were ‘outsiders’, i.e. persons who 
did not live in the community and thus were unfamiliar to the dairy farmers, they perceived 
that the information had no particular importance and relevance for them and thus was not 
listened to. Similar situation was described by an agriculture expert who provided extension 
services for many years to Madurese tobacco farmers. 
Among many places producing tobacco, those places where Madurese farmers predominate are 
more challenging. When my staff was giving technical advice, they were not listened to. So, I 
had to go there by myself. But instead of directly talking with the tobacco farmers, I talked with 
the Hajji50 in the village and asked him to invite other village people to come to his place. I was 
dressed-up in sarong51, traditional Muslim clothing, and wore a kopiah52 – I myself am a Hajji. 
After we had a prayer together and some conversation took place, the Hajji introduced me to the 
invitees and explained the purpose of my visit. Then, I began speaking about the real content. 
Only using this way they will listen. (Exp 3) 
The short testimony above signifies that the message bearer did not present himself as an ano-
nym outsider with no emotional bond to the community, but instead as a respectable and iden-
tifiable person – a Hajji. Moreover, the self-presentation was legitimised and empowered by 
the social leader who owned the trust of the community, so that the information he brought 
gained attention and acceptance. It seems that for Madurese community the ‘who’ and ‘how’ 
of the communication process was of higher importance. 
                                                 
50 ’Hajji’ is an honorific title bestowed upon a person who has completed the pilgrimage or Hajj to Mecca as the 
fulfillment of the fifth pillar of Islam. 
51 ‘Sarong’ is a long piece of thin cloth with patterns or batik which is worn wrapped around the waist and hang-
ing down slightly above the ankle. It is usually used by Muslim men in Indonesia when they are praying. 
52 ‘Kopiah’ or ‘kippah’ is a thin skullcap worn by Muslim men particularly in rural areas of Indonesia. 
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Another more general problem identified with the extension system was the conventional 
method of verbal communication. Dairy farmers experienced difficulties to comprehend the 
information on GDFP which was presented using verbal method solely. 
Changing habitualised, inappropriate dairy practices is not an easy task. We cannot expect that 
they will change by telling them what is right and how to do things correctly. Dairy farmers are 
modest people with relatively low educational background. They cannot understand abstract 
theories or principles in dairy farming. What they need is something real, practicable, and can 
be observed concretely. (Coop 3, higher performance) 
Having the subjective perception as described above, the dairy farmers then rejected the adop-
tion of GDPF. As a result, the adoption rate of GDFP among dairy farmers was low irrespec-
tive of the extension service provided by the cooperatives (HF1). 
10.3.2 Micro variable: Cooperative leaders and staff 
10.3.2.1 Intermediate outcome: Improved service provision for members 
 
Figure 10-19 Intermediate outcome: Improved service provision for members 
Source: own compilation 
All coop leaders from higher-performing cooperatives hold the opinion that a cooperative 
should focus on one core business – in this case the dairy business – in order to succeed. Fo-
cusing on one core business, cooperative has a specific vision and orientation for its future 
development. Such opinion was even supported by a cooperative leader of lesser-performing 
cooperatives. 
In its historical development our cooperative was first established as a dairy cooperative, but 
then it was changed into Village Unit Cooperative (VUC) in 1978 since we wanted to broaden 
the spectrum of services for the members. However, with such organisational format the per-
formance of the dairy business had been declining because the cooperative could not concen-
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trate on the development of dairy farming. Hence, in 1996 the cooperative was changed again 
into a dairy cooperative. (Coop 3, higher performance) 
Our cooperative was established in 1971 and it was founded by 35 dairy farmers. The number of 
dairy-farmer members has been increasing ever since. From the beginning our cooperative has 
always been focusing on dairy production. (Coop 1, higher performance) 
In East Java the cooperatives are quite new like in Ngantang, Grati, and Semen. These can evol-
ve very well. Why is this so? Because they have only one core business, namely the dairy pro-
duction. Therefore, their members are only dairy farmers who depend exclusively on dairy far-
ming. So their life [cooperative and members] is determined by the outcome of their dairy 
business. (Coop 4, lesser performance) 
Based on this perception coop leaders advocated a modification in the cooperative’s basic and 
operational statute requiring officially that coop leaders53 must be a dairy farmer, additional to 
the regular requirements like good leadership and management skill. Through such mecha-
nism it is guaranteed that the elected coop leaders or employed operational manager possess 
profound understanding of and experience in the dairy business and – to some extent – also 
have personal interest in the further development of the dairy business. These, in turn, also 
support the perpetuation of dairy business as the core business of the cooperative. Such 
mechanism presents an organisational solution to assure that the cooperative management 
sustainably supports dairy business 
As the elected leaders have longstanding experiences in dairy farming, they have solid under-
standing of the potentials that can be tapped to improve farm productivity and of the con-
straints that hamper dairy farm development. Viewing the dairy business as the highest prior-
ity in cooperative management, coop leaders thus create policies and programs to facilitate the 
business development of their members. More specifically such policies and programs are: 
i. Production of fresh forage: Because the availability of land for growing green forages is 
strictly limited, cooperatives engaged in cooperation with the local government agency of 
forestry service because this agency has vast areas of forest on which green forages can be 
produced. 
                                                 
53 The term ’cooperative leaders’ used throughout this dissertation refers to the members of the cooperative’s 
board of directors – i.e. (vice) directors, secretary, and treasurer – and, if applicable, the operational manager for 
the dairy business. 
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ii. Production of concentrate feed: Through collective purchase and distribution organised 
by the cooperative, the production and distribution cost of concentrate feed can be sub-
stantially reduced. Also, the quality of the concentrate feed can be monitored and guaran-
teed. This is an important aspect as the sustaining and increasing of dairy cattle productiv-
ity – which is heavily determined by the feed quality – is in the interest of the dairy 
farmers and cooperative. 
iii. Collective provision of water: Similar to the lesser-performing cooperatives, some areas 
of the higher-performing cooperatives are affected severely by the problem of limited wa-
ter availability during dry seasons. To tackle this problem the higher-performing coopera-
tives built long-distance water pipelines to MCCs and decentralised small water reservoirs 
from which dairy farmers can collect additional water for their farm. The establishment of 
such system was in fact costly, but adequate water availability was indispensable for any 
quality improvement measure. Hence, it was considered as an investment rather than cost. 
iv. Extension service: To improve milk quality and productivity the cooperatives established 
their own extension system54. 
v. Veterinary service: The cooperatives employ their own (para-) veterinarians to provide 
services such as artificial insemination (AI)55, pregnancy control, and health check. Since 
these services are, again, exert strong influences on the animal productivity, their provi-
sion is organised by the cooperatives to ensure the availability and quality.  
Having the dairy production as core business does not mean, however, that the cooperatives 
do not have other types of business. Higher-performing cooperatives also provide daily con-
sumer goods and loan services both for consumptive purposes or purchasing dairy cattle. But 
these services are complementary activities and not designated to yield profit. For example, in 
one higher-performing cooperative the loan service is provided without any interest, yet the 
amount and requirements are determined by the member performance; whereas the repayment 
                                                 
54 See Sub-chapter 10.3.2.2 and 10.3.2.5 for further elaboration on the extension system. 
55 The arrangement for AI service differs among the higher performing cooperatives. In one cooperative AI is 
provided without any additional cost because the cost is already covered in the milk price deduction of 400 IDR 
per litre (2006); whereas in other cooperatives dairy farmers pay for the service without any subsidy (40,000 
IDR per AI service in 2006), yet they receive “pregnancy guarantee“: if the animal does not become pregnant, 
the AI is repeated up to 3 times. 
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is deducted from the milk payment. With the implementation of policies and programs ori-
ented toward dairy development and member needs the provision of services to the members 
is significantly improved (HC7) 
10.3.2.2 Intermediate outcome: Effective imposition of quality regulations 
 
Figure 10-20: Intermediate outcome: Effective imposition of quality regulations 
Source: own compilation 
An extremely interesting conclusion drawn from the interviews with the cooperative leaders 
of the higher-performing cooperatives is their unequivocal conviction that the key factor of 
their cooperative development is the strong commitment of the cooperative leaders to initiate 
reform starting with the cooperative itself. Establishing a professional management was al-
ways stated as the first step in the development of dairy cooperative. Therefore, the reform of 
the cooperative in many aspects was the main priority in advancing the performance. 
The role of the board of directors is influential in cooperative development. In a period where 
the board of directors was once led by “outsiders“, the cooperative performance decreased due 
to many problems. These people do not understand the ins and outs of dairy farming and dairy 
business because they themselves are not dairy farmer. But they have high social status and ex-
ert strong social influence in the society. Leaders function as a head that determines which di-
rection the cooperative is walking to. (Coop 2, higher performance) 
Actually, if the board of directors has a strong commitment for the cooperative and members, I 
think there is no reason that the cooperative cannot develop. The problem is whether the board 
of directors has such commitment. [...] Cooperative is like a "container" for its members. We 
cannot improve the "content" if the "container" itself is defect. Therefore, the starting point is 
the cooperative itself. Professional management of the cooperative is the main driving power for 
improvements. (Coop 3, higher performance) 
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Our cooperative was established in 1971 and [...] had been declining and reached its nadir in 
1998 because of increasing default loans and weak management. The pivoting point was in 
2001 when we introduced reform in the cooperative. The basic and operational statutes were re-
vised. A strategic planning for 2001-2005 was devised, in which the new vision, mission, and 
value are defined. (Coop 1, higher performance) 
The subjective perception of cooperative as change agent or pioneer encouraged the initiation 
of progressive changes in the cooperative regarding the introduction and establishment of 
quality regulations. Additionally, since the dairy business is perceived as the core business, it 
receives higher priority in policy-making and larger resource allocation. 
Against the background of the quality regulations, including the quality/price mechanism, 
defined by DPIs, cooperative leaders perceived that further development of the cooperative’s 
dairy business can only be built on the production of higher-quality milk. While the expansion 
of production capacity is somewhat restricted due to, inter alia, the limitation of land avail-
ability, the improvement of milk quality provides great potential of increasing milk revenue. 
For example, based on Table 9-3 the improvement of milk grade from grade 6 to 1 in 2006 
would result in over than 60% increase in milk revenue; in addition price bonuses were pro-
vided for higher fat and protein or SNF content.  
The orientation toward producing higher-quality milk was also reinforced by the objective 
situation that DPIs offer both technical (TA) and financial assistance (FA) only for those sup-
pliers committed to strive for delivering higher-quality milk. While the assistances by DPIs 
are extremely valuable for improving their system, cooperatives are bound to work on and 
yield success in quality improvement measures in order to be entitled to receive further assis-
tances. 
The combination of the internal values and subjective orientations which are shaped by the 
objective situations led cooperative leaders to take necessary actions to effectively impose the 
quality regulations in the interaction system. Such endeavour entails at least three different 
aspects of action: defining regulations, enabling dairy farmers to comply with the regulations, 
and enforcing the reward and punishment system. 
The cooperatives defined the quality regulations in accordance with the requirements deline-
ated by DPIs. As in general DPI’s requirements cannot be met in short term, the regulations 
were conceived in gradual requirement levels progressing toward DPI’s requirements. Speci-
fications were drawn up on milk quality parameters – including the pricing mechanism – and 
on processes directly influencing the quality of milk hygiene. Guiding principles were ex-
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pressed in simple terms – “ABC (aman bersih cepat) dan tanpa antibiotika” which means 
“safe to consume, clean handling, fast delivery, and without antibiotics”. As a result, there are 
clearly stated specifications of quality standards which cooperative staff and dairy members 
should adhere to56. 
To enable dairy farmers to comply with the regulations, the cooperatives established their 
own training system. In contrast to the lesser-performing cooperatives which attempt to exter-
nalise or training and monitoring functions to or depend on local government, the higher-
performing cooperatives viewed this as the main responsibility and interest of the cooperative 
itself. Training and monitoring is given precedence within the cooperative reform processes: 
During the early introduction and enforcement of GDFP we aimed at the improvement of milk 
hygiene. Our cooperative established ‘quality team’. Four quality teams with each three exten-
sion workers were established to socialise and give training about the SOPs, for example, in 
cleaning milking equipment, cattle management, and milking practices. Of utmost importance 
in the whole process was the consequent enforcement of the principle ‘reward and punishment’. 
At present, most dairy farmers already follow the SOPs and the monitoring system is estab-
lished. That is why the extension team is now reduced to 6 persons. They deal mainly with 
problem farmers. (Coop 1, higher performance) 
We pay a special attention to training and monitoring. It is a part of our routine programme and 
also included in the cooperative basic statute. (Coop 3, higher performance) 
Training and monitoring is cooperative's responsibility, not other's [e.g. local government], be-
cause the improvement and maintenance of milk quality is the main business interest of the co-
operative. (Coop 2, higher performance) 
Extension workers and (para-) veterinarian are employed by the cooperative to socialise the 
new regulations, visit farmer groups, encourage dairy farmers to improve their practices, con-
vince them of the benefits of the improved practices, and give technical advice and solutions 
for the constraints faced by them. Given the fact that there had been a wide gap between the 
actual dairy practices and the ideal practices required by the quality regulations, the coopera-
tives had to design a training system that is able effectively both to impart the knowledge of 
GDFP and to initiate sustainable changes of behaviour among dairy farmers. To ensure the 
effectiveness of the training system, the cooperatives applied specific training strategy – in 
addition to the regular socialisation through training and visit extension system – to induce 
behavioural changes among dairy farmers by incorporating and utilising socio-cultural aspects 
                                                 
56 See Sub-chapter 10.3.1.1 for the regulations of product and process quality. 
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of the society57. Hence, in the interaction system the socialisation of the regulations and, more 
importantly, the technical assistance is delivered intensively (HC1).  
To enforce the product quality regulation the cooperatives established their own laboratory for 
testing the milk delivered by the dairy farmers. For the monitoring of process quality the ex-
tension workers conduct regular observation of practices each time they visit farmer groups as 
well as occasional random inspection at individual dairy farm or MCC, sometimes together 
with the field officers from DPIs, to prevent deviant practices. One higher-performing coop-
erative also provides incentive for group leaders if they succeed in encouraging their groups 
to improve milk quality or productivity. In such condition, group leaders are actively involved 
and have stronger interest in the monitoring of quality regulations. With such measures, the 
functioning of the reward and punishment system is guaranteed (HC2). 
The effective implementation of quality regulations also necessitates improvement on coop-
erative side. The cooperatives invested in the improvement of the infrastructure for MCCs 
based on the technical requirements delineated by DPIs: closed building, floor type and site 
plan suitable for cleaning, good ventilation and lighting, hot water and detergent for cleaning 
milk cans, and so forth. Also, any equipment in immediate contact with milk, e.g. milk 
bucket, filters, milk tank, was upgraded to food grade material (stainless steel). The pipe sys-
tem was rebuilt to enable thorough cleaning using CIP (Cleaning-In-Place) system or detach-
able system which allows the dismantling into separate parts for sanitising after each use. To 
inhibit bacterial growth many MCCs of higher-performing cooperatives were equipped with 
cooling plant. Milk transporters were upgraded with cooling capacity. Capacity building was 
given for cooperative staff working in the MCCs as they have to comply with the SOPs. The 
staff is also subject to meticulous monitoring by the cooperative and DPIs. With such invest-
ments the facility and procedures for collecting, storing, cooling-down, and transportation of 
milk are significantly improved. These successful improvements, however, were also on ac-
count of DPIs’ massive supports for their committed suppliers (see Sub-chapter 9.3). 
10.3.2.3 Intermediate outcome: Enhanced organisational and cost efficiency 
                                                 
57 See Sub-chapter 10.3.2.5 for socio-culturally adjusted training and monitoring 
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The strong conviction of the coop leaders that reform measures must start from the coopera-
tive management prompted them, inter alia, to take actions to reduce the large number of inac-
tive members, since inactive member create additional burdens, i.e. the annual surplus distri-
bution58. To tackle the existing problem of inactive members the cooperatives conducted 
member re-registration. One family business is entitled only to one membership in the coop-
erative. Inactive members were given the options either to become active again in dairy busi-
ness or to leave the cooperative. Additionally, the existing members were given short intro-
duction into cooperative principles. To avoid future problem of inactive members, one of the 
higher-performing cooperatives established a new regulation for member admission. 
 
Figure 10-21 Intermediate outcome: Enhanced organisational and cost efficiency 
Source: own compilation 
Applicant for cooperative membership should first attend a 3-day class to get an introduction 
about the basic understanding and principles of cooperative. Then field verification will be con-
ducted and the applicant will be monitored for 2 years. Only after that it will be decided whether 
the applicant is accepted or not. Through this, we can reduce the incidence of inactive members 
and avoid unnecessary burden for other members. (Coop 1, higher performance) 
Coop leaders of higher-performing cooperatives also advocate the idea that the transformation 
from traditional to professional cooperative management is one of the key solutions for the 
declining performance in the dairy business. This required the establishment of transparency 
and accountability to create open communication between the cooperative management and 
                                                 
58 See Sub-chapter 10.2.2.3 for the relation between inactive members and additional burdens for cooperative. 
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dairy farmers as member. Also, by encouraging transparency the propensity for corruption 
can be reduced. 
We try to cultivate honesty and transparency in the cooperative management. Therefore, each 
semester we commission a public accountant to perform external financial audit. (Coop 2, 
higher performance) 
The measures to reduce inactive member and encourage transparency in the cooperative man-
agement have resulted in the enhancement of organisational and cost efficiency. Conse-
quently, more financial resources can be saved and thus are made available for other pur-
poses. This is in fact an important factor for the endeavour to upgrade the performance of the 
system, since every upgrading activity needs to be backed up by adequate resources. 
10.3.2.4 Intermediate outcome: Higher professional performance of leaders and staff 
 
Figure 10-22 Intermediate outcome: Higher professional performance of leaders and staff 
Source: own compilation 
One aspect to be reformed in the cooperative is the nepotism practices in staff recruitment, or 
in business transactions, as it has rather been a general problem in Indonesian cooperatives59.  
                                                 
59 See Sub-chapter 10.2.2.2 for the problem of nepotism in cooperative 
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The members of the board of directors, supervisors, and cooperative staff are prohibited from 
doing nepotism. (Coop 1, higher performance) 
By formally prohibiting nepotism in the operational statute, higher-performing cooperatives 
embraced a more professional human resource management which applies regular recruitment 
process based on competitive application and formal criteria like academic background, skills, 
and work experience. Moreover, one of the higher-performing cooperatives also emphasised 
that to increase the organisational dynamism and innovation the cooperative offered employ-
ment in particular for young professionals. As a result, the individuals – with better qualifica-
tions and competences – employed by the cooperative perceive their work in the cooperative 
as professional occupation with career prospect, rather than as ’mutual help among family 
members’ (cf. Sub-chapter 10.2.2.2). This, combined with the professional remuneration sys-
tem, provides stronger motivation to deliver higher professional performance. 
The vision to transform cooperative into a professional organisation was translated into, inter 
alia, establishing professional remuneration system for cooperative management, i.e. board of 
directors and staff. 
If coop leaders are required to work professionally and concentrate their efforts on developing 
the cooperative, then they should also receive professional payment. Otherwise is not possible. 
(Coop 3, higher performance) 
The remuneration system also entails a performance-based salary system. Cooperative staff 
receives a basic salary plus bonuses depending on the achieved performance. For example, the 
extension workers receive a basic salary of 400,000 IDR (in 2006) plus the bonus of incre-
mental gains in the quantity and quality (germ and TS content) of milk produced by the 
farmer groups they assist. Similar condition also applies for the board of directors. Hence, 
situated in such system coop leaders and staff have higher motivation to excel in their job, 
thereby continuously improving their professional performance. 
10.3.2.5 Intermediate outcome: Socio-culturally adjusted training and monitoring 
The training system which was intended to enable dairy farmers to meet the requirements of 
quality regulations was one of the most important pillars in the establishment of effective 
regulative system. This, however, was not without problem, since certain socio-cultural fac-
tors hampered the dissemination of GDFP, thereby resulting in low adoption rate among dairy 
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farmers (HF1)60. Facing such situation, coop leaders and staff attempted to specify the con-
straints and to find effective solutions – in fact, their commitment, eagerness, and ability to 
identify and tackle the problem was an indicator of their higher professional performance. As 
the problem was caused by socio-cultural factors, cooperative leaders perceived that socio-
cultural aspects should be seriously considered and addressed in the training and monitoring 
system. 
 
Figure 10-23 Intermediate outcome: Socio-culturally adjusted training and monitoring 
Source: own compilation 
The first adjustment for the training system is the utilisation of the prevailing social relations 
in the community in imparting information about GDFP. 
We follow a specific strategy in delivering training and extension services. We focus the train-
ing and extension first on individuals with high social status in the society, like the village 
heads, administrators of the village structure, and community leaders; including their family 
members who are involved in the dairying business. […] After their dairy practices and business 
are improved, other dairy farmers in the society will follow these good examples. (Coop 3, 
higher performance) 
                                                 
60 See Sub-chapter 10.3.1.3 for communication, culture, and social structure. 
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To solve this problem, the strategy for training and monitoring was changed from verbal rec-
ommendations to concrete pilot farming. […] We chose leaders for farmer group among poten-
tial dairy farmers and intensively gave them training and monitoring until they succeeded in de-
creasing the germ content. Consequently, they received price bonus for their improved milk 
quality. Through this method, other members of the farmer groups are interested to imitate or 
follow the dairying and milking practices demonstrated concretely by their group leaders. (Coop 
2, higher performance) 
Social leaders can be individuals with high social status in the society, but also group leaders. 
The fact that the group leaders were selected among potential dairy farmers, expected to suc-
cessfully adopt GDFP, and to be imitated by other dairy farmers bears the notion that they 
should have the capability and willingness to improve their dairy practices and that the coop-
eration with them should exhibit higher likelihood to succeed. Thus, such potential dairy 
farmers are likely those with more resources, stronger motivation, higher education level or 
entrepreneur skill, and higher social acceptability or socially renown in the community. By 
approaching and targeting first the social leaders or ‘insiders’ the cooperatives expected to 
draw the attention of dairy farmers and gives social importance to a model of good and suc-
cessful dairy farm. Also the dissemination of GDFP through social leaders (HC4) has the ad-
vantages that they have stronger social influences which can accelerate information dissemi-
nation. Additionally, the information dissemination by social or group leaders was reinforced 
by practical examples showcased on their dairy farm (HC6). The use of pilot or model farm 
employs visual and demonstrative elements in imparting new information to complement 
regular extension method using mainly verbal communication. 
As in general dairy farmers, their households, and the community where they live do not have 
the habit of consuming fresh milk, they are not aware of the potential health hazards caused 
by inappropriate handling of milk61. Milk is produced only for sale, but not for own consump-
tion. To increase the awareness of milk consumption the cooperatives introduced milk drink-
ing programme for their own staff’s household as well as for schoolchildren in cooperation 
with local schools. One cooperative launched campaign-like events in milk-producing villages 
to encourage farmer households and the wider community to consume the milk produced in 
their own region. On the one hand, such measure stimulated the feeling of pride among dairy 
farmers for being able to provide nutritious food for their own community. On the other hand, 
through this approach it was easier for the cooperative to convince dairy farmers and the 
                                                 
61 Cf. Sub-chapter 10.2.3.2 
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wider community that milk, be it fresh or processed, is designated for human consumption – 
for their own consumption –, so that low hygiene standard and inappropriate treatment like 
adding water or chemicals may cause serious harms for the consumers, i.e. adult people but 
also children and infants. This provided the basis for the cultivation of the socially acknowl-
edged role of a good dairy farmer (HC5): the community became aware that the responsibility 
of dairy farmers is not only to produce milk, but also to be accountable for its quality.  
Due to the large number of dairy farmers and the limited number of extension workers the 
cooperatives established farmer groups for training and monitoring purposes. Starting from 
larger groups covering one MCC, the groups were over time divided further into smaller 
groups to reach an ideal group size of around 8 dairy farmers. In the process of group forma-
tion, the dairy farmers had the opportunity to select their own group members.  In groups in-
formation dissemination has proven to be more effective because dairy farmers had the 
chance to discuss about the new practices and exchange practical experiences among them-
selves. As the emotional bond and mutual trust among group members is stronger; the accep-
tance toward new information is higher. For example, if one member of the group success-
fully applied one part of GDFP and achieved some improvements, then the rest of the group 
can learn this experience more easily. 
Farmers do not learn from us [experts, consultants, extension workers external to their commu-
nity], but among themselves. (Exp 1) 
The large number of dairy farmers also creates difficulties in the enforcement of quality regu-
lations because it would be too costly to monitor the milk quality and dairy practices for each 
individual dairy farmer. To support the enforcement of quality regulations, the cooperatives 
incorporate social pressure in quality monitoring by establishing group pricing (HC3) as de-
scribed in Sub-chapter 10.3.1.1.  
10.3.3 Micro variable: Dairy farmers 
10.3.3.1 Intermediate outcome: Production of higher-quality milk 
The clearly defined product and process quality regulations and their intensive socialisation 
(HC1) increases dairy farmers’ awareness of the necessity to handle milk – as a highly per-
ishable product for human consumption – with appropriate care. The technical assistance pro-
vided by the cooperatives also improves dairy farmers’ practical knowledge – which provides 
an important basis for the adoption – of GDFP. 
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Figure 10-24 Intermediate outcome: Production of higher-quality milk 
Source: own compilation 
The effectively functioning reward and punishment system in the enforcement of quality 
regulations (HC2), including the quality/price mechanism, creates a balanced incentive sys-
tem for dairy farmers. Those farmers applying GDFP are rewarded with, first, the opportunity 
to sustain their dairy business with the cooperative; and, second, the acknowledgement of a 
good track-record which is an important assessment criterion for loan services. Dairy farmers 
applying bad practices, on the other hand, are warned and can be excluded from the dairy 
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business. Similarly, the functioning quality/price mechanism consequently leads to the situa-
tion that different farmers or farmer groups receive different farm-gate milk price. This allows 
dairy farmers to observe concretely the correlation between quality and price. Given the sig-
nificant price difference between low and high quality milk, dairy farmers learn to compre-
hend that producing higher-quality milk provides a better strategy to create a more reliable 
source of income. 
For higher efficacy of rule enforcement, the regulative pillar of interaction system was 
backed-up by the normative pillar. The mechanism of group pricing (HC3)62 put an additional 
peer-pressure for individual dairy farmer because the inability to comply with the quality 
regulations brought negative consequences for the whole group. Similarly, since a social role 
of good dairy farmer was socialised in the wider community (HC5), applying inappropriate 
practices might evoke feeling of guilt or shame – provided that the social role is well internal-
ised in individuals – and face social punishment from other individuals in the community 
which ranges from least severe, e.g. being talked negatively about or shunned, to most severe, 
e.g. excluded from the dairy farmers community. 
The higher adoption rate of GDFP in higher-performing interaction system is also achieved 
through more appropriate communication method (on ‘how’ to impart the information) using 
pilot or model farms (HC6). The establishment of these farms gives dairy farmers, first, the 
opportunity to concretely observe and thus cognitively understand the best practices applied 
in real-life context and situation. Also, as the pilot farm is an integral part of the society, dairy 
farmers have access to the information on GDFP through their experiences in regular interac-
tion with the ‘model dairy farmers’. Hence, the establishment of pilot farms exploits the po-
tentials of visual and experiential learning methods and can complement the limitation of ver-
bal transmission of information. As a result, dairy farmers can learn more effectively. 
Second, the establishment of model farms also decreases the risk perceived by dairy farmers. 
As GDFP are new to dairy farmers, there are at least two kinds of subjective risk of adopting 
GDFP: whether GDFP would be applicable and attainable for their circumstances and 
whether the utilisation of more resources (time resource, efforts, equipment, etc.) required for 
                                                 
62 See Sub-chapter 10.3.1.2 and 10.3.2.5 for the formation of farmer groups for training and monitoring. 
  200
the application of GDFP would be beneficial at all and justified by the outcomes generated. In 
this respect, the model farms concretely exemplify the application of new practices under 
real-life and real-business circumstances – rather than under laboratory or ideal situation –, as 
well as the outcomes of such application, i.e. improved milk quality and farm productivity. 
Consequently, the first-hand testimony of model dairy farmers regarding the concrete costs 
and benefits of adopting GDFP can provide more accurate and comprehensive information to 
other dairy farmers, thereby lowering their subjective risk perception.  
Apart from the ‘how’, the ‘who’ in communication is of great significance. As the informa-
tion on GDFP is disseminated by ‘insiders’ (HC4), i.e. fellow dairy farmers acting as group 
leader; dairy farmers perceive it as more trustworthy and reliable. Since the group leaders 
frequently also possess higher social status and reputation in the society; dairy farmers are 
more open and exhibit higher attention as well as acceptance toward the information im-
parted. Moreover, by disseminating the information through social leaders, the successful 
application GDFP and its impacts – inter alia, higher milk income – are associated with higher 
social status. This, in turn, attracted dairy farmers to imitate the practices, because social lead-
ers and their behaviour – in this case – function as an orientation for other members of the 
community. 
To improve product and process quality adequate availability of water for cleaning is necessi-
tated. As the cooperatives collectively provide water through decentralised water reservoirs 
(HC7), dairy farmer in areas suffering water scarcity in dry periods bear no or less additional 
costs for buying water. As a result, they perceive much lower constraints to apply hygiene 
practices as prescribed by GDFP. 
The explanations above draw the causal relations between the perception of dairy farmers of 
different situations and the selected action of adopting GDFP. The adoption of GDFP means 
that the dairy farmers start and consistently perform the dairy practices as described in the 
SOPs defined by the cooperative. The widespread adoption of GDFP contributed to the pro-
duction of higher-quality milk, i.e. improved milk hygiene and milk composition. For exam-
ple, as one part of GDFP, the abandonment of adulteration practices automatically, first, re-
duces the severity of bacterial contamination as no additional bacterial contamination is 
introduced into the milk; and, second, improves the milk composition as the milk is not di-
luted with additional water. Nevertheless, the adoption of GDFP is also a matter of resource 
allocation by dairy farmers which will be discussed further in Sub-chapter 10.3.3.3. 
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10.3.3.2 Intermediate outcome: Improved animal and farm productivity 
 
Figure 10-25 Intermediate outcome: Improved animal and farm productivity 
Source: own compilation 
The adoption of GDFP did not only result in the improvement of milk quality, but also of the 
animal and thus farm productivity, because GDFP also entails improved practices in the man-
agement of feeding, reproduction, and animal health. However, it is important to emphasise 
that the adoption of the practices were encouraged by the simultaneous improvement of ser-
vices to dairy farmers provided by the cooperative63. These services included the collective 
production of higher-quality concentrate feed, provision of AI, and access to (para-) veteri-
nary service. With these services dairy farmers were able to apply higher quality feedstuff in 
the feeding ration, thereby improving the milk production of lactating cows and the body 
condition of dry cows. Similarly, the improved access to AI and veterinary service reduces 
service per conception ratio, calving interval, and animal diseases which could be detrimental 
to the milk production. Another selected action contributing to the improvement of farm pro-
ductivity is the allocation of more resources to improve dairy farm. 
                                                 
63 See Sub-chapter 10.3.2.1 for the improvement of service provision for members. 
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10.3.3.3 Selected action: Allocate more resources to improve dairy farm 
 
Figure 10-26 Selected action: Allocate more resources to improve dairy farm 
Source: own compilation 
The allocation of more resource to improve dairy farm was a necessitated action for improv-
ing milk quality as well as animal and farm productivity. For example, the improvement of 
milking management required not only correct practices but also food-grade equipment 
(stainless or aluminium milk bucket and milk can) and adequate cleaning system (enough 
water, hot water, detergent, and cleaning utensils). As milk hygiene is also determined by the 
hygiene of the environment, the animal shed should also be improved, inter alia, by changing 
the construction from a traditional design into a design more appropriate for dairy farming 
(separate manure disposal area, concrete floor with slight elevation for better draining or 
“bamboo stage”64, better ventilation and lighting, etc.). Similarly, to improve animal produc-
tivity dairy cows require higher-quality feedstuff which in turn necessitates either higher feed 
cost or labour cost e.g. in the case of silage making or wilting fresh forages before feeding it 
to the cows. Last but not least, the allocation of more resources also means that dairy farmers 
opted for accumulating the capital for the dairy farm, i.e. increasing herd size, which could be 
at the cost of other sources of income. 
The selected action was grounded in three subjective perceptions of the dairy farmers. First, 
as the quality regulations, including the quality/price mechanism, were functioning effectively 
                                                 
64 A cow stall made of bamboo material built above the ground level to allow easier cleaning with water. 
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(HC2), dairy farmers perceived an incentive to concentrate on producing higher-quality milk. 
The price incentive was presumably high enough so that dairy farmers were willing to spend 
more resources to achieve higher quality or, in other words, the marginal milk yield from in-
creased price is higher than the marginal costs required for achieving the quality. Second, 
dairy farmers perceived that dairy business offered higher profitability (also on account of 
better income flow from milk payment every 10 days) and higher reliability (milk price is 
more stable than the price for other agricultural products) than other sources of income, so 
that specialisation on dairy business provided a better livelihood strategy. This is indicated by 
the fact that, first, there are a considerable number of young individuals who decided to en-
gage in dairy farming (both those who continued their parents’ dairy farm and those who 
started new business in dairy farming); and, second, most dairy farmers in the higher-
performing interaction system rely on dairy farming as the main source of income.  
In the case of one higher-performing cooperative in East Java, specialisation on dairy farming 
was further reinforced by the situation that other types of agricultural production or livelihood 
sources were less attractive and feasible, i.e. lower opportunity cost for dairy farming. 
One of the sub-districts covered by our cooperative produces 60% of the total cooperative out-
put. In this sub-district the milk production is in steady increase because dairy farming is the 
only profitable agribusiness. The soil is not so fertile and not really good for crop farming. 
(Coop 2, higher performance) 
Nevertheless, it is also important to note that in another higher-performing cooperative the 
situation is the opposite: In the course of urbanisation the market conditions for agricultural 
products has been changing in favour of fresh fruits and vegetables, so that the opportunity 
cost for dairy farming has been increasing. As a result, milk production capacity was gradu-
ally declining because dairy farmers opted for allocating more resources for other agricultural 
production. 
Nowadays, producing fruits and vegetables is more attractive because farmers can obtain higher 
prices by selling their products directly at marketplaces. The demand for such products is also 
increasing because more people become aware of the need of fruit and vegetables for a healthy 
living. […] But as long as the competition between dairy farming and other types of agricultural 
production runs positively, I think there will be a natural selection. Those farmers performing 
better in dairy farming will continue; those not will choose another business. (Coop 3, higher 
performance) 
Third, based on the fact that social leaders were the first to adopt GDFP and thus achieved 
successful dairy farming, dairy farmers in general associated professional dairy farming man-
agement with higher social status. In this respect, the profession as dairy farmer was amelio-
rated and received social prestige, because it is exercised by social leaders – reputable indi-
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viduals in the community. As a result, dairy farmers had higher motivation to succeed in dairy 
farming and thus were willing to intensify resource allocation for it. 
10.3.4 End outcome: Higher and improving chain performance 
 
Figure 10-27 End outcome: Higher and improving chain performance 
Source: own compilation 
Figure 10-27 illustrates how the interaction of the intermediate outcomes results in the end 
condition. The ‘production of higher-quality milk’ and ‘improved animal and farm productiv-
ity’ by the dairy farmers in conjunction with the ‘improved facility and procedures at MCC’ 
explain the higher chain performance; whereas the ‘enhanced organisational and cost effi-
ciency’ and ‘higher professional performance of leaders and staff’ of the cooperatives as well 
as the selected action to ‘allocate more resources to improve dairy farm’ explains why the 
chain performance has improved over time. 
The figure above also depicts the mutual influence and interdependency between the macro 
variables of the system, cooperatives, and dairy farmers. As an example, the macro variables 
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leading to the intermediate outcome ‘production of higher-quality milk’ are briefly explained 
here: The ‘influences of socio-cultural aspects on communication’ (HS1) prevented dairy 
farmers from accepting the practices recommended through conventional extension system, 
resulting in the ‘low adoption rate of GDFP among dairy farmers’ (HF1). Facing such con-
straint, the cooperatives then utilised the ‘influences of socio-cultural aspects on communica-
tion’ (HS1) in the training and monitoring system by, inter alia, approaching ‘social leaders to 
disseminate information on GDFP’ (HC4). This approach has brought the desired effect: 
dairy farmers were willing to ‘adopt GDFP’. With increasing number of dairy farmers adopt-
ing GDFP the aggregate quality of the milk produced is improved. 
10.3.5 Overview of the variables in the higher-performing interaction system 
Figure 10-28 presents the overview of the variables in the lesser-performing interaction sys-
tem. Listed here are all macro and some important micro variables. 
10.4 Summary and concluding remarks 
10.4.1 Change of the interaction system 
The overview of the variables of both the lesser and higher-performing interaction system (see 
Figure 10-16 and Figure 10-28) shows that the cooperatives exert more influences on the 
dairy farmer than the opposite, because the cooperatives determine the institutional frame-
work in which the dairy farmers operate. While the low and stagnating performance of the 
dairy farmers is indirectly caused by a combination of the objective situations inherent in the 
dairy farmers’ own system and those resulting from the action of the cooperatives; the higher 
and improving performance of the dairy farmers results solely from the objective situations 
created by the cooperatives. It is the cooperatives that created and enforced the regulations 
with functioning incentive system, established socio-culturally adjusted training and monitor-
ing system, and provided necessary collective services. Thus, it can be said the cooperatives 
are the change agent in the interaction system. 
The progressive changes implemented by the cooperatives are ultimately driven by their com-
mitted leaders. Their strong convictions of ‘cooperative as change agent or pioneer’, ‘coop-
eratives as professional organisation’, and ‘dairy business as core business’ are the main driv-
ing power. Interestingly, these perceptions are not grounded in any objective situation of the 
interaction system – no contextual effect. These are not the typical definition of situation by 
individuals, because otherwise the leaders of lesser-performing cooperatives would also have 
the same perceptions as they were situated in, more or less, similar initial condition. Hence, 
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such perceptions can be attributed to the inherent qualities of committed leaders. This conclu-
sion highlights the significant role of committed leaders in development processes. 
 
Figure 10-28 Overview of the variables in the higher-performing interaction system 
Source: own compilation 
Of particular importance is also the effective transformation of strong commitments into sus-
tainable improvements in the interaction system. The committed leaders have the ability to 
change the system because they have the power and authority as leader to do it. However, 
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they do not haphazardly take improvement measures to change the collective phenomena; but 
rather, they identify the roots of the problems – which are not only regulative, but also norma-
tive and cultural-cognitive in nature – and address these in appropriate manner. Even the cul-
tural-cognitive constraints in communication were turned into an effective approach in dis-
seminating GDFP and encouraging dairy farmers to adopt it. Apart from this, the committed 
leaders aimed at the reform of the institutional framework. Their actions were directed toward 
institutionalising the improvement measures by altering the existing structure of the interac-
tion system. Instead of conducting sporadic training activities the committed leaders estab-
lished permanent functions of extension service and group monitoring as well as an incentive 
system to induce behavioural change among dairy farmers. Similarly, to break the habitual-
ised practice of adulterating milk with water the committed leaders did not only conduct strict 
policing activities, but also established a reward and punishment system making opportunistic 
behaviour a sub-optimal option for the dairy farmers. In such manner, the improvements are 
continuous, as they are incorporated in the structure of the system, and capable of reaching 
more dairy farmers. 
10.4.2 Institutional aspects 
Table 10-3 Overview of the institutional aspect in influencing the interaction systems 
Aspect Lesser-performing interaction system Higher-performing interaction system 
Regulative Weak quality regulation, absent incentive sys-
tem, ambiguous organisational format of VUC, 
low professional performance, inadequate ser-
vice provision 
Well-defined and enforced quality regulations, 
functioning incentive system, specialised dairy 
cooperative, higher professional performance, 
improved service provision 
Normative Social norm of pakewuh, principle of ‘familial-
ness’ in cooperative management 
Group learning, monitoring, and pricing; social 
role of a good dairy farmer 
Cultural-
cognitive 
Dairy farmer as non-traditional profession, no 
habit of drinking milk, subsistence orientation, 
dairy farming as sideline job, acceptance of 
opportunistic behaviour 
Problem of cultural and social relation in com-
munication, information dissemination via so-
cial leaders, visual and practical learning, social 
imitation, increasing consumption of own-
produced milk, increasing specialisation on 
dairy farming 
Source: own compilation 
The cases clearly demonstrated that the regulative aspect of institution is an important deter-
minant factor for the performance of the interaction system. The clear definition and conse-
quent enforcement of the quality regulations as well as the enabling of dairy farmer and coop-
erative staff to comply with the regulations are basic necessity for improving the system. The 
regulative aspect does not, however, stand alone; it is strongly correlated with the normative 
aspect. A positive correlation is the case where the rule enforcement is reinforced by the nor-
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mative aspect through group learning, monitoring, and pricing. A negative correlation is the 
case where the enforcement of quality/price mechanism is hampered by the social norm of 
pakewuh. The degree of internalisation of normative values and norms differs in every com-
munity. Albeit prevalent in most Indonesian – and even Asian – communities, the social norm 
pakewuh is strongly internalised in the lesser-performing interaction system. This uninten-
tionally created an additional constraint in rule enforcement, thereby heightening the com-
plexity in curbing opportunistic behaviour.  
The difference in the organisational format of lesser and higher-performing cooperatives 
proved to be substantial, as it reflects the orientation of the cooperative management. Organ-
isational factors inhibiting the development of dairy business are: Dairy business as non-core 
business, maximisation of surplus, principle of ‘familialness’ in cooperative management, 
cooperative as dependent social organisation. Organisational factors supporting the develop-
ment of dairy business are: Dairy business as the core business, cost reduction through opti-
mal provision of collective services, cooperative as professional management and change 
agent. 
The rejection of GDFP through the continuation of adulteration practices by dairy farmers 
was not solely caused by the absence of proper incentive system and acceptance of opportun-
istic behaviour; cultural-cognitive factors also came into play: Orientation toward traditional 
common practices as dairy farming is not a traditional profession, no habit of consuming 
own-produced milk, dairy farming as sideline job, and subsistence orientation. Similarly, the 
adoption of GDFP by dairy farmers was not purely on account of the incentive system, but it 
was also reinforced by socio-cultural aspects: Pressures exerted by peer dairy farmers and the 
wider community due to the acknowledged role of good dairy farmers, visual and practical 
learning method embedded in the real-life and real-business context, and information dis-
semination by social leaders which also encourages social imitation. Of particular importance, 
both cases were demarcated by the absence/existence of collective services provided by the 
cooperatives. 
There is a strong indication that specialisation is an inevitable development path toward 
higher performance for both dairy farmers and cooperatives. By concentrating resources – e.g. 
efforts, time, money, and attention – on one focus – i.e. the dairy business – the likelihood of 
achieving successful improvements is much higher. By specialising on the dairy business 
dairy farmers and cooperatives are subjected to additional pressures to succeed, because the 
dairy business is the main – if it is not the only – means of sustaining and improving their 
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livelihood. Hence, specialisation also entails certain, not to be neglected, risks. The situation 
of monopsony and possible cartel agreements by DPIs increases the risk that DPIs misuse 
their greater market power to impose one-sided changes of more demanding technical re-
quirements or contractual agreements. Other risks include the unfavourable price condition 
due to low bargaining power (price-taker) against DPIs, price instability of concentrate feed, 
and adverse climatic conditions of extended dry periods. 
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11 Reflection and Conclusion 
Closing this study, Chapter 11 provides a reflection on the research results particularly con-
cerning the issues of institutional aspects and the link between value chain governance and 
upgrading. The second sub-chapter discusses briefly the consequence of the research results 
on the model of individual behaviour and poses several suggestions for follow-up studies. 
This sub-chapter also reports the lessons learnt drawn from the application of the research 
framework in empirical study. The last sub-chapter presents the relation between this study 
and the topic of development cooperation, highlighting the role of collective action and local 
leader. Finally, a suggestion is made to extend the conceptual framework of value chain 
analysis by incorporating wider socio-cultural aspects. 
11.1 Reflection of research results 
11.1.1 Regulative aspect of the interaction system 
The regulative aspect of an institution proved to be significant in the interaction system of 
both DPIs-cooperatives and cooperatives-dairy farmers. It was the quality of the regulative 
aspect that, among others, determined the performance of the interaction system. While au-
thors like North (1990/2005) gave primacy of the issues of rule-setting, monitoring, and sanc-
tioning activities to the regulative aspect, the research results called for stronger attention to-
ward the issue of enabling participants of the institution to comply with the rule. The cases 
demonstrated that without any assistance the participants of the interaction system, in particu-
lar the cooperatives and dairy farmers, could not improve their own capability to bridge the 
wide gap between the ideal requirements as defined by the rule and the actual capacity in pos-
session. 
The collective economic activities of dairy farming was regulated, managed, coordinated, and 
supported through the cooperative as organisation – an embodiment of a set of rules in the 
interaction system. Despite its central role and strategic functions for the collective actions 
many dairy cooperatives, in particular those with VUC organisational format, had fundamen-
tal deficiencies of contradictory principles in itself. This resulted in the low and stagnating 
performance of both the organisation and the members. Such erroneous concept of coopera-
tive is, however, not only restricted to Indonesia but also pervasive in many other developing 
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countries that introduce and adopt cooperative system in their economy. Drawing on empiri-
cal experiences as international expert on cooperative development Tchami (2007) concluded:  
This concept is not always understood by members and directors of cooperatives who often 
think that the role of a cooperative is to create surpluses; whereas, as mentioned previously, its 
role is something quite different: to respond as effectively as possible to the needs of its mem-
bers. More particularly, for a consumer cooperative: to sell its products at the lowest possible 
price and/or in the best conditions for the shopper; for a credit union: to allow its members to 
save their money at the highest possible interest rate and likewise to allow them to take out 
credit union loans at the lowest possible rate of interest. (Tchami 2007, p. 20) 
The author also noted that, the contradictory organisation format of the cooperatives was 
caused by inappropriate government interventions in using the cooperatives as political in-
strument – similar to the case in Indonesia.  
After independence in the colonized countries, the governments of the newly independent States 
accorded an essential role to cooperatives especially in the development of rural areas. Never-
theless, in most of these countries cooperatives remained a State-owned tool with which to con-
trol the masses. (Tchami 2007, p. 10) 
The reform and advancement of cooperatives’ professional performance, and thus also the 
members’, was primarily driven by the committed leaders behind them – which were rather 
the exceptional cases. The significance of influential character as leader in accelerating coop-
erative development was also pointed out by Baga (2004). He attributed the positive turning 
point of Indonesian dairy production in the late 1970s to a particular cooperative leader. The 
coop leader seized the momentum to proactively approach, lobby, and encourage the newly 
established Department of Cooperative to play more active role in developing the national 
dairy business by, inter alia, supporting the formation of UIDC, enacting support policies such 
as Busep, and subsidising dairy cattle import programs. As a result, the domestic milk produc-
tion increased continuously during the 1980s until the early 1990s. The decline of domestic 
milk production commencing in mid 1990s was caused, as Baga (2004, p. 279) argued, by the 
diminishing involvement of this particular coop leader in the macro institutional processes 
and the absence of a successor with comparable professional commitment. Hence, Baga 
(2004) concluded1 that high-quality cooperative entrepreneur – who accelerated change proc-
                                                 
1 Cf. Tchami (2007, pp. 51–54) 
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esses in micro (primary cooperative), meso (secondary cooperative), and macro level (na-
tional policy) – was the critical success factor for cooperative development. 
11.1.2 Normative and cultural-cognitive aspects of the interaction system 
In addition to the regulative, the social and cultural-cognitive aspects showed differing impor-
tance in the interaction system DPIs-cooperatives and cooperatives-dairy farmers. In the for-
mer, shared social values and norms or certain habit and orientation toward common practices 
were not identified as an influential factor, because both VC operators were not situated in the 
same community and their relation was limited primarily to business relation. However, the 
issue of trust and trustworthiness was extremely influential for DPIs in deciding whether to 
invest TA and FA to their suppliers – a requisite condition for VC upgrading. From empirical 
case studies Morris (2001) concluded that trust among VC operators is by no means an ubiq-
uitous good, yet is a basic condition for any cooperative measure: 
However, overcoming longstanding barriers to trust and translating this into actual cooperation 
with mutual benefits proved more complex. […] even the offer of financial incentives is not 
enough to widely encourage firms to cooperate. In our experience, in low trust environments it 
is extremely difficult to encourage cooperation through the medium of policy-support mecha-
nisms [...] (Morris 2001, p. 129) 
Against the background of prevalent opportunistic behaviour and weak law enforcement the 
cooperation with trustworthy business partners reduced significantly the subjective risk per-
ception. Similar proposition was posited by Granovetter (2001) who in his theory of em-
beddedness viewed that concrete interpersonal relation is necessitated to generate trust and 
discourage malfeasance. 
The widespread preference for transacting with individuals of known reputation implies that few 
are actually content to rely on either generalized morality or institutional arrangements2 to guard 
against trouble. (Granovetter 2001, p. 57) 
Basically the proposition that intimate interpersonal relation can prevent opportunism is 
closely related with the social norm pakewuh which also treasures the quality of interpersonal 
relation. Nevertheless, the empirical case showed that in the area where the social norm 
                                                 
2 In this context the author referred to ‘institutional arrangements’ as a set of rules, i.e. institution in the narrower 
sense. 
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played important role in guiding individual behaviour opportunism was prevalent. Thus, it 
raised the question: Why was opportunism pervasive among individuals who highly value 
their relationship with others and are willing to avoid conflict potentials at any cost? The an-
swer lay in the fact that opportunism does not necessarily bring negative impact to personal 
relations. As long as the opportunistic action creates impersonal effects, namely not directly 
affecting the relationship of persons knowing each other, it does not stand in conflict with the 
social norm. For example, when dairy farmers adulterated milk with water or did not pay off 
their loan, they did not create direct negative impact to certain persons they know in the coop-
erative, but rather to the cooperative as organisation. Similarly, when cooperative staff and 
leaders applied higher deduction than allowed from the loans to be distributed to the dairy 
farmers, they did this in the name of the cooperative and not personally. In this respect, mal-
feasant actions did not stand in conflict with the social norm, but the correction of malfea-
sance and the enforcement of regulations did. 
Contrary to their limited influences in the interaction system between DPIs and cooperatives, 
the normative and cultural-cognitive elements wielded enormous influences in the interaction 
system between cooperatives and dairy farmers. This was confirmed by the results of another 
empirical study. Inquiring into the decision making processes of semi-commercial farmers, 
Sambodo (2009) conducted a case study of technology adoption of ‘pandu’, i.e. improved 
paddy-prawn system, by comparing two villages in Lamongan, East Java, Indonesia. His em-
pirical research results bore a striking resemblance with those in this research. 
The results highlighted that farmers use rational strategies, and that socio-cultural factors influ-
ence decision making. (Sambodo 2009, p. 2) 
The farmers behaved rationally in the sense that they had a particular goal and took into con-
sideration different factors according to their respective circumstances to come to a decision 
whether to adopt or to ignore or discontinue pandu. Regarding the subjective risk perception 
the farmers viewed the adoption of the new technology as a risky undertaking because they 
had lack of resources, limited knowledge, and restricted access to information. Also, the situa-
tions where some farmers had unsuccessful experiences in adoption resulted in heightened 
risk perception by other fellow farmers. Hence, they preferred retaining their familiar com-
modities and practices which provide low yet stable and reliable income to embracing the new 
technology which provides higher yet less reliable income. This situation corresponded to the 
situation of the dairy farmers in the lesser-performing interaction system where the constraints 
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in know-how and resources as well as the heightened subjective risk perception of intensifica-
tion caused the dairy farmers to opt for preserving the existing practices which were oriented 
to the common practices in the society.  
The author concluded that despite varying decision considerations the decision making model 
of the observed farmers could be classified into ‘intuitive’ farmers, i.e. farmers who analysed 
their options and planned their next actions based on the experiences of their past perform-
ance and the qualitative measures elicited from passive observation on others’ practices; this 
stood in contrast to ‘analytical’ farmers who relied more on quantitative business calculation. 
This distinction is equivalent to the dichotomy of ‘pattern-recognising or connectionist’ vs. 
‘abstract reasoning or computational’ model; the former has proven to be more predominant 
among the farmers. 
The social-cultural factors influencing the decision making ranged from household or family 
concerns to interpersonal relations with the ‘significant others’ in the society. The farmers had 
to weigh up the option of adopting new technology against the own household concerns, as it 
both affected resource allocation in the family and required the support of family labour – an 
obvious indicator for subsistence orientation in the traditional economy. The information dis-
semination, adoption intention, and learning process were strongly influenced by the interac-
tion with the ‘significant others’, namely peers and particularly the leader of farmer groups; 
social and religious leaders exerted much weaker influence in the process. As the adoption 
also necessitated a consensus, particularly in water and pesticide use, with neighbouring farm-
ers who happened to different objectives and choice of commodities, the farmers preferred to 
give up pandu than having an argument with their neighbours, thereby losing the opportunity 
to improve their own livelihood. Such behaviour resembled that of lesser-performing coopera-
tive leaders who gave up the enforcement of quality regulations and quality/price mechanism 
to avoid interpersonal conflicts at the cost of abandoning the potential to improve the per-
formance of the interaction system and cooperative members. Sambodo (2009, p. 252) also 
noted that despite their immediate proximity the observed neighbouring villages showed dis-
tinct socio-cultural influences on the farmers which, in turn, resulted in different responses 
toward the new technology. 
Another empirical study conducted by Sulandjari (2008) investigated the economic behaviour 
of small industries producing wood furniture, garment, and metal utensils in Central Java. The 
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observed small industries which were categorised as semi-commercial enterprises exhibited a 
distinct behaviour in selecting and establishing linkages with business partners. Guided by the 
locally prevailing Javanese normative values in business ethic, the enterprises favoured cer-
tain business partners because (Sulandjari 2008, p. 248): 
i. the partner is my neighbour (“mergo tonggo”), 
ii. the partner is my friend (“mergo konco”),  
iii. I have longstanding relation with the partner (“mergo kulino”), 
iv. I have good feeling of trust and satisfaction toward the partner (“mergo roso – mantep lan 
marem”), and 
v. the partner offers good price (“mergo rego”). 
Note here that the consideration of price – which is influential in determining the profitability 
of their business – was only one among many considerations. The behaviour of profit maxi-
misation was not confirmed here; rather, the enterprises followed the principle “tuna sathak 
bathi sanak” which means that it does not matter to suffer small losses in exchange for gain-
ing new friends, brothers, and sisters. It became apparent that business relations were inextri-
cably intertwined with kinship and familial relations. This result also confirmed the higher 
valuation of family and social concerns in business decision-making among subsistence or 
semi-commercial oriented economic actors. 
In sum, the cases demonstrated that economic actions could not be separated, yet could be 
distinguished, from other aspects of human’s life. Socio-cultural factors played as the reasons 
for economic actions and also as the ends or goals of economic actions. Thus it confirmed 
Weber’s these that economic phenomena should be analysed in conjunction with the non-
economic phenomena influencing the economic phenomena (‘economically relevant phenom-
ena’) and non-economic phenomena influenced by the economic phenomena (‘economically 
conditioned phenomena’)3 
11.1.3 Value chain governance and upgrading 
                                                 
3 See Sub-chapter 3.3.1. 
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The application of the omnibus conception of institution advanced by Scott (2008) to extend 
the existing, yet limited, concept of VC governance has brought fruitful results. It provided 
more comprehensive understanding and realistic picture about the interactions and interde-
pendencies of VC operators. Central issues in VC governance were illuminated in more 
elaborate detail. The investigation into the institutional pillars of the interaction system re-
vealed that communication, transmission of information, and learning process were strongly 
influenced by normative and cultural-cognitive elements, and not only by regulative arrange-
ments. Regarding the issue of power relation along the chain, it became apparent that despite 
possessing the largest market power DPIs as ‘lead firms’ could not easily “lead” – in terms of 
coordinating, setting and enforcing regulations, and driving upgrading – the VC operators 
backward the value chain; the role and function of cooperatives – in particular their commit-
ted leaders – in governing of the value chain was indispensable. 
The reform in the cooperative organisation – the process upgrading within cooperatives – 
yielded significant improvement in infrastructure and equipment for collective dairy produc-
tion, cost efficiency, and organisational performance. All these resulted in, first, the process 
upgrading between cooperatives and dairy farmers, i.e. the effective implementation of qual-
ity regulations and socio-culturally adjusted training and monitoring system; and, second, the 
functional upgrading of improved collective services for the dairy farmers. The functioning 
incentive and support system for dairy farmers prompted them to adopt improved dairy prac-
tices and invest more in their dairy business – the process upgrading within dairy farmers –, 
thereby increasing the overall quality of the fresh milk which provided fundamental basis to 
improve the competitiveness of the whole VC – the product upgrading. 
As for the VC upgrading, particularly in the interaction system between cooperatives and 
dairy farmers, the incorporation of socio-cultural factors into the upgrading strategy was nec-
essary. Had the established incentive system, strict monitoring, consequent enforcement, and 
extension service been completely sufficient to address the constraints and improve the exist-
ing conditions; the higher-performing cooperatives would not have resorted to upgrading 
strategies that premised on thorough considerations of the prevailing socio-cultural factors. 
Therefore, similar approach of VC upgrading should be employed in semi-commercial and 
traditional systems. 
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The differing importance of diverse institutional elements in the interaction systems DPIs-
cooperatives and cooperatives-dairy farmers suggested that each interaction system had dis-
tinct governance type. While the interaction system between DPIs and cooperatives could be 
characterised as a commercial system with particular emphasis on the issue of trust, the inter-
action system between cooperatives and dairy farmers resembled more closely a semi-
commercial system or traditional economy with influential socio-cultural factors. Hence, the 
widespread conception that there is a single governance type for the whole value chain should 
be abandoned. 
11.2 Reflection on research framework 
The research framework of this study employed the broader conception of institutional theory 
and the weak version of methodological individualism to explicate the causal relations be-
tween VC governance and upgrading (macro variables) with resort to the subjective percep-
tion and action of VC operators (micro variables). It accentuated the importance of not only 
identifying the association or relationship between social phenomena, say, of I (initial condi-
tion) and E (end condition), but also plausibly explaining in more detail why I has resulted in 
E, namely through which systematic processes or mechanism I influenced individuals who, in 
turn, select a particular action leading to E.  
This approach resembles the social theory advanced by Hedström (1998) termed ‘social 
mechanism’. It emerged against the background that many social “theories” are void of plau-
sible explanatory power since they are either limited to describing unique social phenomena 
or to associating macro social variables through statistical correlation or probability law with-
out further elaboration on the mechanism linking explanantia and explanandum, as it is in the 
case of black-box explanations in the sociological research on class and its individual corre-
lates: 
A statistical association between “class” and income, or “class” and health, tells us that indi-
viduals from certain “classes” have lower incomes or worse health than others, but it says noth-
ing about why this is the case. (Hedström 1998, p. 11) 
Thus, the proponents of social mechanism posited that sociological theory should take a mid-
dle ground between general social laws claiming universal validity (nomothetic) and idio-
graphic description – middle range theory using general types of social mechanisms. As the 
core idea of social mechanism was built on Coleman (1990)’s Macro-Micro approach which 
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was further extended by Esser (1999), the typology of social mechanisms suggested were 
equivalent to Esser’s terminology: The situational, action-formation, and transformational 
mechanisms in comparison to logic of situation, selection, and aggregation. Social mechanism 
also underlined that individuals should be treated as causal agent and not social macro vari-
ables. 
11.2.1 Model of individual behaviour 
The empirical research results showed that the behaviour of individuals in different interac-
tion system exhibited different characteristics. In the interaction system between DPIs and 
cooperatives which was more commercial oriented; expedient, self-interested and profit-
maximising pattern was more manifest. This was reflected from their subjective perceptions. 
However, a fully-informed individual model was disproved here. DPIs had restricted access to 
information about the reputation of cooperative leaders and thus had to deal with uncertainties 
of malfeasance behaviour. Cooperatives faced limited knowledge and information about mar-
ket, technology, and so forth. On the contrary, in the interaction system between cooperatives 
and dairy farmers which was more semi-commercial and subsistence oriented, such behaviour 
was not the predominant pattern. But rather, individual behaviour followed a mixture of dif-
ferent patterns. Individual action, using Weber (1922/2005, p. 57)’s terminology, was: 
i. instrumental (zweckrational): attempting to achieve a certain goal by considering differ-
ent kind of, not only economic, factors with limited resource in possession; 
ii. oriented toward normative system (wertrational):  guided by prevailing normative 
norms, values, and roles in the society; and 
iii. following habit or common practices (traditional): oriented toward recurrent practices 
or past actions of individuals. 
Satisficing behaviour was also observed among lesser-performing cooperative leaders and 
dairy farmers. The cooperative leaders perceived that the efforts and resources to improve the 
existing, low-performing dairy business were too demanding and exceeded the expected bene-
fits. Hence, they preferred to retain the existing level. Similarly, the dairy farmers perceived 
the existing condition of their dairy farm was sufficient for them and did not strive for better-
ment. According to Esser (2002, pp. 309-313, 326-327), satisficing behaviour was a result of, 
first, the bounded rationality in a complex situation resulting in the inability to discern better 
alternatives; and, second, the high cost of decision making including finding appropriate in-
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formation, efforts, attention, and consideration of alternatives. However, the empirical study 
showed that such behaviour could also be influenced by cultural values. In the traditional 
economy the fundamental preference in economic pursuits was not to continuously improve 
the business and achieve higher economic status, but to generate ‘sufficient’, ‘enough’, and 
‘decent’ livelihood for the household. 
An atomistic view of individual behaviour should be abandoned, because in any observed 
case VC operators always took into consideration the action, perception, need of and relation 
with other individuals. Also, an oversocialised view of individual behaviour was not con-
firmed. Despite the fact that the influences exerted by the system and other individuals were 
enormous, individuals were not dictated by these influences and able to think and act “outside 
the box”. This was evident particularly in the case of the committed cooperative leaders 
whose perception and action differed from and thus not a typical of the majority. Hence, the 
results confirmed Granovetter (2001, p. 57)’s criticism about the atomisation and oversociali-
sation of individuals. 
Both egoistic and altruistic behaviour was observed in the empirical cases. The first was re-
lated with the pursuit of self-interests through malfeasant action irrespective of the negative 
impacts upon other individuals, such as in the case of corruption in the support programs for 
dairy farmers. The latter concerned the case of committed cooperative leaders whose resolu-
tion was to bring advantages and betterment to the dairy farmers – at least through improving 
cooperative management – although such action would bring disadvantage to the cooperative 
leaders themselves, e.g. by rejecting the opportunity of misusing their position without being 
punished to obtain benefits for themselves. 
The discussions above signified that individuals follow RREEMM-Model, i.e. Resourceful, 
Restricted, Evaluating, Expecting, Maximising Man. Following Esser (2002, pp. 231–250), 
individuals have reasons for their action, consider and reflect on the alternative actions, and 
can find solutions to their situation through their creativity (resourceful). But they and their 
actions are also constrained by the own cognitive ability, limited information, and other envi-
ronmental or social constraints (restricted). Individuals select one among many alternatives 
based on their judgement about the value of each alternative (evaluation) and their subjective 
perception whether the value will accrue if they choose the action (expectation). As individu-
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als have different preferences, utilities, or goals; by their action they attempt to attain these 
goals by deciding on the alternative with the most optimum value (maximising). 
11.2.2 Way forward: Further studies 
Being exploratory in nature, the research has identified diverse institutional factors influenc-
ing the action of individuals in an interaction system and used these economic, social, and 
cultural factors to explain the social phenomena in question. There are, however, some inter-
esting issues which require follow-up in further studies: 
 Against author’s own prediction, religious values were not identified as an influential fac-
tor on individual behaviour, as they were not mentioned during the empirical study. Per-
haps, religious values were perceived as a highly personal matter and thus not expressed 
during the empirical observations. But it could also be the case that religious values had 
indeed little influence on individual behaviour. Thus, it is interesting to further observe 
and identify, for example, how objective, socially acknowledged religious values relate to 
opportunistic behaviour or how internalised religious values confront malfeasant behav-
iour. 
 The pivotal point of the development of rural economy was characterised by the shift from 
traditional to more (semi-)commercial oriented individual behaviour. The change toward 
more (semi-)commercial system required individuals to specialise on particular economic 
activity and to comply with more demanding market and technical requirements. How-
ever, a comparison with further or other case studies should be drawn to verify whether 
specialisation provides a better alternative for advancing rural economy and whether the 
abandonment of subsistence orientation (multiple sources of livelihood for risk minimisa-
tion) does not pose risk for rural population. 
On top of this, the research did not cover the issue of ordering the strength of influence ex-
erted by the identified factors. For example, which institutional factor wielded the strongest 
influence on the dairy farmers’ action of adulterating milk with water? Was it the weak mate-
rial incentive of lower milk price, the general acceptance of opportunistic behaviour, the ab-
sence of the habit of consuming own-produced milk, or other factors? On the contrary, which 
institutional factor influenced the adoption of GDFP? Was it the stronger material incentive of 
higher milk price, the information dissemination by social leaders, the group pressure, or 
other factors? Moreover, the comparative analysis of the ordered strength of influences be-
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tween the rejection – i.e. the adulteration of milk with water – and adoption of GDFP may 
shed light on the details of transformation processes from rejecting to adopting behaviour. 
The same approach can be applied to other selected actions. Through such extension, the un-
derstanding of individuals’ perception and decision making in a dynamic context of changing 
institutional environment can be improved substantially. It also reveals the key factors deter-
mining the process of decision making, thereby providing information for the facilitation and 
management of change processes. 
The modelling of the selection between the rejection and adoption behaviour can be ap-
proached with Esser (2002)’s model of rational choice theory. The model assumes that indi-
viduals maximise their expected utilities by optimising the attainment of several goals or pref-
erences through selecting a certain action. This requires the identification of at least three 
variables: First, the alternative actions to be considered; second, the subjective value of goal 
attainment attached by the individuals to each alternative action; and, third, the subjective 
expectation that the value will be realised if they choose the action. However, the quantifica-
tion of such variables poses a daunting task since the values to be compared are of different 
nature, e.g. income, risk, conformity with social norms and values, or observance of habit. 
A possibility of ordering the strength of influences is offered by theory of planned behaviour 
advanced by Ajzen (2005). Based on a previously conducted formative study TPB employs a 
quantitative questionnaire to measure individuals’ subjective valuation of factors influencing 
their behaviour which are categorised into the so-called behavioural, normative, and control 
belief. These subjective beliefs or perception are measured mostly based on an ordinal scale 
and analysed using, among others, multiple regressions. 
11.2.3 Lessons learnt in applying the research framework 
The application of methodological individualism as the analytical framework of the research 
was able to produce convincing causal links between the objective conditions of the interac-
tion systems – the VC governance – and their performance or outcome – the VC upgrading. It 
provided a thorough understanding why VC operators opted for certain action although they 
had other options which were more profitable or beneficial when viewed from an outsider’s 
perspective: For example, why cooperative leaders did not attempt to establish intensive co-
operation with DPIs although they recognised the strategic benefits of assistances provided by 
DPIs; or, why dairy farmers did not the exploit the opportunity to obtain higher milk income 
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through intensifying the feeding management. The Macro-Micro Model revealed the subjec-
tive perception, preferences, and orientations of the VC operators in relation to the action they 
selected. 
However, the investigation into the subjective definition of the situation by VC operators was 
one of the most challenging issues in employing the analytical framework. While the objec-
tive situation of the interaction system and the action of individuals were more visible, con-
crete, evident, and thus relatively easier to observe; the perception of individuals were more 
hidden, abstract, concealed and thus more difficult to identify. The subjective perception of 
individuals was accessed in two ways: First, directly through the statements made by indi-
viduals; and, second, indirectly through inferring from the objective situations and the actions 
taken by individuals – an interpretative approach. The latter was much more demanding and 
required intensive analysis, contemplation, and confirmation as the subjective perceptions had 
to be able to present a logical bridge between the objective situation and selected action. 
The inquiry into individual perception was further complicated by the limitation of data col-
lection methods. Focus group discussion (FGD) and group observation was an appropriate 
and resource-efficient method to collect information on collective level. Nevertheless, when 
interview questions went into more sensitive aspects such as personal considerations in opting 
for certain action, socially desired behaviour, or information that could create negative im-
pression; respondents gave superficial and sometimes dishonest responses. For example, 
when dairy farmers were asked, in the presence of cooperative staff, about what they needed 
to improve their farm, they tended to give positive answers, e.g. that their performance had 
been increasing lately or that the cooperative had provided them with adequate supports. 
Similarly, in formal meetings cooperative leaders were not willing to disclose information 
about the actual constraints and problems faced by the cooperative, because it could hurt their 
image as cooperative leader. They preferred to give the so-called “normative answers”, i.e. 
answers about how situations should be improved or what action should be taken.  
Only after a certain degree of trust was established and the confidentiality of the information 
was guaranteed, interviewees were willing to disclose more sensitive information. Moreover, 
informal and casual interview setting could produce more reliable information than formal 
and tightly structured one. In the lesser-performing interaction system some of the interviews 
with the dairy farmers were conducted in the local language Javanese. Astonishingly, the 
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dairy farmers could unrestrainedly express their situations, arguments, opinions, worries, and 
expectations, thereby providing more resourceful, and sometimes different, information. This 
indicated that first, language could be a limiting factor in expressing information; and, second, 
the usage of local language created a better emotional bond and thus trust to the interviewees. 
Data about regulative aspect was easier to collect because some of them were explicitly for-
mulated or written down. Information on normative aspect was also quite easy to access since 
they were explicitly or frequently mentioned during interviews and observations. The infor-
mation about cultural-cognitive aspect was, however, the most difficult to acquire because it 
was perceived as something natural, taken for granted and not consciously thought of. Also, 
the borderline between the subjective perception and objectified meanings, orientation, and 
habit was not so clear. In this context, the knowledge of external experts provided resourceful 
information. 
11.3 Relevance und recommendation for development cooperation 
In the field of development cooperation VC approach has been widely applied by diverse de-
velopment agencies to spurt the economic growth in developing countries. Apart from pro-
moting economic growth the chief end of its application is to contribute to poverty alleviation 
as emanated in the Millennium Development Goals. In supporting pro-poor economic growth 
VC promotion cannot thus be disentangled from the rural areas, because three quarter of the 
world’s poor dwells in rural areas as farmers and landless labourer (World Bank 2007). How-
ever, as concluded by Altenburg (2006b), hitherto academic researches on VC governance 
have not yet been helpful for policy-makers in formulating pro-poor VC promotion strategy, 
because clear causal relationships between VC governance and upgrading was not yet identi-
fied and supported by empirical evidences. In particular there is a lack of clarification of the 
risks and opportunities as well as the optimal integration of poor people in developing coun-
tries without sacrificing long-term competitiveness of the value chain. 
Against these backgrounds this empirical case study contributed further understandings of: 
 The integration of poor rural producers, including their cooperatives which coordinated 
and organised the collective actions of rural producers, into the national and international 
VC. 
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 The governance structure – from an institutional perspective – of the interaction systems 
between the VC operators, including the objective factors both inhibiting and supporting 
further development of rural producers and cooperatives in the VC. 
 The subjective perception, preference, and orientation of rural producers and cooperatives 
toward the opportunities and risks of upgrading their activities which resulted in their de-
cision whether to engage in or to reject upgrading activities. 
  The strategies – which incorporated socio-cultural factors – implemented to upgrade rural 
producers and cooperatives and their impacts on the performance. 
Strategies to promote economic growth for poor people should carefully take into considera-
tion the institutional aspects of the system in which poor people and their economic activities 
are embedded. First, the examination of the institutional framework and its influences on the 
behaviour of poor people in it provides correct and profound understanding why the poverty 
situation has come about in the first place. Second, based on the understanding, more careful 
and precise predictions can be made about how the individual behaviour would change if par-
ticular part of the system is altered and how the behavioural changes could lead to an im-
proved situation for the poor. This allows the formulation of an effective intervention strategy 
while minimising the negative, sometimes unpredicted, impacts of the intervention. Third, by 
both addressing and utilising institutional aspects in the intervention strategy, the likelihood 
that the progressive changes are sustainable is higher than by conducting sporadic interven-
tion activities. This implies the necessity to follow a systemic approach. 
11.3.1 Collective action: Integration of smallholders into the value chain 
This study also provided an example how poor and smallholder producers can be integrated 
into the value chain and be upgraded to higher performance, namely through organised collec-
tive action. Organised collective action – in this case in the form of cooperative, but can also 
be in other forms like formal producer association or informal producer group – bundles up 
the economic activity of smallholders to reach a considerable economic importance4, making 
it more attractive for larger companies. Although, there are different alternatives of integrat-
                                                 
4 Cf. Morris (2001) 
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ing smallholders into the value chain, e.g. through sub-contracting, outgrower schemes, con-
tract farming, or intermediary traders acting between smallholders and larger companies; or-
ganised collective action is more beneficial for smallholders. First, it can capture the value-
added of economic activities5 performed by other VC operators, for example the activities of 
collecting, storing, and transportation by intermediary traders. Second, it can increase the bar-
gaining position of smallholders against the buyer of their product and also the seller of input 
materials. Third, it can provide services required by smallholders collectively, thereby reduc-
ing the cost of service provision. Fourth, it can create higher degree of organisation, coordina-
tion, and flexibility among smallholders, enabling them to better cope with changing (market) 
situations. 
The establishment and management of collective action, however, is not a simple, but rather 
daunting task. In low-trust environment the collaboration among smallholders is unlikely and 
difficult to initiate. Smallholders are usually reluctant to allocate their limited resource to en-
gage in cooperative activity, e.g. gathering start capital for collective purchase of raw mate-
rial, before any concrete benefit of the cooperation is visible. Once established, collective 
action requires competent and skilful personnel for leading the organisation processes and 
managing the collective services of administration, marketing, purchase, transportation, and 
so forth. The tendency to employ personnel among smallholders themselves who are not 
equipped with necessary skill and competency frequently results in low professional perform-
ance. Additional to the problem of skills and competences, individuals appointed as the leader 
or manager of the collective action may exploit the opportunity of misusing their position to 
pursue their own interests, thereby causing negative impacts to the collective action. Hence, 
the role of individuals in managing and leading position has great significance in producing 
successful outcome of collective action. 
11.3.2 Strategic role and function of leaders 
                                                 
5 The term ‘value-added’ here follows the practical definition used in the economic analysis of value chain as 
described in Springer-Heinze (2007c), namely value-added = total sales value – value of intermediate or bought-
in goods. 
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In the real world changing a system is not an easy task; particularly as development agencies 
have limited role as external facilitator. Internal change agents are required to stimulate pro-
gressive changes from within, so that the impacts are more sustainable. This corresponds with 
the research results that highlighted the strategic role and functions of transparent and com-
mitted leaders. Also, many empirical studies6 in development cooperation acknowledged the 
significance of such leaders – frequently termed ‘champions’ – in development processes. 
Champions are more open and eager toward new, positive changes as well as exhibit strong 
sense of ownership for and commitment to the endeavour to improve the existing condition. 
As they are usually equipped with more resources and thus influence, they can be the first to 
introduce changes, support and stimulate others. Additionally, they often have better access to 
policy-making which can alter the system. Thus, the identification of leaders or champions in 
the system and the subsequent cooperation with them provides a better alternative to induce 
structural changes in the system. 
Nevertheless, as this empirical study already demonstrated, not all leaders were following 
altruistic motives in improving the well-being of the people they lead; some were fraught with 
vested self-interests. Combined with weak law enforcement, such impaired situation may ne-
cessitate the introduction of particular changes into the system making the pursuit of self-
interests through malfeasant actions sub-optimal. These changes can be in both positive, i.e. 
encouraging non-opportunistic behaviour, and negative sense, i.e. discouraging opportunistic 
behaviour. For the first, an alluring incentive system rewarding non-opportunistic behaviour 
can be crafted based on careful identification of the interests or utility function of the leaders; 
a system where the personal utility function of the leaders is in accordance with that of the 
collectivity. Such incentive system can be a mixture of material interest (e.g. through more 
attractive remuneration system or performance-based financial bonus), ideal interest of repu-
tation (e.g. public acknowledgement of improved performance), influence (e.g. social support 
from those benefiting from the improved performance), and others. For the latter, resort to 
regulative (e.g. coercive power of regulation) and normative aspect (e.g. creating social role 
                                                 
6 Cf. FAO (2009a); Kula et al. (2006); Morris et al. (2003); Morris (2001); and others 
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of good leader in conjunction with raising the collectivity’s awareness and responsibility of 
social pressure) may be taken to countervail malfeasant behaviour. 
11.3.3 Extending the conceptual framework of value chain analysis 
Based on the research results, the conceptual framework of VC analysis can thus be extended 
to include wider socio-cultural aspects. While it is acknowledged that there is no such one-
size-fits-all model to perform extended analysis of VC governance, there are at least impor-
tant socio-cultural issues to be investigated into in order to achieve more comprehensive un-
derstanding of the prevailing VC governance. The following are two groups of issues to be 
clarified, additional to those standard issues in VC approach7. The first group concerns the 
characteristic of the relation or linkage both between different categories of VC operators and 
within one category of VC operators: 
i. Social relation: Is the relation limited to business / commercial only? If not, does it ex-
hibit egalitarian or more hierarchical relation, such as in paternalistic, familial / kinship, 
quasi-feudal, or patron-client relation? 
ii. Social leader: Are there any VC operators or certain individuals (or even organisations) 
outside, yet influential in, the VC possessing higher economic, social, religious, or politi-
cal importance and thus power? Do their interests or utility function support or stand in 
conflict with the further development of the VC? 
iii. Trust and malfeasance: Do VC operators trust each other and thus are open toward co-
operation? If not, why? Do opportunism, weak law enforcement, and impunity hinder trust 
building or is mistrust caused by socio-cultural factors?  
iv. Collective action: Do VC operators in the same category work individually or collec-
tively? Are they aware of the benefits of collective action? Is there any negative impact 
for collaboration? 
The second group concerns the wider institutional aspect of the VC in which the VC operators 
are embedded: 
                                                 
7 Cf. Springer-Heinze (2007a); Kula et al. (February 2006); Kaplinsky et al. (2001); and others 
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v. Historical aspect: How has the economic activity in the VC (the profession) come about? 
Is it related with other professions? Is it perceived to be positive or negative by the respec-
tive VC operator and the wider community? 
vi. Social values and norms: Do the behaviour – in particular the economic one – of VC 
operators follow any social value, norm, or role in the society? Are these hindering or can 
these be of positive use for further development of the VC? 
vii. Orientation: Is the orientation of VC operators commercial, semi-commercial, or tradi-
tional / subsistence? Does their activity in the VC serve as the primary or rather supple-
mentary income (as it in the case of livelihood strategy: using spare time for working at 
another place, using harvest residue to create additional income, etc.)? 
viii.Habit and common practice: Is the economic activity in the VC connected to certain 
habit, e.g. other household, social, cultural, or religious activities? Do VC operators fol-
low certain common practice or pattern of behaviour in the society? 
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Appendix 1: The Miles and Huberman Framework for 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
The Miles and Huberman framework for qualitative data analysis (Punch 2005, pp. 197-202, 
286-288; Miles et al. 1994) consists of three main components: data reduction, data display, 
as well as drawing and verifying conclusions. These three activities are concurrent and inter-
acting or interwoven throughout the data analysis: 
i. Data reduction has the objective to reduce data without significant loss of information 
and - particularly in qualitative analysis - without stripping the context from the data. In 
the early stages of data analysis it is done by editing, segmenting, and summarising the 
data. In the middle stages it happens through coding and memoing; whereas in the later 
stages it is performed through conceptualising and explaining - a way of developing ab-
stract concepts. 
ii. Data display organises, compresses, and assembles information through charts, causal 
models, mind-mapping, etc. With the phrase 'You know what you display' Miles et al. 
(1994, p. 11) accentuated the importance of visualising data since it helps create better 
understandings of information and thus is essential at all stages of the data analysis. 
iii. Drawing and verifying conclusions happens more or less concurrently with data reduc-
tion and analysis. Conclusions made in the early stages – which may be vague – are still 
tentative and sharpened during the analysis process. 
The two first components are operated through coding and memoing. Coding is the process of 
putting tags, names, or labels against pieces of data. The point of assigning labels is to attach 
meaning to the pieces of data. It also serves the functions of indexing the data and providing a 
basis for storage and retrieval. Coding both begins the analysis and continues at different lev-
els throughout the analysis. In the early phase of the analysis descriptive codes – also called in 
vivo codes in grounded theory coding – are often in use for summarising segments of data; 
whereas in the later phase inferential or pattern codes are used for bringing together less ab-
stract, more descriptive codes into a more abstract, higher-order concept. Memoing means 
writing-up of ideas and their relationships that come up during coding. It captures the re-
searcher's momentary ideation based on data with probably a little conceptual explanation. 
Memoing links coding with the development of propositions and thus requires creativity. 
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The last component, drawing and verifying conclusions, has the objective to integrate previ-
ous stages into a meaningful and coherent picture.  This operation involves a series of alter-
nating inductive and deductive steps, whereby data-driven inductive hypothesis generation is 
followed by deductive hypothesis examination for the purpose of verification. It is the most 
difficult to describe since it encompasses numerous different analytical processes, which hap-
pen simultaneously rather than sequentially, and which cut across and combine with each 
other. To facilitate this difficult operation Miles et al. (1994) suggested two lists of tactics. 
The first list contains 13 tactics for generating meaning from data (Miles et al. 1994, pp. 245–
262): noting patterns and themes, seeing plausibility, clustering, making metaphors, counting, 
making contrasts or comparisons, partitioning variables, subsuming particulars into the gen-
eral, factoring, noting relations between variables, finding intervening variables, building 
logical chain of evidence, and making conceptual / theoretical coherence. 
The second list records the tactics for testing or confirming findings (Miles et al. 1994, pp. 
262–277): checking for representativeness, checking for researcher effects, triangulating, 
weighting the evidence, checking the meaning of outliers, using extreme cases, following up 
surprises, looking for negative evidence, making if-then tests, ruling out spurious relations, 
replicating a finding, checking out rival explanations, and getting feedback from informants. 
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